Foundation

The International Review of Science Fiction

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

Philip K. Dick Special Issue

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Foundation

The International Review of Science Fiction

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Editorial

Paul March-Russell

A devotee of libraries, I tend not to want to be shown around. I love to browse, to get my own feel for the space and arrangement of the collection. And so, in September 1993, at the start of my Masters course at the University of Kent, I was browsing amongst the literature journals when I was astonished to discover row upon row of *Extrapolation* and *Foundation*. Although I had heard of them – thanks to Patrick Parrinder's *Science Fiction: Its Criticism and Teaching* – they still seemed like fabled beasts. An academic journal devoted to science fiction? Surely such a thing was not possible! Anxious not to lose these precious items, not knowing that twenty-five years later I would still be at Kent, I made numerous photocopies about the authors I was most interested in – Ballard, Delany, Dick, Le Guin… But other names impressed themselves – David Pringle (didn't he also edit *Interzone*?), John Clute (I'd heard him on the radio), Edward James (a witty man by the sound of his editorials). Still, they seemed like remote figures to me, but I felt I had received some tantalizing glimpse of a utopia – where one could be an academic or professional writer and be permitted to pursue one's passions, even if they were in such a deplorably 'low' thing like science fiction. Quite how one got to that utopia, though, was another matter but my discovery of other books at about that time – Lucie Armitt's *Where No Man Has Gone Before*, Scott Bukatman's *Terminal Identity* and Sarah Lefanu's *In the Chinks of the World Machine* – suggested that somehow, some way, it was possible.

Twenty years later, by which time I had succeeded to convening the science fiction programme at Kent (there *had* been a reason why there were so many sf books and journals in the university library), and I was astonished to become *Foundation* editor. Initially, I had hesitated about applying for the job but I was encouraged to do so by Paul Kincaid and Maureen Kincaid Speller. Just to be interviewed by the aforementioned James was honour enough – I never expected to be appointed. No more than I expected to meet Clute at my first AGM – or, for that matter, Roz Kaveney and Ben Aaronovitch. (I had met Farah Mendlesohn and Andy Sawyer previously but I was still overwhelmed.) There have been several more experiences like that since – a Worldcon panel with Nina Allan, Helen Marshall and Lisa Tuttle with Clute and Christopher Priest in the audience; escorting Brian Aldiss at the AGM in 2015; sharing a pub lunch with Chris Beckett, Anne Charnock and Stephanie Saulter in 2017 – and all I have managed to do is to hide my sense of 'how did I get to be here?!' slightly better (I hope).

And now, the party is nearing its end. Six years after I was appointed (five since my first issue appeared), I have decided to stand down as journal editor.

Elevation to a full-time university post has some advantages but it also has serious drawbacks – like more teaching and (especially) more administrative duties. Coupled to that the precariousness of the HE sector, and the door to the utopia I thought I had glimpsed in 1993 is closing. For me, at this critical juncture in the future of our universities, I simply don't have the additional time needed to edit a journal like *Foundation*.

And make no mistake, there really isn't another journal like *Foundation*, which combines academic rigour with fan enthusiasm, theoretical analysis with reviews of the latest fiction releases. I hope I've maintained the journal's characteristic love for argument and dissent. In that regard, I have been lucky to have had a brilliant editorial team – what you read is always a collaborative effort. My tenure has coincided with both an expansion in sf studies in the UK, especially amongst younger academics, and increasingly turbulent politics – Brexit and austerity politics have also affected the HE sector, whilst the rise of Trump and other nationalists was prefigured within sf fandom by such events as GamerGate and PuppyGate. The content of the journal, and in particular my own editorials, has unashamedly addressed these concerns. My justification is that this is the natural consequence of regarding sf as not only a socially relevant genre but one which is also committed to political and technological change – whether for good or for ill.

Despite, or even because of, these issues, my successor arrives at a particularly opportune moment. I am delighted to say that the finances of the SFF are stronger than they have been for some time and membership is gradually on the rise. (And here I make an appeal to those who follow us on social media – don't just do that, become members of the SFF; if you like what we do, your membership fees will enable us to do even more!) We have a new librarian of the SFF Collection, Phoenix Alexander, who arrives with outstanding credentials from Yale University. Allied to that are our new website, social media presence and support of the Worldcon in Dublin, and I am more convinced than ever before that the SFF is not only the equivalent to the SFRA in the United States but that it is also a hub, connecting the worlds of academia, independent scholarship and fan criticism. Let me reiterate – I believe that anyone who is seriously committed to the study of sf as a force for change (whether that is in terms of politics, society or aesthetics) should be a member of the SFF. And the more members we have, the more we can do – together. This is a truly exciting time for my successor to arrive.

Having said that, I won't be gone quite yet, and I envisage a smooth handover between now and next summer. In this issue, we have Valentina Salvatierra's prize-winning essay (for the Foundation Essay prize, now officially renamed after my illustrious predecessor Peter Nicholls) and a special section,

marking the annual Philip K. Dick Day, co-edited by Thomas Knowles and Terence Sawyers. Our next issue will also be a special number, devoted to Shakespeare and science fiction. As the Bard once said, 'O brave new world / That has such people in't'. In starting my departure from the stage, that's still how I feel about sf.

Editor – *Foundation*

Dr Paul March-Russell will be standing down as editor of Foundation in 2019/20, and the Science Fiction Foundation is seeking a successor.

Main duties

- Overall responsibility for production of Foundation journal (3 issues/yr) and journal pages on SFF website
- Appoint Assistant Editor, Production Editor, and any other posts necessary for production of journal. Work with them and other SFF committee members for smooth running of journal.
- Maintain journal's standards and reputation.
- Ability to attract high-quality papers.
- Oversee journal's peer-review process.
- Promote and market journal as widely as possible, for instance by regularly attending conferences in the field.
- Develop journal's web presence
- Work on new initiatives as appropriate to enhance journal's profile.

Main skills

- Wide knowledge of sf and sf scholarship (academic and otherwise, and reflecting the journal's international remit).
- Interest in interdisciplinary approaches to the study of science fiction.
- Knowledge of publishing processes.
- Ability to work with and develop editorial team.
- Organisational and administrative experience.
- Experience of academic editing
- Commitment to SFF's goals.
- Excellent communicator.

Applications, comprising a CV and letter setting out the candidate's qualifications and plans for the journal, should be made to Graham Sleight, Chair of the SFF, by 30th September 2019. Either Graham Sleight (grahamsleight@gmail.com) or Paul March-Russell (p.a.march-russell@kent.ac.uk) will be happy to answer questions about the role informally.

The Peter Nicholls Essay Prize 2019

The 'fiery arc' of Language: Fictive Multilingualism, Resistance and Alterity in Ursula K. Le Guin

Valentina Salvatierra

Both Ursula K. Le Guin's sf and her non-fiction frequently address the power imbalances of colonialism and linked forms of oppression, such as slavery. These can be viewed as specific instances of her wider concern with the Other: Le Guin has argued that a majority of sf works are regressive because they deny any affinity with those who are different: non-white, non-male, non-American (Le Guin 1975). For Le Guin, there is a need to both acknowledge difference and affirm that it is not absolute.

Where does language come into this Self/Other relationship? Le Guin herself exhibits awareness of the link between language and the legacies of colonialism in an essay about the settling of North America: 'we are the conquerors', she writes, and then laments that 'we are the inhabitants of a Lost World. […] Even the names are lost', replaced by names in the 'language of the conquistadores' (Le Guin 1989: 47). In this essay, my focus is on multilingualism as one of several strategies through which she critiques power imbalances.

Studying a text as a multilingual construction, as Rachael Gilmour and Tamar Steinitz observe, requires recognising the power imbalances that language differences can reflect and consolidate (Gilmour and Steinitz 2018: 2). Within Le Guin's politically charged fictional worlds, one can identify power differentials and ascertain which of the fictive languages exerts dominance. I posit that this line of analysis significantly enhances current understandings of sf neologisms. A brief overview of critical work around fictive neology is needed, therefore, to establish the present project's location within the field.

In *The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction* (2008), Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. defines 'fictive neology' as one of the genre's fundamental features and synthesizes previous critical studies. Csicsery-Ronay begins by considering three areas of social life where neology takes place: within scientific 'technolects', social institutions and slang (Csicsery-Ronay Jr. 2008: 15–16). He explains that 'political power is redistributed, dissipated, and reconsolidated' (18) through the transformation of language within and across these social domains. Cross-cutting the sociological categories of word coinage, one can draw a properly linguistic distinction along an axis with neosemes on the 'syntagmatic' pole and strict neologisms on the 'paradigmatic' pole (19). Within this classification, the phenomenon considered here usually manifests as a sub-category of strict neologism.

A common critical rationale for neology in science fiction is '"verisimilitude"; e.g., aliens would believably have alien words and concepts' (Spruiell 1997: 449). As Ria Cheyne writes, the primary role of a created language is to signify the 'difference of the beings that speak it […] from readers' expectations for contemporary humans' (Cheyne 2008: 392). Through neology, a single alien word can generate the estranging effect of 'confronting a set normative system […] with a point of view or glance implying a new set of norms' (Suvin 1972: 374). In most scholars' work, then, neologism is considered a straightforward way to produce the cognitive estrangement that has been viewed as essential to sf since Darko Suvin's seminal definition.

Working from the above, I coin the term fictive multilingualism to describe the literal rendering of words, phrases, syntactic forms, or other linguistic manifestations originating in a created source language, within a target language text. This essay's focus is thus on utterances that are described as originating in a foreign language, analysing them as a form of multilingualism. I exemplify the multilingual approach through texts by Le Guin due to the thematic importance of the encounter with the Other within a 'polyphonic body of work' that 'cannot be considered in terms of a single text, a single language, or a single dominant discourse' (Cheyne 2006: 468). While I believe that the critical apparatus of the present article can be fruitfully extended to other texts in the future, the connection between Le Guin's oeuvre and multilingualism justifies the single-author scope adopted here.

Throughout this article, I draw on Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin in order to frame fictive multilingualism as a source of 'heteroglossia', placing the focus on the role of such utterances within the text's wider ideology. One axiom of Bakhtin's work is that heteroglossia, the inclusion of 'social diversity of speech types' (Bakhtin 1981: 263), exists even within a single language through its various social, professional and generic languages (272). As Gilmour and Steinitz explain, the 'monolingual paradigm' evolved 'through both the emergence of the modern European nation-state, and the work of colonial linguistics to develop languages as distinct, reifiable units of knowledge' (Gilmour and Steinitz 2018: 6). Unitary national languages can be understood as the result of what Bakhtin calls language's centripetal forces (Bakhtin 1981: 271). Insofar as these forces are linked to the centralisation of socio-political power, language cannot be politically neutral: Bakhtin conceives it as 'ideologically saturated' (270). On the other hand, language is affected by the multiplicity of generic languages in a single nation as well as wider processes of migration and globalization (Gilmour and Steinitz 2018: 6). These constitute the centrifugal forces of language (Bakhtin 1981: 272). Bakhtin's insight is that discourse is shaped by both centripetal and centrifugal forces that converge in

a ‘situation’ of heteroglossia (Holquist 1990: 69).

Multilingual writing can both portray and oppose power imbalances such as those of colonialism. In critical terms, the postcolonial perspective leads to ‘challenging the world-view that can polarize centre and periphery in the first place’ (Ashcroft et al 2002: 32). For Le Guin, a central challenge of sf as a genre is precisely establishing a gap and then bridging it through narratives of connection. In her own words, ‘to create difference – to establish strangeness – then to let the fiery arc of human emotion leap and close the gap’ (Le Guin 2001). The following two sections apply the concept of fictive multilingualism, which I have established in relation to prior sf criticism and heteroglossia, to Le Guin’s work and show how she uses fictive multilingualism as a means of political resistance, to close the conceptual and political gaps between Self and Other.

Representing resistance through multilingualism

Rachael Gilmour has cannily observed that, even in a postcolonial world, all specific instances of multilingualism ‘must be probed for their politics’ (Gilmour 2018: 93). How might the representation of fictive multilingualism in a sf text promote political and cultural resistance? Le Guin in particular uses this strategy to prefigure a utopian reality and criticize power imbalances in the empirical world. In order to makes this point, I analyse two works selected for their political charge: the ‘ambiguous utopia’ of *The Dispossessed* (1974), and the liberation narrative of ‘Old Music and the Slave Women’ (1999).

The Dispossessed tells the story of Shevek, a physicist from the anarchist society of Anarres who travels to Urras in order to develop his general temporal theory and ‘bring together two worlds’ (Le Guin 2014: 90) whose 200-year isolation he has come to see as detrimental. Throughout the novel, Le Guin depicts both the deficiencies of western-style capitalism on A-Io and the pitfalls of Anarres. Language plays an important role in a novel that political theorist Laurence Davis describes as an ‘unprecedented portrayal of an imaginary anarchist society and the characters that emerge from it’ (Davis 2005: xii). Shevek has to learn Iotic, the language of the capitalists on Urras, in order to undertake his journey. Implicitly, Shevek negotiates linguistic difficulties as well as cultural and political ones: he is speaking what is for him a second language. The settlers of Anarres adopted a language thought to be better suited to their system of collective organization and ownership. This implies that within the fictive universe, Pravic is a constructed language, ‘a deliberate construct designed at a particular time for a particular purpose’ (Cheyne 2008: 386). Outside the narrative, it is only a created language; its ‘technical linguistic information’ (Cheyne 2008: 389) is only summarily sketched and the majority of

utterances are simply rendered in English. Here, I focus on the term 'ammar' to show the role of fictive multilingualism in the enactment of political alternatives.

The Pravic word for brother or sister, 'ammar', is presented early in the narrative and then appears five times; 'brother' and 'sister' are used much more frequently in the text as a whole. Therefore, it is worth asking why Le Guin coins this fictive foreign-language term at all if more often than not she employs the ostensibly synonymous English words? One way to justify this coinage is by drawing on Bakhtin's idea that words are 'shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in the object' (Bakhtin 1981: 279). Even isolated words participate in this dialogue. A reader can trace multiple associations between the word 'brother' and other ideas, other words: we could mention the French Revolution's *fraternité*; the taboo on incest between siblings; the gendered nature of 'brother' and 'sister'; and so forth. Perhaps ammar offers the possibility of referring to the same concept but being free of the myriad connotations that any given reader is likely to associate with the existing terms. Neology could be understood as a utopian attempt to recover the 'virginal fullness' (278) of the concept. In this light, ammar might prefigure a different way of fraternizing, developed in a society without coercive government structures.

Although possibly inspired by such a utopian impulse, Le Guin's coinage does not deny the heteroglossia that surrounds the concept of brotherhood. Rather, this heteroglossia is explicitly thematized as a point of discussion from ammar's very first appearance in the narratorial discourse. The term is translated back to Pravic after Shevek says goodbye to the doctor who tended to him on the freighter taking him to Urras:

> No more adequate response occurring to Shevek through his headache, he reached out and took Kimoe's hand, saying, 'Then let's meet again, brother!' […] After he was gone, Shevek realized he had spoken to him in Pravic, called him *ammar*, brother, in a language Kimoe did not understand. (Le Guin 2014: 19).

In this initial encounter, the word is translated back from English, marked out by italics, and glossed immediately afterwards. As Gilmour has observed, the use of italics to mark out foreign words in a multilingual novel can emphasize the separation between languages (Gilmour 2018: 88). They distance Shevek from both Kimoe and the reader, whereas when the italics are dropped in later occurrences the term sheds its foreignness. Shevek's reversal to his native language is the first of many attempts to establish true bonds of brotherhood with the Urrasti. The linguistic gap created between brother and ammar mirrors the ideological gap he will encounter between his ideas and those of the Urrasti.

This first encounter with the term evidences that the word can never be

fully released from dialogue with other words insofar as ammar is glossed as 'brother' – bringing the reader back to English and to the contemporary moment. Glossing asserts the translatability between English and Pravic, arguably even assigning a higher status to 'brother' as the referent for ammar: it 'accords the english [*sic*] word the status of the "real"' (Ashcroft et al 2002: 61), in contrast with a concept that the reader knows is ultimately an authorial invention. Its coining foregrounds brotherhood as a political ideal while at the same time establishing the political distance between ammar and contemporary manifestations of fraternity.

The second appearance of the term is in a footnote that glosses another Pravic term, 'tadde', by contrasting it with 'ammar (brother/sister), which may be used to anybody' (Le Guin 2014: 64). This footnote provides an important clarification: it establishes the gender-neutral nature of the neologism in contrast with gendered sister/brother or the more technical sibling. The footnote, indeed, can be read as an exercise in estrangement through multilingualism by which 'a familiar language can also be made to seem foreign' (Kellman 2000: 29). This second gloss fosters a critical estrangement in relation to the familiar English terms of fraternity, forcing awareness of their gendered and potentially exclusionary character.

According to Bakhtin, the insertion of heteroglossia allows an author to represent the 'image' of a language: 'its potential, its ideal limits and its total meaning conceived as a whole' (Bakhtin 1981: 356). How would this apply to an imaginary language? Even as the reader remains aware of the language's non-existence, the inclusion of this Pravic word in three direct character dialogues generates the sense that there is a real language, and corresponding culture, behind the glimpses. As Carl Freedman has observed, the novel is not merely a treatise on anarchist theory; it is a 'novelistic dramatization of how daily life in such a society is actually felt' (Freedman 2000: 117). Through the various dialogues where ammar appears, Le Guin dramatizes this critical utopia's social dynamics.

To illustrate the above, consider the term's use by Rulag, Shevek's estranged mother. Rulag intervenes in the heated debate about allowing visitors or sending someone to Urras with the following words: 'Let's open the door – that's what he's saying, you know, ammari. Let's open the door, let the Urrasti come!' (Le Guin 2014: 355–56). The Pravic word reminds the reader that Rulag was raised in a society of extended bonds of brotherhood, where even disagreements must be resolved through persuasion. It is telling that despite her opposition Rulag is unable to stop Shevek from going to Urras. Davis has written that the novel's merit lies in presenting a utopia 'premised on an acceptance of the enduring reality of social conflict' (Davis 2005: x); the use of

the utopian ammari in an adversarial context is one example of this acceptance. Rulag's dialogue dramatizes the interactions that could exist in a society that has replaced coercive government with extended fraternal bonds, but where disagreements persist.

Le Guin has described *The Dispossessed* as an attempt to envision different social relations through 'an embodiment of idea – a revolutionary artefact, a work containing a potential permanent source of renewal of thought and perception, like a William Morris design' (Le Guin 2005: 306). When this political intentionality is accounted for, ammar and its related terms are best viewed as experiments to extend familial solidarity (an exclusionary bond in contemporary society) to a wider swathe of humanity. The novel's political ideas at the level of content are thereby reinforced at the level of language.

Whereas ammar ostensibly originates in a utopian constructed language, a later work by Le Guin shows that a word located in an alien culture's traumatic past can also play a politically progressive role. 'Old Music and the Slave Women' is a story from a phase in Le Guin's career where 'she uses her science fiction overtly to discuss the problems and dangerous leanings of her society' (Lothian 2006: 386). The story is set on the same twin planets of Werel and Yeowe as the novellas in the earlier collection *Four Ways to Forgiveness* (1995). On Werel, the dominant political system for the past 3000 years has been a capitalist and patriarchal 'master-slave society based on skin color' (Le Guin 2011: 238). The third-person narration of this particular story adopts the focalisation of a foreigner who has lived for over three decades on Werel. Esdan – nicknamed 'Old Music' – is a Hainish member of the Ekumen embassy staff. During the civil war, he attempts to show the embassy's neutrality by liaizing with the rebels; on his way there, he is taken hostage by 'Legitimate Government' (pro-slavery) forces and imprisoned in Yaramera, a former plantation. While recovering from brutal torture in a device historically used for slave punishment, he befriends three slave women who have remained in servitude three years after the Liberation, the uprising that sparked the civil war. As they are held captive first by forces defending the old order and then by a faction of the Liberation army, Esdan and the women help each other survive in their helplessness. Esdan comes to understand that liberation is a gradual process that he cannot bring about for others; he can, however, treat the women as equals and resist oppression alongside them.

Throughout the stories set on these twin planets, there are several instances of multilingualism oriented towards world-building, such as the military 'veot ranks' (Le Guin 2002: 191) and the neosemic 'asset' to signify slave. In contrast, the ambiguous interjection 'enna' has a deeper significance than just establishing the foreignness and plausibility of Werel. It first appears after Esdan has been

tortured, in his initial conversation with the youngest of the bondswomen, called Kamsa. Esdan asks her about the transgression committed by a man who, Kamsa recalls, was tortured in the same device more recently used on Esdan himself:

> 'Enna,' she said, the one-word denial he'd often heard assets use – I don't know, I didn't do it, I wasn't there, it's not my fault, who knows…
>
> He'd seen an owner's child who said 'enna' be slapped, not for the cup she broke but for using a slave word. (173)

Unlike most of the neologisms discussed here or quantified by William Spruiell, enna is not a noun but an interjection with a cognitive function (Spruiell 1997: 447; Ameka 1992: 113). Within Csicsery-Ronay's three sociological areas of neology, enna comes from the domain of slang; it represents a countercultural détournement against the masters, 'accessible only to initiates' (Csicsery-Ronay Jr. 2011: 17). The contemporary reader along with Esdan can recognize enna as a defence mechanism, a linguistic evasion of responsibility on behalf of a systematically oppressed underclass. Italics and glossing mark out the interjection as decidedly foreign from Esdan's perspective, who feels both condescension and sympathy towards the slave women. Esdan condemns the Werelian social order and has actively worked towards changing it. This attitude is congruent with the technique of glossing in the initial encounter with the term: higher priority is assigned to the dominant language and perspective of the enlightened Hainish, as opposed to the slave dialect. English stands in for Hainish just as Esdan's point of view stands in for that of a liberal contemporary reader who, presumably, will be opposed to slavery and to Werel's racial stratification.

As the story progresses, Esdan gains a deeper understanding of the slave women's mindset and the psychological barriers to their liberation. He also acknowledges that he himself has become almost entirely powerless. At one point, the Liberation faction orders him to publicly threaten retaliation against the Legitimate Government. Esdan knows that this strategy is unfeasible, because he lacks the authority to issue such a statement and the Ekumen has no armed forces. His only tools at this point seem to be his sharp tongue and emotional equanimity, and he ends the conversation with the factionalists in this manner:

> He murmured barely audibly, 'Yes, master.'
>
> Banarkamye's head snapped up, his eyes flashed. 'What did you say?'
>
> 'Enna.'
>
> 'Who do you think you are?'
>
> 'A prisoner of war.'

'You can go.' (Le Guin 2002: 199)

Here there is no glossing or italics to mark out the foreignness of enna. Esdan has gone beyond the detached explanation of enna's first appearance. In a situation of heteroglossia, understood with Michael Holquist as the 'situation of a subject surrounded by the myriad responses he or she might make […] any one of which must be framed in a specific discourse selected from the teeming thousands available' (Holquist 1990: 69), Esdan selects the discourse of the slaves over his own. The foreigner has internalized the slaves' tongue and is using it against a former slave – now turned oppressor – in what seems to be a parodic register intended to subtly shame his interlocutor.

Esdan's utterance of enna, and the dialogue more generally, represents a 'hybrid construction' combining two 'semantic and axiological belief systems' (Bakhtin 1981: 304): Werelian slavery and Esdan's own. Because Kamsa had been the only character to utter the term before, we can also identify here an 'encroaching' of her 'character zone' (315). Concretely, this means that the influence of Kamsa's language on Esdan's discourse stands in metonymically for the slave women's emotional influence. Earlier, enna had established the otherness of the slave mindset in relation to the protagonist. Now, it allows Esdan to bridge this otherness. As in postcolonial writing, language is 'developing specific ways of both constituting cultural distance and at the same time bridging it' (Ashcroft et al 2002: 64). First, the reader is shown what slavery engenders in language and, then, how a historically charged term can be appropriated by people seeking freedom.

In theoretical terms, the former slaves on Werel are undergoing what postcolonial thinker Homi Bhabha calls a 'time of liberation'. Both the Werelians and Esdan himself are caught up in a 'time of cultural uncertainty, and, most crucially, of significatory or representational undecidability' (Bhabha 2010: 2369) because of the uprising and liberation. As Esdan says to his first captors, 'you must redefine yourselves to include me' (Le Guin 2002: 178), because he is neither owner nor owned. Werel as a whole is also moving towards the erasure of that distinction. Bhabha explains that during such periods 'even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricized and read anew' (Bhabha 2010: 2371) in a process that splits the subject and frays hierarchical claims regarding the pure or static nature of cultures. In Esdan's fraught words, 'the monolithic lie frays out into a thousand incompatible truths, and that's what I wanted' (Le Guin 2002: 198). Through the appropriation of the slave term, Esdan shows that the production of a linguistic Third Space, where redefinitions can be carried out, calls for complex acts of negotiation and transformation. In this light, the heteroglossia in Esdan's use of enna plays an important role in the

narrative's configuration of a conceptual space beyond the polarity of servitude and ownership.

Despite the differences in the terms' utopian or oppressive origins, both instances of fictive multilingualism discussed above allow political struggles to be understood at the level of lived experience: the reader sees the struggle operating at the level of dialogue, which is more vivid than simple narration. In Freedman's terms, ammar and enna both enact at the 'molecular' (Freedman 2000: 38) level of language what each narrative implements at a higher thematic level. In the case of enna, the language hierarchy stands in for other types of (racial) hierarchy that Le Guin wishes to call attention to in her contemporary America. Meanwhile, ammar as a self-consciously dialogic neologism points not only to the 'historical mutability' of existing concepts of brotherhood but also to the 'utopian possibility' (32) implied within a new signifier.

Both ammar and enna are tools that Le Guin uses as part of a wider project of envisioning alternative realities that encourage critical thinking about contemporary society. On one hand, ammar is a utopian term to imagine brotherhood in a non-coercive, economically egalitarian society. Its use can be seen as one of her self-described attempts to present 'alternatives to the status quo which […] enlarge the field of social possibility and moral understanding' (Le Guin 2004: 219–20). Meanwhile, her connected stories set on the slave-owning planets of Werel and Yeowe critique a master/slave mentality that Le Guin perceives in present-day America (211). In light of Le Guin's stated intention to employ fictive words in order to address issues in our own world, the second section will take a step back and consider the ethical merits and risks of such a strategy.

Risks and merits of fictive multilingualism

Do the advantages of fictive multilingualism outweigh the ethical risks involved? A first potential shortcoming of fictive multilingualism can be deduced from its relation to the empirical world. Because it is not sourced from an existing culture, fictive multilingualism might replace awareness of real-world cultural conflicts with knowledge and awareness of a fictive world. Elyce Rae Helford, for instance, has critiqued Le Guin's ahistorical use of Native American imagery in *Always Coming Home* (1985) and other narratives, accusing her of 'poaching' the discourses she supposedly values (Helford 1997: 84). She criticizes Le Guin's use of 'images and visions' of marginalised cultures in contrast with an alleged lack of commitment to 'the actual struggles of these cultures for survival within the mainstream western world' (81). Le Guin's fictive multilingualism could be viewed as a specific instance of a wider evasion of responsibility through sf. Assuming that readers' attention is a scarce resource, there is a risk

that focusing attention on the fictive cultures of mainstream sf might crowd out empirical realities of oppression or the voices of minority writers within sf itself (84).

Although such possibility seems plausible, it is to a large extent merely hypothetical. If mainstream sf such as Le Guin's did not deal with the power imbalances and alterity, there is no way to ascertain what her readers would engage with instead. Helford suggests she might make space for the Native American sf writer Misha, but it is likely that readers would simply engage with other mainstream sf. Rather than discussing such counterfactuals, it seems best to consider the works themselves in their actual context of production to evaluate the dangers of sf's supposed ahistoricity.

To borrow Bakhtin's term, Le Guin's work should be considered in in dialogue with other sf texts that constitute an 'expected literary horizon' (Bakhtin 1981: 314). In this sense, Le Guin's work might be viewed as countering certain tendencies of prior sf in relation to the Other. On the one hand, John Rieder has identified the 'anthropologist's fantasy' as a key myth of earlier sf that portrayed 'natives' with less technology who are therefore ideologically placed in 'our' past: he writes that 'technology is the primary way of representing this confrontation of past and present' (Rieder 2008: 32). Meanwhile, Peter Fitting's analysis of the Martians in H.G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* (1898) as a 'speculative figure of our own evolved humanity' provides the converse example of how sf had traditionally represented the future Other as threatening and dehumanized (Fitting 2001: 140). In both cases, technological asymmetry represents the asymmetry of power between one culture and another. By contrast, *Always Coming Home* presents a reversal of the anthropologist's fantasy by placing the less technological Kesh in our future rather than our past.

Furthermore, Helford's accusation of 'poaching' Native American traditions seems to omit at least two levels at which Le Guin is critically self-aware of her privileged position. Within the text itself, Le Guin punctuates her work with recognitions of complicity. In an especially vivid passage, Pandora asks a series of rhetorical questions:

> Am I not a daughter of the people who enslaved and extirpated the peoples of three continents? Am I not a sister of Adolf Hitler and Anne Frank? Am I not a citizen of the State that fought the first nuclear war? (Le Guin 1988: 147)

In this meta-fictional reflection, Le Guin is recognizing her own privileged position, both in terms of her European settler-colonialist origin and her present-day complicity (even if passive) with her country's foreign policies. Additionally, Le Guin's incorporation of Native American beliefs does not purport to directly

represent them. Indeed, Le Guin responds to Helford's critique by describing *Always Coming Home* as 'enormously composite', with no 'single element relating it directly to any single existent society or culture' (Helford 1997: 87). Precisely by virtue of its fictive character, her multilingualism is one way in which Le Guin avoids appropriating terms from a culture not her own. Although it remains up for debate, my view is that insisting on the illegitimacy of drawing from other cultures is a fallacious ad hominem attack, especially when the adaptation is done with self-awareness and respect.

Good intentions notwithstanding, there remains a risk that fictive multilingualism assumes linguistic determinism and thus promotes a cultural essentialism that solidifies rather than weakens linguistic power imbalances. For example, a note in *Always Coming Home* remarks that English speakers 'would be more likely to say that he learned from his uncle about orchard trees; but this would not be a fair translation of the repeated suffix oud, with, together with' (Le Guin 1988: 274–75). In applying the syntactic rules of the source language to a phrase in the target language, this passage exemplifies 'syntactic fusion' (Ashcroft 2011: 41); it appears to suggest that the Kesh language contains a more reciprocal relation to objects than that of western technological thought. The narrative use of multilingualism in cases like this one suggests that Le Guin uses language to stand in metonymically for wider modes of thought.

As Cheyne observes, Le Guin is using language as a metaphor for mindset, and she could even be suggesting a direct link (Cheyne 2006: 464). This would mean such passages are implicitly supporting the 'linguistic relativity hypothesis' (also known as the Sapir-Whorf or Whorfian hypothesis), which holds that 'human perceptions of reality are structured and constrained […] by human languages' (Elgin 2000: 52). The danger of this view is that it can be used to support a culturally essentialist stance wherein the divergent worldview contained in the foreign language becomes 'experientially inaccessible to members of another culture' (Ashcroft et al 2002: 42). Language becomes an unbridgeable obstacle to communication between Self and Other, solidifying both gaps and imbalances between them.

By ascribing certain inherent qualities to Kesh language that therefore structure Kesh thought, Le Guin might be positing that there is something essentially different about other cultures. If language determines thought, then the Kesh way of thought would be inaccessible to Anglophone readers. This interpretation of linguistic relativity would contribute to a monolingual paradigm, a 'strong model of the exclusive link between language and identity' (Yildiz 2012: 204). This paradigm renders division between Self and Other both unavoidable and unbridgeable.

In opposition to such a culturally essentialist stance, however, the dynamic

and transmittable nature of language in Le Guin suggests that the alterity between own and foreign words is never total. Rather, 'the meaning of the word is that composite of uses which emerges in any reading' (Ashcroft et al 2002: 42). Because cultural meaning is not inherent in the words, languages can be learned; an engaged interlocutor can reconstruct the meaning of the foreign-language words to some degree. So, for example, the TOK language in *Always Coming Home* is potentially learned by all humans of the region and allows exchange between them (Cheyne 2006: 461). Shevek, likewise, acquires the dominant language of A-Io but uses it to expand his society's horizons through instantaneous communication. Perhaps the example which best synthesizes the continuity that Le Guin establishes between Self and Other is this passage, which opens the encyclopaedia-like second half of *Always Coming Home*:

> Húíshev wewey tusheíye rru gestanai
> Of-two-legged-people [adj.] all[s.n.] work this [is] doing things well, art
> M duwey gochey.
> And [o.n.]all shared, held in common
>
> The Whole Business of Man is the Arts, and All Things Common. – William Blake. (Le Guin 1988: 407)

The first English segment exemplifies a syntactic fusion between English words and the grammar and syntax of the Kesh. The alternation of Kesh and English highlights this fusion, as does the Blake quote which has ostensibly been translated into Kesh then back to syntactically-fused English. This is not a literal translation, however. For instance, 'tusheíye' is a compound word formed from 'sheiye', which in turn comes from 'iye', or energy 'considered as work' (489). The Kesh concept of sheiye is wider than how 'business' is usually understood in English; it includes unglamorous tasks of biological reproduction as well as commerce or artistic creation (490). Similarly, Le Guin replaces 'Man' with the gender-inclusive 'two-legged-people'. Such distinctions evidence that the back-translated English phrase is not fully equivalent to Blake's.

On the other hand, this dual translation affirms a sense of enduring humanity despite the global disaster, years and language that separates Blake from the Valley. Rather than affirming that the Kesh language is inevitably distinct from Blake's English, Le Guin is positing an underlying shared stratum of humanity that allows communication, much like a universal grammar. As Steven Kellman explains, this would lead to the conclusion that 'universal deep structures subsuming every language are more crucial than superficial differences' (Kellman 2000: 23). Linguistic barriers could be surmounted without denying their relevance in shaping, or at least reflecting, a given worldview. Even if

languages reflect cultural difference, they do so in a non-deterministic manner.

Conclusion

What are the political implications of the insertion of difference through fictive multilingualism? In the first section I showed how the heteroglossia introduced by fictive multilingualism can be politically leveraged, while the second section went on to consider some, admittedly non-exhaustive, ethical consequences of this political use. Throughout, Bakhtin's theoretical framework suggested that multilingualism is a centrifugal force that opposes the hegemonic and centralizing forces of monolingualism.

Fictive multilingualism can make space for the Other and draw awareness to the Self's ethical responsibility. In 'Old Music and the Slave Women', initially dissimilar voices become 'reciprocally permeable' (Easterbrook 2009: 385) and thus engender ethical responsibility. In relation to such responsibility, it is important to note that for Le Guin 'it is not actually possible for human beings to stand in an ethical relationship with something which is totally different from themselves' (Burns 2008: 204). The Other that Le Guin writes about is not, this suggests, absolutely alien and non-human. One avenue for future research lies precisely in the application of the multilingual approach to other authors who consider non-human Others rather than the ethical and cultural Others that Le Guin focuses on.

I have argued that, for Le Guin, the difference inserted through fictive multilingualism remains surmountable – translatable, as it were. As Bakhtin writes, heteroglossia offers the possibility of 'ideological translation of another's language, and an overcoming of its otherness – an otherness that is only contingent, external, illusory' (Bakhtin 1981: 365). My analysis showed how the appropriation of enna allowed Esdan to bridge the gap with the slave women, in the same way that the back-translated William Blake quote analysed in the second section established a continuity of human endeavours. In both cases, Le Guin's fictive multilingualism works towards 'ideological translation' between cultures. The heightened heteroglossia introduced through fictive multilingualism is an important factor in the transmission of two key themes in Le Guin's work: injustice and liberation. The multilingual approach exemplified here could be used to shed new light on similar strategies within sf of various time periods and geographies. For instance, Bill Ashcroft's strategies of transformation could be used to analyse many of the works in Cheyne's inventory of sf texts featuring created languages (Cheyne 2008: 391). As this article has shown, the literary representation of an entirely fictive multilingualism is a powerful way to represent and critique interfaces between Self and Other, and is worthy of further critical scrutiny.

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Guest Editorial

Thomas Knowles (Birmingham City University) with Terence Sawyers (Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh)

In the winter of 2010, having completed my undergraduate degree, I had begun to think about what might come next. I got in touch with Prof John Goodridge at Nottingham Trent University about his upcoming Philip K. Dick Day. These biannual events had started in the mid-Noughties with John running them under the institutional radar using empty classrooms at weekends. Despite or because of such informalities, John had attracted writers such as Graham Joyce and Ian Watson, noted Dick scholars such as Andrew M. Butler, and even a conversation with Tessa Dick. I had not been to an academic conference before, but John was so welcoming, and PKD Day 2011 was such a friendly and stimulating gathering that it continues to be the yardstick by which I measure symposia. (I helped out with making sandwiches in the morning before the speakers arrived!)

Fast forward to 2016 when, having completed my PhD, it was my privilege to be able to relaunch PKD Day at Birmingham City University. With John's blessing, and with the help of Charlotte Newman, 'Philip K. Dick and the Counterculture' attracted scholars from the US, India, Italy and the UK, working in such fields as literature, video games, linguistics, psychology, music and media studies. Interdisciplinary approaches had been a mainstay of PKD Day under John's tutelage, so it was great to see this tradition continue: PKD Day 2016 brought together linguists and psychologists at BCU over a shared interest in PKD; and they went on to pursue successful research projects together.

Terence Sawyers got in touch with a great idea for PKD Day 2017 and this became 'Philip K. Dick and Vast Narrative'. Another key element has been the fostering of up and coming scholars, and PKD Day 2017 included an excellent group paper by BCU English undergraduates on the short story 'Foster You're Dead'. After this success, Terence put on PKD Day 2018 at QMU, and 'The Half-Life of Philip K. Dick' attracted papers from a mélange of disciplines considering the legacies of Dick's work in late twentieth-century and contemporary culture. This special section is therefore designed to celebrate more than a decade of the event.

Umberto Rossi gave the keynote at PKD Day 2015 (subsequently published in *Foundation* 131), and his contribution is a sequel to that talk. In 'Philip's Books: Printed Lies and Revelations in Dick's Oeuvre', Rossi considers the old technology of the codex and its transformations through various modern media, unsettling any simplistic notion of a stable or authoritative text, and working through the medium's propensity to dispense misinformation that may

nonetheless prove revelatory. It is Dick's books within books in texts such as *The Man in the High Castle* that make this abyssal structure of the book apparent.

In 'The Psychology of Good and Evil in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep*?', Hamed Moosavi takes an innovative approach to the question of evil in Dick's work by considering the behaviour of humans, androids and the wider society in conversation with the modelling of a range of behavioural psychologists and ethicists. Combining this approach with the more familiar territory of Manichean and Gnostic understandings of good and evil in Dick's work makes for an unsettling view of the latent totalitarianism inherent in coercive societies.

The question of empathy is pursued in Joshua Bulleid's article on 'vegetarianism and animal empathy' which explores the distance between the vegetarian credentials of much of Dick's writings and thought, and his behaviour as a meat-eating man from a rural background. Key instances that evince a greater ethical responsibility for and towards animals deserve to be considered alongside and given equal weight as Dick's fascination with man-made simulacra.

In 'Uncursing the Cursed World: Bad Fate & Apostolic Reading in Philip K. Dick', Francis Gene-Rowe considers the co-dependency of the political and metaphysical poles within Dick's writing. These two poles, expressed via the *koinos kosmos* or 'shared world' of objective phenomena and the *idios kosmos* or 'personal world' of subjective experience, are shown to overlap, providing a respective lens with which to define and make sense of the other. Rowe utilises models of fate theorised by Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben's reading of Pauline apostolicism to aid him in this inquiry.

Rowena Clarke's 'Westworlds: The Frontier Politics of Suburban California in Philip K. Dick's Space Colonies' considers the national myths of frontier living, which underwrote the growth of suburbia in post-war America, and are echoed in Dick's critique of interplanetary colonization. Dick's work allows us to analyse the way that myth, architecture and advertising work together to propagate an ideology of expansionism at the expense of indigenous and socially marginalized peoples.

Dick scholarship continues to grow alongside the film and TV adaptations of his work, the discovery of new methodological approaches to his fiction, and the ongoing research into Dick's exegetical writing. With this in mind, we plan for PKD Day to continue as an opportunity for Dick scholars to meet and share their research, initiate collaborations and, crucially, provide the same friendly and stimulating atmosphere that marked the event from its start.

Philip's Books: Printed Lies and Revelations in Dick's Oeuvre

Umberto Rossi

If one wishes to ascertain to what extent the printed book was present in Philip K. Dick's life, one may read his February 1, 1960 letter to Eleanor Dimoff, an editor at Harcourt, Brace & Co., which was then interested in publishing his mainstream novels. Here Dick lists quite a few 'good novels' (Dick 1996: 56), that is: Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*, Nathanael West's *The Day of the Locust*, Herbert Gold's *The Prospect Before Us*, William Styron's *Lie Down in Darkness*, Ernst Jünger's *On the Marble Cliffs*, Fyodor Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*, Ivan Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*, W.M. Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*, James Agee's *Death in the Family*, J.D. Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye*, Wolf Mankowitz's *A Kid for Two Farthings*, Norman Mailer's *Deer Park*, and James Jones's *From Here to Eternity*. To this heterogeneous bibliography we should add his recommendation of Hans Fallada's *Little Man, What Now?* in his April 25, 1962 letter to Anthony Boucher (64); and those in the May 22 and June 7, 1964 letters to James Blish, where he mentions William Gaddis's *The Recognitions*, Philip Roth's *Letting Go* and Herbert Gold's short story 'Love and Like' (73); William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*, J.P. Donleavy's *A Most Singular Man* and *The Ginger Man*, J.R.R. Tolkien's *The Hobbit*, Richard E. Kim's *The Martyred*, Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones*, Samuel Beckett's *Watt* and *All That Fall*, and Jünger's *The Glass Bees* (79–81).

To these titles one might add some plays, such as the *Wallenstein Trilogy* by Friedrich Schiller, or Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* and Xenophon's *Anabasis*, plus authors whose names Dick nonchalantly drops into his correspondence, such as Franz Kafka, Eugène Ionesco, Bertolt Brecht or Karel Čapek. Another important presence is James Joyce, whose name occurs six times, beginning with the February 10, 1958 letter to Blish (40), in which Dick mentions HCE from *Finnegans Wake*, *Ulysses* and the story 'Araby'. One might well expect that the letters of a professional writer like Dick would mention other writers, be they classics or the work of his contemporaries. Besides, how can one become a writer without having been a reader? Knowing what literary works Dick read and what he thought of them is relevant for critics interested in understanding his making as a writer. What I find interesting, however, is that while the occurrences of writers' names and titles dramatically decrease after the first volume of the *Selected Letters*, books remain an important and inescapable presence in Dick's own fiction even after the mystical events of 2-3-74. Media play a very important role in Dick's twisted worlds (Rossi 2009; 2018), and printed books may well be considered the first industrial medium, preparing the way for today's electronic and digital media (Bolter and Grusin 1999: 21–50). In this article, I will try to

map the presence of books, both real and fictitious, within Dick's fiction that play important roles in how his narratives work rather than mere stage props put in just to add a touch of realism.

This tendency has been already noticed by Andrew M. Butler who, in his essay on *Lies, Inc.* (1984), focuses on the book-within-a-book, *The True and Compete Economic and Political History of Newcolonizedland* by Dr Bloode, a text that 'does not just purport to be a complete history' of the extrasolar colony on Whale's Mouth but 'also includes events that have not happened yet' (Butler 2005: 265). The book seems able to foretell the future, even though Butler warns us that Bloode's book 'may not be a full and true version of [the characters'] historical reality' (274). In fact, there are several versions of the text, one of which has been concocted by Jaimé Weiss, a scientist who is helping the UN to fight against THL, the interplanetary corporation that owns the colony on Whale's Mouth. As Butler says, the instability of Bloode's narrative mirrors the complex writing history of *Lies, Inc.*, of which he lists five different versions, some quite different from the others (274). This, in combination with a defiantly non-linear plot with a long episode of lysergic hallucination, time travel and possible subliminal manipulation, brings about a condition of radical ontological uncertainty within the text, inasmuch as 'we cannot maintain that one realm is a conditional environment and the other a hallucinatory conditional environment, or that one is an unlimited universe and the other a pocket one; Dick's texts will not let this decision be easily made' (275).

The extreme ontological instability of *Lies, Inc.* leads Butler to politely rebuke both Carlo Pagetti and myself for having put forward a 'seductive but misleading' map of 'distinctive textual levels' in Dick's fictions in which they are numbered sequentially, thus suggesting 'a hierarchy that the text itself cannot sustain' (275). By contrast, I warned readers that 'the fourfold scheme could be not very useful when applied to later Dick novels. I do not think that the game of textual levels in, say, *Ubik* or *A Maze of Death* is endowed with such a comfortable and elegant (and visually pleasant) simplicity' (Rossi 2002: 413). Butler's contention, though, that the presence of the visionary book-within-the-book of *Lies, Inc.* affects the ontological status of its fictional realities is indisputable. One has to think that whenever a writer grafts a fictional (or hyper-fictional) text onto his/her narrative, we always get close to those bewildering effects of *mise en abyme* first theorized by André Gide; one might mention as a blatant example Laurence Durrell's *Avignon Quintet* (1974–85), in which the characters of a hyperfictional text meet and interact with those of the fictional text, so that the writer Aubrey Blanford repeatedly phones and ultimately meets the writer Robin Sutcliffe, a character in the novel Aubrey is working on.

The role played by *The True and Compete Economic and Political History*

of Newcolonizedland in *Lies, Inc.* is no less destabilizing. When the characters in the novel read the parts of this book which describe what is going to happen to them, they are manipulated by the authors of the different versions, Jaimé Weiss and Dr Lupov, with the latter defining the text as 'a powerful weapon in this final vast conflict' (Dick 2004: 135). To this confusion between fictional present and conditional futures foretold by the book, one must add another de-realizing factor: the book and the hyperfictional reality in which it is read by several characters may well be a hallucination caused by a strong dose of LSD-25 injected in the protagonist, Rachmael ben Applebaum, by a soldier as soon as he arrives on Whale's Mouth. But *The True and Compete Economic and Political History* – its title notwithstanding – is aimed at explaining why there can be *no* such colony on Whale's Mouth as that shown by the TV ads encouraging humans to settle on Newcolonizedland. Hence, Bloode's history book seems to play a double, contradictory role in the novel: on the one hand, it is a tell-tale text, unmasking the conspiracy hatched by Theodoric Ferry, the head of THL; on the other hand, it also presents itself as a prophetic book that can show the future (or better, the fate) of the characters in the novel, but is in turn unmasked as a fiction, as a changeable text aimed at manipulating its readers. This duality does not only apply to this book-within-the-book: other hyper-fictional volumes in Dick's oeuvre, for example, *Galactic Pot-Healer* (1969) and *Nick and the Glimmung* (1988), straddle the borderlines between revelation and falsification, prophecy and charlatanism, truth and hoax. Butler ironically remarks that 'Dick clearly believed in getting mileage out of unpublished ideas' (Butler 2005: 277), and this is exactly what all professional writers like Dick tend to do. But the recurrence of books-within-the-book that tell characters what is going to happen seems to be something more than a novelist husbanding his ideas: it is rather a sign of Dick's long-term interest in the prophetic power of books.

A clear example of this preoccupation is *The Divine Invasion* (1981), in which the prophetic book par excellence, the *Bible*, appears as a hypertext. This is what Emmanuel, one of the main characters, contemplates as a hologram:

> The Bible, expressed as layers at different depths within the hologram, each layer according to age. The total structure of Scripture formed, then, a three-dimensional cosmos that could be viewed from any angle and its contents read. According to the tilt of the axis of observation, differing messages could be extracted. Thus Scripture yielded up an infinitude of knowledge that ceaselessly changed. It became a wondrous work of art, beautiful to the eye, and incredible in its pulsations of color. Throughout it red and gold pulsed, with strands of blue. (Dick 1982: 70–71)

Extracting differing messages from the holy writ is what Kabbalists have done

since the Middle Ages, but doing this by turning the *Bible* into a holographic hypertext is something new. What is at stake here, however, is the possibility of introducing change and mutability into a seemingly fixed text through both interpretation and adding new parts to the text. Emmanuel suggests feeding 'something new into it' to Elias, the owner of the holoscope containing the Biblical hologram, who responds: 'It is not done' (71). Emmanuel then understands that, even if no new lines of text are fed into the holographic *Bible*, the transformation of the printed text into a three-dimensional hologram has operated a very important transformation nonetheless:

> If you learned how you could gradually tilt the temporal axis, the axis of true depth, until successive layers were superimposed and a vertical message – a new message – could be read out. In this way you entered into a dialogue with Scripture; it became alive. It became a sentient organism that was never twice the same. (72)

This is similar to Bloode's history of Newcolonizedland, of which there are several different versions that undermine the idea of a fixed, predetermined future which is implicit in a prophetic book. The juvenile *Nick and the Glimmung* features a book-within-a-book, *One Summer Day*, which describes the species living on Plowman's Planet (echoing William Langland's visionary poem *Piers Plowman* [c. 1370–90]), but also foretells what is going to happen, thus implying a fixed, unavoidable future. The prophetic book seems to have been written by Glimmung, an anthropomorphic creature with superpowers, the arch-villain in the plot. Yet *Galactic Pot-Healer*, which emerged out of *Nick and the Glimmung*, includes *The Book of Kalends* (echoing the title of another religious text, the ninth-century *Book of Kells*), which predicts the failure of the Glimmung's attempt to raise the Heldskalla cathedral from the Mare Nostrum. Here, Glimmung is not a villain and the ominous prophetic book has been redacted by the Kalends, an ancient life-form that Glimmung sees as his antagonist. The Kalends are threatening figures, opposing the forces of restitution, such as the pot-healer Joe Fernwright, who are endowed with 'a positive and well-nigh Utopian dimension in their own right' (Jameson 2005: 378).

Prophetic books which present the future as something fixed and unchangeable are depicted by Dick as instruments of menace and/or manipulation; they become acceptable if they are endowed with a capacity to update themselves, or to feature more than a single, petrified future by means of diversified versions, or to lend themselves to different interpretations. Besides, Dick seems to approve of books-within-the-book that undermine the status quo, for example, the Prestonite books in *Solar Lottery* (1955), four 'half-crazed, half-prophetic' (Dick 1987c: 28) pamphlets defending the expansion

of humankind towards extrasolar planets and positing the existence of a tenth planet (whose name is also the title of one of John Preston's works, *Flame Disc*), which could become a gateway to the stars. *Flame Disc* and the other books by Preston, discredited and despised by the ruling elite of a future multi-planetary society organized according to a new corporate feudalism, are quite different from the history of Newcolonizedland, *One Summer Day* or *The Book of Kalends*, inasmuch as they are not the product of extremely bright scientists or superhuman entities, but have been written by a wretched man in disgrace:

> There were fragments of the story of John Preston himself, the tiny frail man creeping from the Information Libraries to the observatories, writing his books, collecting endless facts, arguing futilely with the pundits, losing his precarious classification, and finally sinking down and dying in obscurity. (28)

This brief outline of Preston's destiny is quite impressive inasmuch as it seems to predict what Dick's life will be until its last years, when the sale of the rights for *Blade Runner* (1982) greatly improved his financial resources. Nevertheless, his last novels plus the *Exegesis* could well be seen as 'half-crazed, half-prophetic' texts, written after the collection of 'endless facts' (with much 'creeping from' the *Encyclopedia Britannica* to obscure theological writings). However, though Preston may have been treated as a crackpot charlatan, his disciple Leon Cartwright ultimately defeats the evil autocrat Reese Verrick, and the Flame Disc is reached, thus opening the gate to the stars. The Prestonite books are vindicated: they do not attempt to map and immobilize the future, but to chart outer space – a subversive act in a static, enclosed society as depicted in *Solar Lottery*.

The presence of forbidden books, of samizdat literature, is not uncommon in Dick's fiction. Felix Buckman's essay *The Law-and-Order Mentality* in *Flow My tears, The Policeman Said* (1974) is a good example, as it is 'an autobiographical exposé of the planetwide police apparatus [...] circulated illegally throughout the major cities of earth', which continues 'to clandestinely circulate' (Dick 1984a: 203) even after the murder of its author. This book-within-the-book is only briefly mentioned in the epilogue to the novel, like another forbidden text in *Time Out of Joint* (1959), *The Struggle against Tyranny*, 'a pamphlet circulated among the thousands of workers at Ragle Gumm, Inc.' (Dick 1984d: 167). A more extended depiction of subversive literature and its diffusion can be found in *Our Friends from Frolix 8* (1970), in which the tracts written by Eric Cordon, the leader of the Under Man network, striving to defend the individuals oppressed and discriminated against by the artificially evolved New Men, are forbidden. Although it is true that this novel is 'a throwback to twenty years before' (Butler 2007: 93),

it also means that the Cordonite tracts are the offspring of the Prestonite books in an even more dystopian setting. Moreover, what the Cordonite literature aims at is the overthrowing of the totalitarian regime oppressing humankind (one more link to *Solar Lottery*) while Thors Provoni, a disciple of Cordon who left the solar system looking for help, reminds us of Captain Groves, the African-American spaceman who ventures into interstellar space looking for the Flame Disc postulated by Preston.

Since the background of Dick's narratives is often dystopian (even though the plots do not always qualify as such), it is to be expected that forbidden books abound. History books, for example, are the typical victims of totalitarian regimes: one of the characters in *The Simulacra* (1964) says that such books are 'banned to everyone except *Ges*. I mean the real history texts; not the ones they give you for studying for those relpol tests' (Dick 1983a: 117). Manipulated history textbooks are something out of George Orwell, a powerful influence on Dick, and since the *Ges* are the ruling elite in the future USEA (United States of Europe and America) in which the story is set, we have once again different versions of written history, one for the privileged and powerful *Ges*, another heavily manipulated for the *Bes*, the oppressed citizens. When *Be* technician Nat Flieger sees Molly Dondoldo, who is not a *Ge*, reading 'a banned text by the twentieth century sociologist C. Wright Mills', he thinks that she is 'a remarkable woman in many ways' (40), one who dares challenge the social order.

Another subversive book is the fictitious *Pilgrim Without Progress*, read by Anne Hawthorne in *The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch* (1965), which denounces the bleak life of colonists on Mars, so that 'the UN had condemned' and suppressed it (Dick 1984c: 117). In contrast, Dick's novel also features the Great Books animator, a device that turns the classics of world literature into cartoons, allowing viewers to shorten the plot, or make it funny 'or *same-as-book* or sad version' (124), and enabling them to choose the style of the cartoons among those of Dali, Bacon or Picasso, or other 'system-famous artists' (125). This remediation hints at domesticated movie or TV versions of literary classics, and proves that Dick was well aware of the condition of books in a mass media age, when printed texts are one of several interrelated media, and a written narrative can be transposed onto the large or small screen.

But when it comes to forbidden books-within-the-book revealing a disturbing and subversive truth, the best example is *The Grasshopper Lies Heavy* in *The Man in the High Castle* (1962). In an alternate reality where the Axis Powers won World War Two, a novel depicting a world where the war was won by the Allies is suppressed as *entartete Kunst* (degenerate art), although it is tolerated in the Rocky Mountain States and in Canada. *The Grasshopper Lies Heavy* does not foretell the future nor does it deal with faraway worlds in outer space:

it conjures up a different past, another outcome of the war which ended about fifteen years before the beginning of the novel. Yet, according to the *I Ching*, which Hawthorne Abendsen had used to write the book, it is still endowed with 'inner truth' (Dick 1987d: 246), to which Abendsen angrily responds: 'my book is true? […] Germany and Japan lost the war?' (247). Compared to other hyperfictional books in Dick's oeuvre, the capacity of *The Grasshopper Lies Heavy* to generate ontological uncertainty in its readers (be they external or internal to the novel) is heightened by the fact that the text of *The Man in the High Castle* includes several excerpts from Abendsen's novel, for example, the depiction of Adolf Hitler's trial:

> ...black, flaming, the spirit of old seemed for an instant once again to blaze up. The quivering, shambling body jerked taut; the head lifted. Out of the lips that ceaselessly drooled, a croaking half-bark, half-whisper. 'Deutsche, hier steh' Ich.' Shudders among those who watched and listened, the earphones pressed tightly, strained faces of Russian, American, British, and German alike. Yes, Karl thought. Here he stands once more... they have beaten us – and more. They have stripped this superman, shown him for what he is. Only – a. (125)

The Grasshopper Lies Heavy, unlike the Prestonite books, is not just a title with brief hints at the content: it is a text we can directly read, at least in part. A novel whose prose is slightly different from Dick's own, as if he strove to give Abendsen his own authorial voice, a bit more melodramatic than the dry, streamlined, at times bald language of *The Man in the High Castle*. But this counterfactual novel is not the only book-within-the-book: we should never forget that *The Grasshopper Lies Heavy* is validated by another book, the *I Ching*. Like Abendsen, Dick developed his plot by using the ancient Chinese divination book (Dick 1993: 180). We might go so far as to say that the story of Dick's novel was told by the ancient Chinese work, were we not aware that the hexagrams are endowed with a 'necessary vagueness' (183) that requires subjective interpretation of their messages: for example, the different readings of hexagram 61 made by the characters Juliana Frink and Nobosuke Tagomi. In *The Man in the High Castle*, then, we are presented with two books that subvert the social status quo, one of them directly (*The Grasshopper Lies Heavy*), the other indirectly (the *I Ching*), by validating the alternate history of Abendsen's novel.

The issue of interpretation is not limited to the *I Ching* hexagrams; there is a moment in which the difficulty to understand a printed text comes to the fore. It is when Paul Kasoura, a young Japanese executive that the antiques dealer Robert Childan strives to befriend, asks the American antiquarian to explain a

short novel 'by Nathanael West. Title is *Miss Lonelyhearts*' (Dick 1987d: 113). Paul cannot fully grasp the meaning of the book, which 'gives strange view about suffering […]. Insight of most original kind into meaning of pain for no reason' (114). Unfortunately for Paul, Childan has not read the book; moreover, when he is told that its author was a Jew, he reacts by uttering an anti-Semitic remark: 'If Germany and Japan had lost the war, the Jews would be running the world today. Through Moscow and Wall Street' (114). West's novel remains unexplained to its Japanese reader, a microcosm both of the intractability of *The Man in the High Castle* itself and the need for texts *as texts* to be deciphered, interpreted, decoded. Since 'Dick's oeuvre is full of messengers. […] Dick too was an urgent messenger' (Suvin 2002: 395), many of their messages are carried and printed in books – with a desperate need for interpreters. (Although, as the function of the advice column indicates in West's novel, interpreters themselves can become desperate by what they read.)

In one sense, *Miss Lonelyhearts* is there to show how difficult it is to bridge the gap between two different cultures (Japanese/American, Oriental/Occidental, master/slave), and to further define the personality of Childan. An expert in American antiques, he aspires to the culture of connoisseurship, which is to say, he sees himself as cultured by being a man of taste and distinction whilst, at the same time, reducing all objects (including that of human beings such as Jews and African-Americans) to an arbitrary system of authentication, classification and commodification. In another sense, though, Dick sees an affinity between his fiction and that of West's novel since the problem of suffering without cause that puzzles Paul is one of Dick's recurring themes. One of the characters in *The Man in the High Castle*, Frank Frink, is a Jew who will suffer without cause later in the story, while another, Nobosuke Tagomi, will also suffer, dying of a heart attack after having saved Frink from deportation to the Nazi-ruled East Coast. Like the doomed protagonist of *Miss Lonelyhearts*, Dick's use of real books and his allusions to real-world characters act as internal mirrors to the themes of his fiction. The 14th century Buddhist tract, *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* (also known as *Bardo Thödol*), mentioned in *Ubik* (1969) can be read as a blueprint of the half-life in which Joe Chip and the other characters find themselves, dead yet kept in cryogenic suspension. (*The Tibetan Book of the Dead* also appears in *The Man in The High Castle*, as part of Tagomi's inner monologue during his visit to our world in chapter 14.) C.S. Lewis's *Out of the Silent Planet* (1938) is not only cited in *The Divine Invasion* but its central plot device – Earth enslaved by Satan – is also replicated in Dick's novel. Moreover, Thomas à Kempis's *De Imitatione Christi* (c. 1418-27), mentioned in *The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch*, warns us that the latter novel is in its own blasphemous way an imitation of Christ, since Eldritch is a selfish messiah

who asks men to die for his own salvation, and peddles a black Eucharist, his ontological-hallucinogenic drug Chew-Z. Last but not least, two classics that appear in *Time Out of Joint*, Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1851) and Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), respectively hint at enslavement and isolation, two features of Ragle Gumm's condition.

Although books can act as important conveyors of meaning in Dick's fiction, their messages may be encoded, scrambled or murky. They may even be bogus, as is the case with the false Phil Dick novels that the oppressive regime of President Fremont, in *Radio Free Albemuth* (1985), publishes after the writer is arrested and sent to a concentration camp. Here is what an agent of the state police tells the fictional Dick about his next novel:

> Do you want to see the manuscript of your next book? […] I'll have it brought to you. It has to do with an invasion of Earth by alien beings who rape people's minds. *The Mind-Screwers* it's called. […] These hideous things come here from across space and work their way into people's heads like worms. They're really horrible. They come from a planet where it's night all the time, but because they have no eyes they think it's daylight all the time. They eat dirt. They really are worms. (Dick 1987b: 271)

Phil asks what is the moral of such a book to which the agent replies, 'It's just entertainment. It has no moral' (271), but she cannot cheat a professional writer who knows very well that even the most apparently mindless form of entertainment, even the most foolish pulp novel may well have its own moral. And *The Mind-Screwers* has a very clear and repugnant one: 'People should not trust creatures different from themselves: anything alien, from another planet, was vile and disgusting. Man was the one pure species. He stood alone against a hostile universe... probably led by his glorious Führer' (271).

When a counterfeit book appears within one of Dick's novels, it often resembles what he has written for a long time, especially at the beginning of his career: a cheap sf novel published in instalments in a pulp magazine with a lurid cover, or a pulp paperback with as equally a lurid cover, something like one of Dick's less appreciated works, such as *Vulcan's Hammer* or *Dr Futurity* (both 1960). Dick could not help being aware of the bleak industrial side of the medium he knew from the inside, the book as a disposable product and its writer an exploited labourer. He knew what it meant to churn out manuscripts to make ends meet; manuscripts whose titles were changed by publishers to please their consumers (for example, *The Zap Gun* [1967], originally titled *Project Plowshare*). As a consequence, Phil (the character) is well aware of how the fake PKD novel is produced: it is just a matter of recycling older stuff. *The*

Mind-Screwers is later described as 'a mix of Clark Ashton Smith and Robert Heinlein' (274), while its imaginary sequels are titled *The Underground City of the Mind-Screwers* and *Return to the Underground City of the Mind-Screwers*, titles one could expect from the unavoidable sequels of a cheap sf novel. Dick's typical deadpan humour is at its sharpest here and (not without bitterness) also aimed at himself, the then underestimated producer of pulp fiction before his final, posthumous canonization.

Printed texts in Dick's fiction can act as vehicles of truth, especially those truths that may (paradoxically) give the lie to the fictions everybody believes in – those sanctioned either by the political establishment or by social tradition. But books may also be untrue, be the work of charlatans, power-hungry entities or groups who aim at manipulating readers. To that end, Dick's dualistic description of the cultural function of books prefigures current debates about the status of online news: Are they true stories that unmask the lies of the powers that be, or fake news whose purpose is to persuade us to vote for the morally wrong politician or to support the morally wrong policy?

This ambiguity is captured in Dick's last novel, *The Transmigration of Timothy Archer* (1982). On the one hand, we have the Zadokite scrolls, written c. 200 BCE, when words had to be manually reproduced by specialized craftsmen; on the other hand, the outrageous book Bishop Timothy Archer is writing, *Here, Tyrant Death*, which proclaims the return of Timothy's son, Jeff, from the hereafter. The scrolls are carriers of a subversive truth, that is, sayings attributed to Jesus Christ written two hundred years before his time by the drug-fuelled Zadokite sect, whose descendants include Christ's disciples. The scrolls belong to the constellation of books-within-a-book that transmit revelations which undermine our established beliefs and knowledge. Archer's book about the afterlife and the messages he received from there belongs to the group of fake prophetic books, written in order to cheat or manipulate readers, even though Archer is neither a charlatan nor a confidence man, but a father cheated by a crook and ravaged by the pain caused by his son's suicide. The oscillation between revelation and lie, truth and fakery, is powerfully embodied in the doubling of the two books-within-the-book. The Zadokite scrolls and *Here, Tyrant Death* both mirror the themes and content of *The Transmigration of Timothy Archer*, a deliberate fictionalization, as Dick confirmed with his literary agent, Russell Galen, on August 28, 1981, of an incident involving Dick's friend, James Pike, and his partner Maren Bergrud (Dick 2009: 224–25). Even the Zadokite scrolls are a literary avatar of real ancient documents, the Dead Sea Scrolls (also known as the Qumran Caves Scrolls), discovered between 1946 and 1956 and made famous by John Allegro's sensational and controversial essays (dutifully mentioned in Dick's novel).

Revelation and mystification, truth and fiction can be both found in books, as Dick knew all too well. It does not come as a surprise, then, that the books read and interpreted by his characters oscillate between these two, maybe complementary opposites. But Dick's books-within-a-book also trace a history of the medium, from the ancient, sacred and supposedly true Zadokite scrolls in *The Transmigration of Timothy Arthur* to the hypertextual *Bible* in *The Divine Invasion* that foreshadows the digital texts we can now download onto our e-book readers. I wish to end with this intertextual image of the evolution of the book (a superimposition just like the different textual layers in the holographic *Bible*), from parchment and papyrus to bytes, not so much to advertise Dick's prophecies, but to show how he was attentive to the technological evolution which took place in his lifetime – something we can also see when he deals with radio, TV or sound recording technologies. Dick saw the book as a medium among other media, as one of the messengers in a world increasingly feeding on or producing information – our world, the world of global networks and relentless messaging. It is this awareness that still makes Dick a writer of our time, his books oscillating between revelation and fabrication, the vehicles of terribly urgent messages concerning us, today, here and now.

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The Psychology of Good and Evil in Philip K. Dick's *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*

Seyedhamed Moosavi

Like much of Philip K. Dick's fiction, the boundaries between reality and illusion are blurred in his most famous novel, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (1968). As Lejla Kucukalic points out: 'The question of authenticity extends throughout the novel: genuine and televised lives, genuine and invented religion, and genuine and artificially induced emotions and perceptions make up the cosmogony' (Kucukalic 2006: 93). Although, because of the gap between reality and illusion, many of Dick's books gravitate toward the issue of paranoia, the struggle of humanity with its creations is at the heart of *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* The subject of reality versus falsehood seems collateral to the novel's fictional world, while the issue of authenticity only appears to embolden the question of whether androids possess consciousness, which is the title and subject matter of the book.

Therefore, do androids dream of electric sheep or, in other words, are androids alive or dead? Although this question has been frequently addressed, what is striking when one looks at the critical literature is the lack of consensus even as to the role of the organizations, bodies and persons that make up its 'cosmogony'. For instance, this is especially evident in the role of Mercerism, which is the dominant religion of the novel and is (supposedly) inspired by the sufferings of a single person, Wilbur Mercer. Mercerism's role has been considered as both good and evil. Richard Viskovic defines Mercer in the following terms:

> He is a historical figure. He is an old man climbing a hill to his death. He is the actor Al Jarry on a stage. He is an 'archetypal entity from the stars, superimposed on our culture by a cosmic template'... He is a real person, appearing in the flesh to John Isidore to heal his damaged spider and to Rick Deckard to warn him of a trap. He is a god. He is Rick Deckard. He is everyone joined together in fusion. He is no one – a person who never really existed. Mercer figures at the center of the novel, but he is a figure of myth and uncertainty. (Viskovic 2013: 167)

While for Viskovic, Mercer ultimately symbolizes goodness, in that his presence echoes the degree of empathy of both androids and humans, for Jill Galvan, Mercer is in the hand of the ruling power, which 'foists this image [of Mercer being a positive force that fosters empathy] off any number of gullible citizen-consumers among whom Rick's wife Iran figures predominantly' (Galvan 1997:

416). Galvan concludes that 'Mercer's image serves the purpose not of social solidarity but of disintegration – an outcome which dramatically reduces the potential for public unrest' (416). Fredric Jameson calls Mercerism 'a quasi-religious consolation therapy' (Jameson 2005: 370), but Aeron Barlow considers Mercerism finally as more good than evil 'because the system is based on empathy and operates in opposition to the prevailing system […] unless, of course, the sense of empathy has a fraudulent base, its anti-establishment character hiding its own purpose' (Barlow 2005:194).

It is not only the role of Mercer that seems to be dubious and contentious however; androids are also a subject of debate as to whether they possess consciousness, or are mere humanoid machines that only 'pretend' to be alive. Kucukalic, for instance, considers androids to be alive and the subject of oppression by human and government alike. She argues that 'The androids, Deckard realizes during his hunt, are not simply unfeeling machines, but are an organism compelled to seek "a better life without servitude"' (Kucukalic 2006: 92). Leah Hadomi argues, conversely, that while humans dread death and dying, this fear is 'contrasted to the attitude of the androids […] whose lifespan although mechanically limited is everlasting through constant duplication' (Hadomi 1995: 92). Apparently, androids possess a 'Frankenstein-like existence' (93) whose presence symbolizes man's utopian effort at immortalizing himself but with dystopian results. Christopher Palmer, similarly, seems suspicious of androids because 'they imitate the human rather than offering an alternative to it. Frequently they think they *are* human, in the conventional, consensual meaning of the term they tend continually to collapse into *each other*' (Palmer 2003: 13). He believes that they 'do not really exist, because they lack individuality, since each can merge in or be replaced with by a designedly identical item' (94). Androids it seems are similar to 'kipple' (amassing of useless matter) in that their reproducibility and replaceability is both formless and meaningless; the fact that they can be easily replicated is evil in that they blur the boundaries of real and fake by lacking 'individuality'.

But these issues might remain unresolved because it can be argued that the discrepancy between reality and illusion is integral not only to this novel but also dystopian fiction *per se*. The fact that we do not realize which of these bodies, people or organizations are actually evil might be exactly the point Dick (consciously or unconsciously) is trying to make, since this discrepancy in itself constitutes perhaps the greatest evil that distinguishes dystopias from other types of society. In George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949), Winston Smith is even obsessed with the authenticity of ale: he suspects that the ale he drinks is not the real one, and this conviction drives him to seek an old man to find what ale in the old times really tasted like (to his dismay). In other foundational works

such as Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932) and Yevgeny Zamyatin's *We* (1924), the gap is evident in almost every substrata of people's lives: concepts such as love, art and science have been stripped of their real meanings and functions, and only fakes have replaced them.

The evil in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* is achieved, firstly, through the mystification of the role of organizations as well as people. This mystification can be said to achieve four main purposes for the ruling power: firstly, the perpetrators can become illusive, difficult to incriminate and less subject to scrutiny by law; secondly, by blurring the boundaries between reality and illusion evil can be hidden, and where evil is covert and not blatant perpetrators can feel good about their own heinous actions (Sluzki 2005: 627); thirdly, humans are more prone to experience 'cognitive dissonance' (changing their mentality due to outside forces) in situations where mistrust is predominant; and finally, trusting and mistrusting reality are one of the most fundamental psychological mechanisms in the mental development of an individual (Erikson 1978: 222–26). Where there is danger, and mistrust prevails, individuals cannot develop healthy selves, and the society will become a paranoid reality for them. The psychologist Abraham Maslow puts safety only after physiological needs such as eating, shelter and sex (Maslow 1970: 39–43). Safety is therefore attacked by the ruling forces, because when feeling unsafe individuals will be more prone to manipulation.

Dick in his letters counts what he calls 'the Lie' as amongst the greatest evils: by contrast, he cites the Zoroastrian value of honesty as 'the greatest thing in the Persian system' (Dick 2011: 18). Dick's version of honesty and lying seem to parallel Jean Paul Sartre's concepts of 'freedom' and 'bad faith'. It is true that Dick believes our disintegrating reality might have within it some 'ontological' Kantian reality that we might gain access to if we truly seek it (419–20): 'suppose our irreal world is like a sort of bubble within an actual world?' (415). Yet for him, there is a difference between a quest for reality (or hidden truth this quest may reveal to us) and building a 'pseudo-reality': 'As soon as one lies one becomes separated from reality. One has introduced the falsification oneself' (20).

In *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, the issue of trust and deception becomes secondary to the question of whether androids possess consciousness because if they are alive, then Deckard is perpetrating the penultimate evil, namely murder. The opening scene of the novel shows him having a spat with Iran over their mood organ, in which his moral position regarding androids is brought up in the argument:

> 'Get your crude cop's hand away,' Iran said.
>
> 'I'm not a cop – '. He felt irritable, now, although he hadn't dialled for it.

'You're worse,' his wife said, her eyes still shut. 'You're a murderer hired by the cops.'

'I've never killed a human being in my life.' (Dick 1996: 29)

Rick is, therefore, faced with a difficult dilemma: he either has to kill or forgo the acquisition of money and social status that goes with it. But if androids are not really alive, Deckard is right and, from a moral standpoint, he is not actually committing murder. So, the question of whether androids are alive or dead becomes one of the utmost importance in the book, since it is the difference between doing right and doing wrong.

Yet, although we have no way of proving that androids are alive, it may be more logical to do so because a) we see them show feelings such as fear, hatred, lust, revenge, collusion, and so on; b) they are capable of sympathy; and c) they are at least partially organic beings. The question however is if, in accepting this argument, there is more ground and evidence to believe in androids' possessing consciousness than otherwise, why are they then the subject of so much aggression and are deemed mere objects in the novel? The first reason might have to do with the role anonymity plays in dystopias, which is itself the result of the illusory nature of things in the novel. Besides making it difficult, if not impossible, to identify where evil resides, the difference between reality and illusion further increases anonymity, described by the American psychologist, Philip Zimbardo, as 'Anything that isolates us from our kin kills the human spirit; anything that makes us feel anonymous perverts the human spirit into not caring for others – and makes vandalism and violence more probable' (Zimbardo 2005: 131). Zimbardo calls this impulse the 'Lucifer Effect': the force that oppressive social situations exert over the individual into making him/her perpetrate acts of evil.

Zimbardo's argument was developed as a result of the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment which he conducted in 1971. The experiment was an attempt to simulate exact prison conditions, in which student participants were divided between mock prisoners and mock guards (Zimbardo 2007: 20). The experiment had to be terminated only after six days because it got 'out of control' (Zimbardo 2005: 139). The guards were exhibiting inhuman behaviour that Zimbardo ascribed to the unregulated power that the prison conditions gave to them. The experiment was designed in a way that the students could not individually recognize each other and remained anonymous. Zimbardo's experiment suggested two conclusions that a) anonymity breeds inhumanity and b) social forces are stronger than individual will in changing human behaviour. The premise that human beings, except in rare instances, nearly always turn bad under bad conditions is described analogously by Zimbardo: 'while a few bad apples might spoil the barrel (filled with good fruit/people) a barrel filled with

vinegar will always transform sweet cucumbers into sour pickles' (47). Whilst Zimbardo has himself suggested a connection between his experiments and William Golding's *Lord of the Flies* (1954) (Zimbardo 2007: 24), Ursula K. Le Guin's *The Dispossessed* (1974) contains a childhood scene in which the hero, Shevek, and his friends Kadagy and Tirin conduct a similar experiment. When Kadagv volunteers to go to a fake prison, since in their anarchist society real prisons do not exist, Tirin and Kadagv immediately assume their roles as guard and prisoner: 'They were not playing the new role now, it was playing them' (Le Guin 1974: 34). As with Zimbardo's experiment, Kadgav comes out in a horrible condition.

Zimbardo, though, was not alone in showing how oppressive situations can act as a powerful factor in actuating individuals to do evil. In Stanley Milgram's earlier experiment, participants in the role of a teacher were told to administer supposedly electrical shocks to another, unseen participant (a confederate of Milgram's) performing the role of a student. The learner was meant to memorize pairs of words and the teacher was asked to apply electric shocks, from slight to sever that could supposedly kill the learner, every time the learner recalled the wrong word (Milgram 1974: 18–20). What happened was that 65% of the participants harrowingly continued to the highest level of electric shock that could kill the participant. Every time the teacher did not administer the electric shock and disobeyed, Milgram as the authority figure read out four prods such as 'the experiment requires that you continue' or 'you have no other choice, you must go on' (21). Milgram performed these experiments with different variables over a span of years with the same results. These experiments suggested that under given situations in which individuals are authorized to do evil acts, they will regard themselves as less responsible and acting only as an instrument that is obeying orders, so that committing evil for them becomes easier and thus justifiable.

In discussing his notion of the Lie, Dick takes a similar view of evil: 'any system which says, this is a rotten world, wait for the next, give up, do nothing, succumb – that may be the basic Lie and if we participate in believing it and acting (or rather not acting) on it we involve ourselves in the Lie and suffer dreadfully (Dick 2011: 19). 'Obedience to Authority', to quote Milgram, incorporates then the following behaviours: not being honest with oneself, in that the individual does not take responsibility for his/her actions; self-deception; and a moral disengagement from reality when one lies to both oneself and others, and evades personal responsibility. The picture that these experiments present of human beings can be likened to a fruit that has a sweet skin but a bitter kernel, and under certain situational forces the skin is removed and the bitter kernel reveals itself. But the fruits (humans) must have a positive

picture of themselves to be able to function psychologically (Bandura et al 1975: 254). Accordingly, Deckard's protestation that 'I've never killed a human being in my life' shows that it is important for him to have a positive image of himself, even only as a self-deception. It must be noted, however, that the experiments of Milgram and Zimbardo have been challenged over their methodological as well as conceptual issues. It has been argued, for instance, that Nazi guards were not well-disposed toward their victims while in Milgram's experiments the participants were (under the pretext of education as a social good) (Baumrind 1964: 422–33). Neither were Nazi guards reluctant but the Milgram participants were (Miller 2004: 212). Deckard is also dissimilar to the participants in that he does not intend to help the androids, nor is he reluctant to kill them (at first). Additionally, there was the ideological element in Nazi killings while in Milgram's experiments there was no ideology involved. Yet, like Milgram and Zimbardo, Dick was writing in the immediate shadow of the Jewish Holocaust; consequently, all three were concerned not only in how such an atrocity could have occurred but also in what the correlation might be between authority and obedience.

So, what psychological mechanisms (or tricks) do individuals use to bring themselves to doing, and coping with doing, evil? Or put another way, how do individuals perpetrate evil and still think of themselves positively in their minds? One of the most effective methods is depersonalization or deindividuation, both of which describe a similar process of anonymization. It is achieved through labelling, stereotyping or anonymizing individuals, for example, by using numbers, labels or categories instead of their names. Zimbardo, in a move similar to the social organization of OneState in Zamyatin's *We*, anonymized the participants in the prison experiment by giving them numbers in place of their names (Zimbardo 2007: 40). Similarly, when a generic label such as 'the enemy' is attached to a person, the perpetrator can morally disengage her/himself and turn the victim into an object. In *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, Deckard is an experienced bounty hunter, but because he has always been second to another professional hunter, Dave Holden, the quality of his interactions with androids has been merely that of a hunter and a prey (it is the hospitalization of the officer Holden which gives Deckard the chance to change this perspective). Deckard, at first, only thinks of them as 'things' (a general and dehumanizing term) not individuals. Phil Resch, another bounty hunter whom Deckard meets later in the novel, for instance, refers to androids as 'murderous illegal aliens'. So, it can rightly be claimed that deindividuation of the android is the premise from which Deckard begins and that, as embodied also by Resch's attitude and seemingly justified by Holden's hospitalization, this depersonalization underwrites the organization of Deckard's society.

Consequently, blind obedience to authority is another mechanism that persuades Deckard into following what the government mandates or which it inculcates into its citizens. By law androids are not alive: 'Legally you're not [alive]. But really you are. Biologically. You're not made out of transistorized circuits like a false animal; you are an organic entity' (Dick 1996: 198). Because of the way androids are characterized by the authorities, assuming them to be machines without life becomes easier for humans to maintain their social superiority – until Deckard makes the fatal error of falling into love with the android Rachel. In Milgram's experiment, for instance, only a few mandatory sentences were enough to make most participants electrocute strangers they supposed they were actually hurting (Milgram 1974: 44–66). This willing acquiescence to authority means that Deckard could not have seen himself as being responsible for the killing of live creatures but, instead, sought to justify his actions in deference to what was approved by the authorities and the legal system.

Where mistrust prevails, obedience to authority becomes more probable. The reason for this can be explained through Erik Erikson's 'Eight Ages of Man'. Erikson's fifth stage, which describes the age before adulthood, is called 'Identity versus Role Confusion'. According to Erikson, in puberty, when the individual's social identity has not yet formed, and his/her role in society is not yet certain, the danger is that the person might not finally be able to define an identity for him/herself. When this happens, s/he can turn into easy prey for those in power and the person's identity can become what is desired by the authorities for their own advantages; that is why we talk of adolescent vandalism and gang membership because at this stage to define their identity the youth wants to belong to a peer group (Erikson 1978: 234–37). Similarly, when there is confusion in the roles of people and organizations, we might expect to see people more confused in their roles and, as a result, define their identities either through a process of cognitive dissonance or conforming to the hegemony. One would expect, therefore, more obedience from people who live in societies where the borderlines between reality and illusion are blurred and lies prevail. These individuals can readily, as Albert Bandura terms it, 'morally disengage' themselves because they either do not see anything wrong in their heinous actions or they think of themselves as only instruments that are not actually responsible for their deeds.

In addition to anonymity, Bandura argues that such individuals will not picture their victims – their facelessness helps to deindividuate the victim and to distance their suffering from the actions of the perpetrator (Bandura 2002: 107–8). Furthermore, such individuals will disengage themselves through an expression of 'moral justification' (103). Deckard justifies his actions by seeking to obtain the money to buy a real animal (a goat), which in Deckard's post-

apocalyptic world is viewed as sacred, and approved both by the political authorities and Mercerism as holy. His claim to noble intentions is complemented by what Bandura terms 'euphemistic labelling' (Bandura 1975 et al: 254), the application of nice-sounding or neutral terms to disguise the reality of evil actions. So, androids are not mercilessly killed but are 'retired'. At the same time, others are blamed for one's own deeds: in the novel, there is hardly any mention of the evilness of humans whilst only the androids are viewed as a constant threat. World War Terminus, which was waged by humans before the novel starts, is rarely brought up as the reason for what is happening in their world. Androids, on the other hand, seem to be the subject of hatred and blame for what humans are solely responsible for. The psychologist Ervin Staub posits that 'difficult life conditions', such as in the novel, generate 'emotional and cognitive reactions' that shift 'individual identities to greater identification with some group […], elevating the group's status, […] by diminishing other groups, and finally, scapegoating (i.e., blaming) some group for the elevated group's life problems' (Staub 2004: 61).

But, during the novel, we see Deckard's perspective change from not caring to finally caring for androids. Three events appear to be especially significance in his empathetic transformation. The first is Deckard's encounter with the parallel police department and its head officer, the android impostor George Gleason. Whilst attempting to test the emotional responses of a female android opera singer, Luba Luft, Deckard meets his fellow bounty hunter, Resch, who arrests Deckard under suspicion of being an android himself. Resch takes Deckard to the hidden department, which Deckard knows nothing of, where he is interrogated by Gleason. The latter, who (unlike Rachael) knows he is an android, explains to Deckard that Resch is an android too but that he doesn't know he is. The revelation that Gleason is an android, and that Resch had been working for him without knowing it, makes both bounty hunters doubt whether they are androids or humans. The question therefore becomes: are Resch and Deckard androids with fake memories who think they are real humans, or are they really humans with real memories, who (because of the job they do) act as if they are machines? It could also be inferred that if memories tell us who we are, and are the cornerstones by which we make sure that we are genuine, how can we ascertain and rely on those memories being genuine themselves? This discrepancy foreshadows the change in Deckard's perspective towards androids and makes him (at least unconsciously) begin to sympathize and identify with them as creatures with possibly similar emotions.

The second major event is Deckard's encounter with Luba Luft because when he saw her 'he found himself surprised at the quality of her voice; it rated with that of the best, even that of notables in his collection of historic tapes'

(Dick 1996: 99). The grain, as it were, of Luba's voice makes manifest the same desires as those of human beings. Tracing her to an exhibition of the Norwegian artist, Edvard Munch, Deckard witnesses Luba's infatuation with the painting *Puberty* (1894), in which a naked adolescent girl sits on the edge of a bed, staring determinedly out towards the viewer, her arms and hands crossed in front of her genital region. Luba's identification with the painting makes Deckard sympathetic towards her, and he offers to buy a copy for her (which he does). John Goodridge, in discussing this scene, believes that 'Luba, Pinocchio-like, also wants to be "real", to understand what it feels like to be a real woman, a real person' (Goodridge 2012). Luba's recognition of Deckard, however, and her harrowing fear as a result of seeing him affects him deeply: 'her eyes faded and the colour dimmed from her face, leaving it cadaverous, as if already starting to decay. As if life had in an instant retreated to some point far inside her, leaving the body to its automatic ruin' (Dick 1996: 130). For the first time, Deckard sees his potential victim truly for what she is.

While Luba is fascinated by Munch's *Puberty*, Deckard is drawn to his most famous painting *The Scream* (1893), which he describes as:

> A hairless, oppressed creature with a head like an inverted pear, its hands clapped in horror to its ears, its mouth open in a vast, soundless scream. Twisted ripples of the creature's torment, echoes of its cry, flooded out into the air surrounding it; the man or woman, whichever it was, had become contained by its own howl. It had covered its ears against its own sound. The creature stood on a bridge and no one else was present; the creature screamed in isolation. Cut off by – or despite – its outcry. (129)

According to Goodridge (2012), the painting depicts the oppressive situation the androids are in and, in particular, the interminable frustration of their desires as embodied, in this scene, by Luba. Kucukalic reminds us, though, that both androids and humans face an 'existential crisis' in the novel (Kucukalic 2009: 82), so that the painting can also be read as depicting the tortured souls of humans and androids alike. 'Do androids have souls?' Deckard subsequently asks Resch. The answer seems to be yes because, when Resch fires at Luba, Deckard's observation stresses the importance of the effect and centrality of the paintings both for Deckard and the novel overall: 'She began to scream; she lay crouched against the wall of the elevator, screaming. Like the picture, Rick thought to himself' (Dick 1996: 131). In both remorse and self-disgust, Deckard lasers the notebook he had bought Luba because 'he cannot face this appalling physical evidence of Luba's desperate quest for humanity, in the light of the brutal butchering he has just enacted' (Goodridge 2012), therefore shifting the

balance between android and human.

The third major event is when Deckard falls in love with Rachael. As the property of the Rosen Association, the corporation that produces androids, Rachael also manifests a stoical behaviour and a level of metaphysical thinking that shows humans at their best: she wonders if when she dies, the Rosen Association will reproduce her and whether she will be reborn. Whereas in *Blade Runner* (1982), Deckard is recast in his relationship with Rachael as a sexual initiator and educator, in Dick's original novel, it is Rachael who educates Deckard into becoming a better person. Her murder of Deckard's goat, as just revenge for Deckard continuing and succeeding in his hunt for the remaining androids, Pris and Roy Baty, is not the non-empathetic action of an unfeeling machine; it is deserved retribution for Deckard's betrayal of her trust. His subsequent nervous breakdown is symptomatic of Deckard's realization of the vain glory of his murderous – and ultimately profitless – quest.

As a result of his experiences and actions, Deckard not only understands and perceives other points of view that he had not previously seen but his moral position – the positive mental picture that he has of himself – is also jeopardized. For him, androids are no longer deindividuated, anonymous or part of a category. His cognitive change can be best illustrated in the following picture that Wolfgang Kohler uses to explain how human perception works (Kohler 1992: 171).

In this picture if the reader is asked to see the smaller triangles in relief, three triangles on a white circle can be perceived, but if s/he focuses his attention on the three bigger triangles, s/he will see three large triangles attached to a white circle in the background. It could be said that Deckard, in a similar fashion, comes to see androids in a different light, which through the psychological machinations of the hegemony he had not been able to do before. His Gestalt change makes him conclude that 'electric things have their lives, too. Paltry as those lives are' (Dick 1996: 240). Deckard's change has implications in understanding how dystopias work. Dystopian regimes rely on these Gestalt mechanisms so that individuals see reality as the ruling power sees fit, and therefore become less empathetic toward one another and more in the service of despots.



The absence of empathy, on the other hand, seems to be the defining feature of dystopian fiction. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* people are scared and apathy is predominant; in *Brave New World*, John the Savage laments the lack

of love and human empathy which finally makes him commit suicide; and in Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451* (1953), the fireman Montag protests to his apathetic wife that 'I've heard rumours; the world is starving, but we are well-fed. Is it true, the world works hard and we play?' (Bradbury 1996: 74). Dystopia, according to Dick, can be defined as a place where there is no empathy, and individuals are left lonely or alienated as a result. Even if Mercer is a fake and salvation is an illusion, empathy remains a genuine, integrating force. By contrast, where pseudo-reality prevails, we can expect at least some degree of the psychological phenomena discussed above. By making individuals less anonymous, by not using generalizing or dehumanizing labels, and by trying to evidence the reality that we see around us rather than rely on unproven truth claims, it is possible to change from a psychology of evil to a psychology of good.

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Vegetarianism and Animal Empathy in the Life and Works of Philip K. Dick

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Philip K. Dick's lifelong love of animals appears to be implied even in his own name. 'Philip', meaning a 'lover of horses', was something Dick appealed to when naming his alter-ego 'Horselover Fat' in *VALIS* (1981). Moreover, as the animal rights philosopher Angus Taylor has pointed out, Dick's middle name – 'Kindred' – seems to convey the generous and caring relationships he sought between humans and other animals (Taylor 2008: 189). Animal empathy also played a central role in Dick's conception of morality, in which he regularly appealed to a person's treatment of animals as a means to determine their moral worth. Dick's emphasis upon animal-human relationships also greatly informed his writing. His examination of animal ethics in his best-known novel, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (1968), has been investigated extensively. However, a survey of Dick's other writings reveals a persistent concern with humanity's treatment of other animals that is evident from his earliest short stories to his final novels, and which often included endorsements and implications of vegetarianism.

Nearly all accounts of Dick contain an anecdote about the kindness he showed toward other animals. His second wife, Kleo, notes that Dick was 'very empathetic with […] cats and other small creatures': he would release mice he caught in their home into a vacant lot rather than kill them (Rickman 1989: 233). The writer Tim Powers, likewise, tells of how Dick provided a cockroach he trapped in his kitchen with food and water, since it 'looked ill' and adds that he was 'so sorry when the bug died, a day or so later' (qtd Anon 1982: 13). Dick also referred to a 'satori' (P. Dick 2011b: 392), a sudden experience of enlightenment, following an encounter with a beetle that he claimed inspired not only his understanding of empathy and morality but also his life's work. While in third grade, Dick discovered a beetle hiding inside a snail shell, and set about attacking it with a rock every time it tried to emerge. It was then that he realized 'that this beetle was like I was':

> He wanted to live […] and I was hurting him. For a moment […] I was that beetle. Immediately I was different. I was never the same again. I was totally aware of what I was doing, I was just transformed – my essence was changed […] His life was as precious to him as my life was to me. (Rickman 1988: 48)

For Dick, the way a person behaved towards animals indicated both their moral worth and their capacity for greater good. To Gregg Rickman, for example, Dick declared his seemingly genuine belief that humans were, in fact, disembodied

brains who were being tested by a group of god-like beings as to how they responded to various situations induced by direct sensory stimulation. Dick explained it was not the 'big decisions' that humanity was tested on, but rather the 'situations that are so small that we don't even realize there's a moral element involved', giving a friend's attempt to abandon his cat, only to have it put down when it returned a week later 'with the pads all worn of its feet', as an example of 'something **terrible**' that would fail the supposed test (Rickman 1988: 45; bold in original). Such ethical evaluation recalls the Voigt-Kampff test in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, by which unfeeling androids are distinguished from empathetic human beings through their responses to situations involving animal cruelty.

However, a different view of Dick's relationship to animals appears in Anne Dick's account of their marriage. During the early 1960s, Dick and Anne, his third wife, were living on a large property, populated with animals. Yet, while Dick was known to regularly pick up small sheep and hug them, he also slaughtered them for food and even developed paralysis in his hands from 'holding the hind legs of the sheep while their throats were cut' (Rickman 1989: 345). Anne, who by contrast was put off from eating mutton, considered Dick's lack of attachment 'surprising since he loved animals and was so sensitive'; to which Dick reminded her that he came from a farming background (A. Dick 1995: 80). Dick's dispassion, though, complemented his ill-treatment of Anne, including manipulation, committal to a psychiatric ward, physical beatings, even possibly attempted murder. In addition, despite his earlier catch-and-release policy, Anne recalls Dick putting out poison and traps for a particularly resilient rat, which he also attempted to drown and eventually decapitated with a hatchet (92-3). Dick's violence towards both humans and animals appears in *Confessions of a Crap Artist* (1975), via the abusive relationship of Fay and Charley Hume, which ends with Charley shooting the couple's pets as well as himself. Even if Dick's cruelties can be put down to his mental state, and were exacerbated by his drug use, he nevertheless appeared to consider the slaughter of animals for food to be both acceptable and commonplace.

By contrast, Dick's earliest short stories hint at the more radical messages concerning animal consciousness and vegetarianism that would appear in his later work. The first story Dick ever sold, 'Roog' (1953), is told from the perspective of a dog, while his first published story, 'Beyond Lies the Wub' (1952), sees its titular Martian creature debating philosophy with a spaceship crew intent upon cooking and eating it. The wub itself is a vegetarian – being 'too good-natured to hunt for game' – and, although the creature ends up being eaten by the ship's captain, it responds by taking over the man's consciousness and questions how 'any lasting contact' can be established between his species and humans

if they continue such 'barbaric' behaviour (P. Dick 2002: 30). Both stories give voice to nonhuman experiences with the latter directly challenging human carnivorousness. 'Beyond Lies the Wub' was followed by a sequel, 'Not by Its Cover' (1968), in which books bound in wub fur are re-written by the creature's lingering consciousness, which also appears to hold the secret to immortality. Although the story does not discuss carnivorousness, Dick's description of the wub as 'a fusion between a hog and a cow' suggests a connection between the enlightened creature and animals commonly consumed by humans via their resemblance (P. Dick 1991: 233). As Rickman notes, Dick 'differed from […] most other sf writers in his ultimate welcome for the alien' (Rickman 1989: 214), and his earliest celebrations of non-human consciousness were often connected with critiques of human carnivorousness.

In later life, Dick remained concerned with animal welfare and envisioned a future wherein Americans would become less carnivorous, for primarily ethical reasons. In 1976, he wrote to the vegetarian manufacturer Morningstar Farms, congratulating them on the taste of their mock meats and suggesting they re-direct their advertising campaign to appeal 'to people who are becoming progressively more and more morally squeamish about the killing and eating of animals. […] Stress only the positive, that animals are our companions and friends and not something or some-one to be eaten. I'll bet you a buck that the trend in this country is more and more away from killing and eating animals on ethical grounds rather than merely that of the health of the human doing the eating' (P. Dick 1991-2010: 6.304). Dick's recognition of animals as being 'some-one', rather than 'something', stresses the empathetic basis of his concerns. Moreover, while Dick himself may have switched to vegetarian 'meats' for health reasons, he emphasized the ethical aspects of vegetarianism above all. He also depicted just such an ethical vegetarian future in what is likely his most well-known and influential novel.

Although often only implied or hinted at in Dick's other works, vegetarianism is explicitly endorsed in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* The book's humans define themselves by their empathy which, as the protagonist Rick Deckard decides, 'must be limited to herbivores or anyhow omnivores who could depart from a meat diet', since empathy would impede the survival instinct of carnivores by making them 'conscious of the desire to live on the part of [their] prey' (P. Dick 1996a: 31). By Deckard's reasoning, it is impossible to be empathetic while remaining carnivorous, with the mere recognition that an animal might suffer prohibiting its consumption. The humans' emphasis upon empathy comes in response to a catastrophic nuclear war, which has left most of the earth's animal population extinct. In response, the humans undergo an organized effort toward better relations with other animals as a means of

redemption, with neglecting to take care of an animal being regarded as being both 'immoral and anti-empathetic' (13). Their empathetic redemption is led by the quasi-prophet Wilbur Mercer, whose name suggests 'mercy' and who preaches a love for 'all life, especially the [other] animals' (24). Mercer decrees that his followers 'shall kill only the killers'. However, they are 'free to locate the nebulous presence of The Killers wherever [they see] fit'. Deckard is therefore justified in his work, hunting (and executing) androids, who show 'no regard for animals' (31-2). Just why the androids are considered fit for execution, while other 'solitary predators', such as snakes and spiders, are considered 'sacred' (161) is unclear. Yet, as Sherryl Vint has argued, Deckard's occupation is 'about making rather than policing a boundary', with Dick 'simply [putting] androids in the place historically occupied by animals' (Vint 2007: 116-7). Moreover, that Deckard consciously makes his job more 'palatable' by thinking of the androids as sub-human (P. Dick 1996a: 31) further gestures toward a similar denial of subjectivity forced upon non-human animals by slaughterers, butchers and other purveyors of carnivorousness.

Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?'s investigation of animal subjectivity is complex and often contradictory, leading critics such as Vint and Josh Toth to address its intricate engagement with animal consciousness at great length. As Vint has identified, there is critical consensus regarding the novel, which contends that the book's human characters are degraded by their unfeeling, technologized lifestyles, with Deckard further degraded by his activities, before eventually being 'healed by reconnecting with nature' (Vint 2007: 112). She argues, however, that the humans are already android-like due to their reliance on rational – rather than empathetic – notions of subjectivity, and emphasizes the role of 'embracing animal being' in Deckard's ultimate defiance of the way 'the human/animal boundary is used to dehumanize the other so that ethics do not enter into certain kinds of killing [such as] slaughterhouses' (117). Toth, similarly, examines the way the novel's depiction of empathic expansion 'critiques the human tendency […] to commodify, exploit and estrange "others" in the name of humanity […] while simultaneously exposing the paradoxically self-serving limits of naive empathy' (Toth 2013: 67). Taylor, furthermore, has appealed to the novel's insistence on empathetic relations with other animals when refuting a 'new argument from nature', which he considers 'probably the most influential grounds for rejecting animal liberation' (Taylor 2008: 177). Despite the prevalence of the animal theme within Dick's writing, most critical examinations of his works that focus animal ethics have concentrated on this single novel. To understand Dick's position, though, necessitates addressing the less-examined explorations of vegetarianism and animal ethics which pervade Dick's fiction.

Empathy toward other animals is earlier promoted as a defining feature of humanity in Dick's short story 'Human Is' (1955). The story concerns a dispassionate toxin researcher, Lester Herrick, who is replaced by a more benevolent imposter from the planet Rexor IV. Herrick is portrayed as mechanical and unfeeling, while the Rexorian imposter is considered more human due to its passionate and kind behaviour. Herrick's inhumanity is shown through his unfeeling attitude toward food and animals; he taunts his nephew with descriptions of how animals are used for research and wishes that intravenous delivery of food would be made 'universally applicable' (P. Dick 1996b: 333). Yet, while Herrick's dismissal of animals is condemned as inhumane, vegetarianism is not promoted in its place, with one of the first signs that gives away Herrick's Rexorian replacement being its enthusiastic preparation of a 'sirloin steak' (333). Nevertheless, Dick considered 'Human Is' to represent his 'early conclusions as to what is human' and declared he had 'not really changed [his] view' when reflecting on the story over two decades later (492). Similarly, in his essay 'Man, Android, and Machine' (1976), Dick contended that the term 'human' applied 'not to origin or to any ontology but to a way of being in the world' which hinged upon kind actions (Sutin 1995: 212). A similar dehumanization to that depicted in 'Human Is' takes place in Dick's novel *We Can Build You* (1972), in which the robot designer Maury Frauenzimmer becomes concerned that his daughter, Pris (who shares her name with an android in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*), has become more machine-like following experimental treatment for her schizophrenia. He describes her as being 'precise as a calculator' and notes that while 'Once she had cared about animals […] she had suddenly gotten so that she couldn't stand a dog or a cat' (P. Dick 2012d: 31). Although not published until 1972, *We Can Build You* was written ten years earlier (as the quasi-mainstream effort *The First in Our Family*) and serves as a thematic precursor to *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* Both it and 'Human Is' provide early examples of Dick's fiction, which establish the mistreatment of other animals as being both inhuman and inhumane, with these themes being elaborated to include vegetarianism in his later work.

The electric animals, which foreground humanity's commodification of other animals in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, also have their precursors in Dick's earlier fiction. The protagonist of *Eye in The Sky* (1957), Jack Hamilton, creates a pair of mechanical cats in order to catch mice and flies (as well as each other). Although intended in jest, Hamilton's remark that 'Cats have no souls' (P. Dick 2012a: 30), since they seem only interested in procuring their next (carnivorous) meal, sets up a similar ethical boundary to that established between vegetarian and 'predatory' animals in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* The dehumanizing properties of carnivorousness are similarly touched

upon in a later scene satirizing dietetics, in which Hamilton is declared a '*savage*' due to his desire to eat 'Animal flesh' (134; italics in original). Although the scene's critique of human carnivorousness is, again, intended ironically, the boundary between human and non-human remains frequently blurred in *Eye in the Sky*. Moreover, that the humans are later described as eating 'Mechanically' (165), further connects the idea of consumption with dehumanisation.

Animal consciousness also provides a central theme in *Dr Bloodmoney* (1965) which serves as a companion novel to *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* Both books share a similar premise, with the events of *Dr Bloodmoney* also taking place following a catastrophic nuclear war. The novels are further linked through their similar casts of characters and preoccupation with a set of common themes, including animal predation and subjectivity. They differ, however, in the way their characters treat non-human animals following their respective nuclear catastrophes. 'Meat animals' have completely disappeared in *Dr Bloodmoney*, with many of its characters claiming not to have tasted traditional meats since the catastrophe. However, other, less-traditional animal fare has become available. Squirrels are sold at markets and recipes have been developed for 'dog soup, dog stew, [and] even dog pudding' (P. Dick 2007: 137). The post-catastrophe population have also adapted to eating radioactive fish. These animal offerings remain the result of hunting and scavenging operations, and no attempt to re-establish traditional animal farming appears to have taken place, since 'as everyone knew, an acre of land could function better as a source of grains or vegetables' (93). Yet, despite this practical concession to vegetarianism, the human-caused nuclear catastrophe in *Dr Bloodmoney* results in an expansion of humanity's carnivorous habits, rather than the empathetic and vegetarian relationship with non-humans inspired by that of *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*

The characters' treatment of other animals, however, remains indicative of their moral positioning. Dr Bruno Bluthgeld, whose miscalculations (and potential psychic powers) caused the catastrophe, seeks to atone for his transgressions by becoming a shepherd and awaiting God's judgement. That he further develops a 'phobia about slaughtering' and refuses to slay his sheep for meat, 'no matter what he's offered', is a further manifestation of repentance, which – as in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* – connects human absolution with an abstinence from carnivorous activity (121). Conversely, the increased barbarity of the television salesman Stewart McConchie is indicated by his brutal treatment of non-human animals. While first hiding from fallout in a shelter, McConchie kills a rat and eats it raw. Although framed as a matter of survival, since McConchie has not eaten in days, the cruelty of the act is also emphasized from the rat's perspective. Dick describes it squeaking 'long

and sufferingly' as McConchie skewers it, and Dick also draws attention to the 'aware[ness]' and 'fear' of the rat during this scene, as well as its desire to escape the situation (82). By granting the rat an internal perspective and desires, Dick draws attention to the potential amorality of its slaughter. Moreover, McConchie continues his exploitation of non-human animals even after he leaves the shelter. He becomes a salesman of automated animal traps, and lives in a 'cat-pelt-lined basement' rented to him by Dean Hardy, the traps' inventor (133). A scenario involving a dead animal pelt is considered a 'major element' of the Voigt-Kampff test in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (Dick 1996a: 49) and is representative in *Dr Bloodmoney* of both Hardy and McConchie's increased disregard for other animal life. Dick himself decorated his new house with sheepskin rugs made from the skins of the sheep he and Anne had owned, following their separation (A. Dick 1995: 175), and the tobacco merchant Andrew Gill, in *Dr Bloodmoney*, reflects Dick's own defence of animal slaughter when he states that being 'faced constantly with the death of animals' has 'always been one of the basic unpleasant verities of rural life' (P. Dick 2007: 184). However, a further connection between McConchie and Hardy's mistreatment of rats and their own ethical degradation is established, later in the novel, when the murderous Hoppy Harrington – whom Dick considered to epitomize the 'monster' inside all humanity (275) – is likened by the character Bonny Keller to a 'town rat catcher', causing her to shiver in revulsion (234).

As with Deckard, McConchie is dehumanized by his hunting-adjacent activities. He comes to consider, 'gloomily', that even a passing animal 'ought to be hanging by its hind legs minus its skin' (132). However, when McConchie's own horse is killed and eaten, the experience causes him to realize the deleterious effect that being an animal trap salesman is having on his personal growth. He then proposes the vegetarian alternative of becoming a horticulturist and discovering a kind of 'mutant potato that would feed everybody in the world' (141). Although he frames his revelation in terms of economic rather than ethical advancement, it is consistent with the ethical vegetarian-carnist dialectic that pervades Dick's fiction. Yet, just as Dick considered Deckard's apathetic dismissal of the androids to be proven 'correct', due to the 'cruelty' they display when cutting off the legs of a spider (Sutin 1995: 155), he found the predatory McConchie to be a more sympathetic character than the redemption-seeking Bluthgeld. In the afterword to *Dr Bloodmoney*, Dick confesses to holding a similarly hateful and 'overly simplistic' view of Bluthgeld, to that held by McConchie, whom Dick further describes as his 'favourite character' in the novel (P. Dick 2007: 276-7). Even so, Dick's sympathies are perhaps not as surprising as they might first appear; it is, after all, McConchie who recognizes the difference in the human-animal relationship in the novel's post-catastrophe

world, declaring that 'It's much closer; there isn't the great gap between us and them that there was' (136-7).

Issues of animal intelligence are also investigated in *Dr Bloodmoney*. Whereas nuclear radiation in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* is said to have resulted in supposedly less intelligent human beings, in *Dr Bloodmoney*, it causes the development of greater intelligence in other species. Dr. Bluthgeld's dog, Terry, is 'an extreme mutation' whose face is 'intelligent in a new way', and is also capable of basic speech (121). Fredric Jameson curiously characterizes such 'gifted animals' as a form of non-organic life, entirely distinct from (organic) human beings, when breaking down character types in *Dr Bloodmoney* (Jameson 1975: 35). Yet, beyond non-human animals presumably being organic, Dick further complicates Jameson's categorization by using the gifted species – in a similar manner to the (also organic) Nexus 6 androids in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* – to blur the lines between human and non-human intelligence, when he likens Terry's articulations to that of 'a human spastic' or someone trying to work a damaged vocal apparatus (P. Dick 2007: 122). That the schoolteacher Hal Barnes begins to show 'some sympathy' (127) for the dog, once he becomes better capable of understanding it, suggests greater communication as an effective way of establishing more empathetic cross-species relationships. Feral cats, in *Dr Bloodmoney*, are likewise rumoured to have developed a new language among themselves, and one of its characters even claims to have a pet rat smart enough to play the flute. However, since the cats are further rumoured to steal away and eat human children, 'they themselves [are] caught and eaten in return' (114). Nevertheless, the novel concludes with Keller wishing luck to two mutated bulldog-like creatures as they evade one of Hardy's traps, suggesting a more mutual relationship between the human and non-human animals left to rebuild after the war.

Notions of biological vegetarianism had a direct influence on Dick's writing. His insistence upon the vegetarianism of early hominids – stemming from an argument with Anne – led him to write *The Man Whose Teeth Were All Exactly Alike* (1984) in which the skull of a supposedly vegetarian, early humanoid is discovered in a suburban back yard. The skull is ultimately revealed as a forgery, intended to call attention to the incisor-less 'chuppers', who have experienced mutations due to water pollution in the area. Nevertheless, Dick reiterated his arguments for hominid vegetarianism to Rickman during his final years (Rickman 1988: 92), and Chuppers, appear again in *The Simulacra* (1964), as holdovers from an earlier period of human evolution who beg for vegetables, since they are incapable of eating meat. Dick makes no ethical arguments based on his insistence of hominid vegetarianism, however, carnivorousness is often connected with corruption in his other novels. Meat-marketing, for

example, is declared a 'fitting' occupation for an ex-SS officer (P. Dick 2012c: 31) in *Lies, Inc.* (1984). Likewise, that the antagonist of *Martian Time-Slip* (1964), Arnie Kott, becomes the head of a smuggling ring that specializes in terrestrial meats, of which he was previously the 'best single customer' (P. Dick 2003: 27), suggests a connection between carnivorousness and the corruption he represents. Meat is given a particularly dystopian treatment in *A Scanner Darkly* (1977), whose characters speculate about their burgers being made of 'ground up cows' anuses' (P. Dick 1984: 208).

Dick's ethical investigation of vegetarianism and animal rights continued throughout his later novels. When first outlining *Flow My Tears, the Policeman Said* (1974) to Roger Zelazny, Dick described the novel as a study of 'seven forms of love' and stressed that 'even love for an animal [was] included' (P. Dick 1991-2010: 1.291). Dick sent two pages which explored the human/animal relationship as a sample of the novel to Zelazny, which were presumably the same 'two rabbit pages' he sent his editor Terry Carr the same month (302). In the scene, as it is in the finished novel, the character Ruth Rae tells the tale of a friend's pet rabbit, who behaves affectionately toward two kittens and who attempts an ill-fated relationship with a neighbour's dog. The other characters commend the rabbit for having a 'complex personality' and for 'pushing against the limits of his […] physiology' by 'trying to become a more evolved life form, like the cats' (P. Dick 2012b: 117). Although the rabbit is considered less-intelligent than the cats, due to its 'smaller brain', it is shown to be capable of both 'love' and higher 'aspirations' and Ruth's later description of grief as 'the most powerful emotion a man or child or animal can feel', likewise, grants nonhuman animals internal emotional experiences (117-19). Although the other animals in the story are considered of lesser intelligence than the human characters, they are given value via their self-consciousness and capacity for both emotions and empathy. Dick stressed in his letters to Zelazny that there was 'nothing implied' in the scene 'about human beings improving themselves, or about human beings at all' in the original rabbit scene (P. Dick: 1991-2010: 1.302). However, the protagonist, Jason Taverner's later comparison of the conceivably worthwhile loss of a non-human pet to the supposedly unfathomable and horrifying loss of a human being suggests the scene is more preoccupied with how the human characters cope with the loss of their pets than with the experiences and concerns of the animals themselves.

Along with *Flow My Tears, the Policeman Said*, 1974 also saw the publication of Dick's controversial anti-abortion story 'The Pre-Persons', in which Dick conflates the issues of abortion and animal rights by having pound trucks patrol the story's streets for both stray animals and supposedly soulless human children. While writing the story, Dick wrote to the Animal Protection

Institute of America, commending them for their work with animals and declaring he was writing a story to 'make the point [that] helpless life forms need the protection of the strong, animals or human' (P. Dick 1991–2010: 2.331). Dick likewise characterized abortion as 'a dreadful menace to unborn children, much as there is to animals', when later defending the story to Vonda N. McIntyre (P. Dick 1991-2010: 4.177). Abortion is earlier connected with animal suffering and carnivorousness in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, where it carries a 'life sentence' and is used as part of the Voigt-Kampff test (P. Dick 1996a: 50). Nevertheless, 'The Pre-Persons' contains no explicit criticism of carnivorousness, although the story's human characters experience a kind of enforced, dystopian vegetarianism, with steak being served only to 'early comers' at restaurants as a result of overpopulation (P. Dick 2012d: 366). Dick's lone children's novel, *Nick and the Glimmung* (1988), in which a family emigrate to a new planet to save their cat from the 'dreaded anti-pet man' (P. Dick 1990: 9) who patrols the streets in response to food shortages brought about by overpopulation, presents a more animal-focused take on a similar premise to 'The Pre-Persons'. No criticism of carnivorousness is forthcoming there either. Yet, while Dick's opposition to abortion was controversial, he remained consistent in appealing to animal empathy as a basis for his ethical position.

The final decade of Dick's life coincided with an explosion in global animal rights criticism, largely due to the rise of the animal liberation movement during the early 1970s. However, Dick's engagement with animal rights philosophy appears to have been rooted almost exclusively in theology and classic metaphysics, despite his continued interest in the subject. As Tessa, his fifth and final wife, explains, 'toward the end […] Phil was more in tune with the Old Testament, especially with […] the kindness to animals and the needy' (Rickman 1985: 68-9). Dick's investigation of the Torah directly inspired *The Divine Invasion* (1981), a sequel to *VALIS*, in which the Scientific Legate Nicholas Bulkowsky relates a dream his wife, Galina, has had to the Christian-Islamic prelate Fulton Statler Harms. In Galina's dream, a giant fish offers itself as food to a group of people who saw off chunks of its flesh while it is still alive. Witnessing the fish's dissection during the dream, Galina thinks: 'This is wrong. We are injuring the fish too much'. Harms interprets the fish as Christ, who offers his flesh so that humanity may have eternal life, but Galina believes such an arrangement to be 'unfair to the fish' and considers that humanity 'must find another kind of food, which doesn't cause the great fish suffering' (P. Dick 2011a: 114). However, Dick's endorsement of animal sympathy is undermined earlier in *The Divine Invasion*, when an incarnation of the Hebrew prophet Elijah – Elias – debates morality with a dying dog. The dog responds to being asked whether it might be dying as punishment for having killed during its lifetime by declaring

that, although it kills for 'joy' as well as for food, it is essentially 'blameless' in the killing, since it has been 'constructed to kill smaller things' (76). The dog's response implies the right of larger creatures, including humans, to feed upon smaller ones. Moreover, while the divine Elias might choose not to consume other creatures, the other characters remain subject to God's 'natural' Law and are therefore as 'blameless' as the dog for their infliction of suffering upon other animals. The validity of a divine Law that allows animal suffering is also brought into question in *VALIS*, via the character of Kevin, who resents his Creator for allowing his cat to be 'stupid' enough to get run over (P. Dick 2001: 226-7). Even so, Galina's dream rejects the role of sacrifice and animal suffering inherent in Christian narrative, while suggesting a move toward an alternative belief system which minimizes suffering by abstaining from eating other animals.

Dick also argued for a Biblical basis for vegetarianism and the kind treatment of other animals during his correspondence with Ursula Le Guin. In 1981, Dick wrote to Le Guin that The Torah had 'enchanted' him with its 'haunting concern for all creatures' and quoted to her Deuteronomy 22:6–7, which cautions against interfering with a mother bird and her hatchlings (P. Dick 1991–2010: 6.218). He also appealed to the interpretation of the British Chief Rabbi, Dr Joseph Herman Hertz, who considered the passage to imply that the mother's eggs and brood should be left 'untouched' since they 'are generally unfit for food' (219). Although her side of the correspondence is unavailable at present, Le Guin seems to have taken issue with Dick's vegetarian interpretation, leading him to clarify in his following letter that Hertz himself was quoting the Medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides, who was 'simply pointing out […] that a dam brooding on eggs is brooding fertile eggs, which of course are unfit for eating' (228).

Animal ethics were also essential to Dick's interpretation of his own religious experiences. Writing to Le Guin in 1974, Dick told her that, as a result of the epiphany that subsequently inspired *VALIS*, he 'fell silent for the first time' and 'heard the talk of the small creatures' (P. Dick 1991-2010: 3.51). Dick claimed to have received a further vision in 1981 of a new messiah named Tagore, who lived in Sri Lanka, 'practicing high-technology veterinarian medicine, mainly with large animals such as cattle' (Dick 1991-2010: 6.257–8). Like Mercer in *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, Tagore's benevolence is suggested by his dedication to other animals and Dick, furthermore, wrote to several members of the science fiction community describing Tagore as an ecological martyr who gave voice, not just to the human 'elect', but to 'the ecosphere as a whole, from the snail darter [fish] on up' (258). Dick similarly considered a third vision – of ape-like alien creatures attempting to make contact with him in a paradisiacal meadow – to imply that animals were 'sacred' and identifiable with Christ, and appealed to the way *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* and *The Divine*

Invasion 'conceptually prepare[d] the way' for such a meeting as 'proof' of their validity (P. Dick 2011b: 864). His interpretation of the visions as an attempt by a higher power to prepare humanity for an encounter with a new form of extraterrestrial life led him to suggest his fiction's ultimate mission to be the preparation of humanity for contact with an alien consciousness, before which it must first necessarily recognize the subjectivity of other terrestrial animals. Although the authenticity of Dick's visions is questionable, and his self-analysis unreliable, his interpretations are consistent with a lifelong philosophical investigation, which emphasized the ethical treatment of animals.

As Kim Stanley Robinson has observed, the inconsistency of Dick's work suggests that he was perhaps 'not in full control of his fictions, and that the political analyses they embody were not consciously thought out' (Robinson 1984: xi). However, issues of animal ethics and subjectivity proved a cornerstone of Dick's fiction, as well as of his personal philosophy and politics. Although his concern for non-human animals took various forms, the recognition of other animals as essential beings who deserved as much consideration as any other creature remained central to Dick's conception of ethics, leading him to embed his fiction with messages of animal ethics and subjectivity. Carnivorousness and other animal cruelties are used as frequent markers of malevolence throughout his work, and Dick often judged people in real-life based upon their treatment of other animals. Although alluded to in *Dr Bloodmoney* and his early short stories, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* deals directly with issues of speciesism, while depicting the kind of ethically vegetarian future he envisioned in his letter to Morningstar Farms. He frequently discussed issues of animal empathy with other members of the sf community, and his ethical conception of animal consciousness also informed his later religious experiences and theological investigations, with Dick interpreting his various 'visions' in terms of the messages of species unity embedded in his fiction. Dick may not have been a vegetarian himself but, while many sf writers have helped advocate and raise awareness of vegetarianism and animal rights, he perhaps did more than any other author to promote more empathetic and ethical relationships with other animals.

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Uncursing the Cursed World: Bad Fate & Apostolic Reading in Philip K. Dick

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Philip K. Dick's 1965 essay 'Schizophrenia & *The Book of Changes*' opens with a discussion of humanity's relationship with the *koinos kosmos* or 'shared world' of objective phenomena and the *idios kosmos* or 'personal world' of subjective experience (Dick 1995: 175). Dick's opening argument is that for humans, unlike the majority of terrestrial lifeforms, the *idios kosmos* survives the moment of birth. Whilst subsequent research in animal cognition undermines Dick's hypothesis of anthropic exclusiveness, the division, distortion and fusion of shared and personal worlds are processes which permeate his fictional and nonfictional writings alike. Around the poles of *koinos* and *idios*, a series of pairings can be posited:[1]

[*koinos kosmos*]	[*idios kosmoi*]
phenomenal reality	subjectivity
ontology	epistemology
tyranny (dystopia of the state)	psychopathology (dystopia of the self)
politics	theology

In practice, these categories have a tendency to slide into and across each other. Although their listing above implies an oppositional relationship between each pole, it is my contention that Dick's writing harnesses each in the service of the other; not just bringing them into relation but enriching our critical and affective grasp of the one through the lens of the other. In other words, material oppression can be understood by way of schizophrenic thinking, and vice versa. Likewise, theological concerns are also political concerns, and so on. By means of an investigation of the *idios kosmoi* encountered by Dick's characters, and specifically the ways in which they relate their subjective experiences of suffering to materially-grounded causality, I propose to show the underlying co-dependency – in fact, the fundamental unity – of the political and metaphysical poles of Dick's writing. Along this road to Damascus, I will refer to Walter Benjamin's concepts of fate and history, as well as Giorgio Agamben's exploration of Pauline thought.

Portents

The realities encountered by the subjects of Dick's novels are invariably oppressive and laced with the inevitable prospects of suffering, madness, false consciousness and death. Paranoid thinking, at the level of the individual and of the state, is a constant. Textual elements such as psychopathology, drug

use, oligarchy, permanent war economy and fictive technologies contour and give shape to these worlds, operating as signs of the undesirable fates which befall the characters of each text. In *Martian Time-Slip* (1964), Jack Bohlen progressively slides into a mental breakdown. The event mirrors a similar breakdown Bohlen suffered some years previous, which is retold in a flashback that comprises part of the novel's fifth chapter (Dick 2008a: 66–70). In each instance, early symptoms of an impending psychotic break are received as foregone indicators of what is to come. Bohlen's girlfriend, Doreen Anderton, tries to impress upon him the prognostic significance of his ominous symptoms:

> 'That's an evil and sick drawing,' she said […]. 'I know what it is. It's the Tomb World […] The world after death […] that's what you're beginning to see…'
>
> 'It's not that bad,' he said, deeply perturbed by her reaction.
>
> 'Yes, it is,' Doreen said. 'And it's a dreadful sign that it doesn't strike you that way. Did it at first?'
>
> He had to nod yes. (144–45)

Bohlen and Anderton are both passive, seemingly unable to intervene in an irrevocable course of events. There is no alternative to nodding yes, and nothing remains to surprise either of them: it's always-already too late to change anything.

In *We Can Build You* (1972), Louis Rosen experiences a similar descent into mental illness. Again, characteristics and signs of his eventual breakdown are recognized and understood too late, signalling an outcome that is already determined. Rosen is flatly informed that 'There must be a far less stable streak in you than any of us knows about […] Someday you're going to reveal grave psychological problems' (Dick 2008c: 85), only to subsequently find himself behaving 'like a machine: propelling itself forward into a universe it did not comprehend […] like a blind thing flipping along' (169) as he flounders, seemingly helplessly, towards commitment to a mental health institution. As Dick would write later in *VALIS* (1981), 'one of the first symptoms of psychosis is that the person feels perhaps he is becoming psychotic' (Dick 2009: 183). In Dick's writing, the subject's unpleasant and restrictive experiences are intertwined with their always-already too late recognition of the causal chain directing their life. Psychopathology in *Martian Time-Slip* and *We Can Build You* is depicted as a process whereby Bohlen and Rosen's personal worlds recede from the increasingly stressful shared, outer reality of each novel. While these situations are driven by external factors – the machinations of Bohlen's boss, Arnie Kott, and Rosen's desperate romantic pursuit of Pris Frauenzimmer – each of them is mired in a hopelessly reactive predicament. They continually lag

behind external reality's curve.

Another perennial vector for this kind of dynamic in Dick's work is drug use. *Now Wait for Last Year* (1966) features the addictive death-drug JJ-180, which causes some of its users to encounter surrounding objects as totally fixed in place, with no possibility of agential intercession in or interaction with them: 'nothing could change because everything was present already' (Dick 2008a: 526). Upon first taking JJ-180, Kathy Sweetscent experiences an 'extinction of hope, of the ability even to conceive a possibility of escape' (523) as the objects around her deaden and lose all familiarity. She later discovers that a single dose of JJ-180 is both irrevocably addictive and will sooner or later prove fatal. Kathy's drug experience of being marooned in a deathly void outside of life, cut off from being able to access any meaning of or participation in surrounding phenomena, stands as an indicator of what will inevitably befall her. In the novel's setting, JJ-180 has been produced as a weapon of war for use against both civilian and military populations, such that what happens to Kathy as an individual subject points towards a future collective atrocity.

Another prominent drug in Dick's work is Substance D in *A Scanner Darkly* (1977), which is accompanied in the novel by similar elements of foregone death and belatedly perceived signs of personal fate. There is also an aura of 'afterward-ness' surrounding the motif of the scanner, of the novel's surveillance society as a collective existence in which the individual becomes both scanner (voided of agency and identity) and scanned (pre-recorded, pre-formatted, restricted). Reality itself – and the ways in which we read reality – is described as a recording several times in the novel: 'Another fantasy film rolled suddenly into his head, without his consent' (874) and 'Life in Anaheim, California, was a commercial for itself, endlessly replayed' (884). Robert Arctor becomes, in effect, a humanoid scanner, severely brain damaged to the point of being 'sentient but not alive' (1069) as a result of his Substance D consumption and reduced to performing the role of unwitting police surveillant. Drug addiction equates to becoming a recording, a state of being in which autonomy has disappeared. Ultimately, Arctor and Kathy slide from subjecthood in the direction of object status, living (yet doomed) indices of the world of each text, whereby their impoverished *idios kosmoi* stand as indicators for a more universal state of oppression. Crucially, neither of them realizes their fatal condition until it is far too late.

Beyond drugs and psychopathology, the hints and clues which imply the underlying determinism of a given Dick world can include a wide range of signs, from the trash in the gutter to instances of writings on the wall. *Ubik* (1969) overflows with fatal signifiers, as its characters are constantly trying to interpret what the signs around them – scummy cream in freshly served coffee,

antiquated currency, dilapidated elevators, urinal graffiti – might mean. Entropy and death are inevitable conclusions but the fact of their inevitability can only be faced after the point of no return has passed. As Joe Chip reflects, fatalism is a component of material reality: 'An image thrust itself into his agitated, fatigued mind: a bird caught in cobwebs. Age hung about the image […] this aspect of it seemed literal and real. And, he thought, prophetic' (Dick 2007: 690). Chip's intimations of mortality foreshadow, but do not offer an escape from, his companions' demises and his own near-death, each of them trapped in a process of accelerated bodily decay.

In *Time Out of Joint* (1959), Ragle Gumm comes to realize that his cosy life is actually a simulation when he encounters surrounding objects dissolving into signs bearing their names. This illusory world is not one that offers Gumm any kind of agency:

> We live in words. Our reality, among words not things. […] Thingness ... sense of substance. An illusion. Word is more real than the object it represents. Words don't represent reality. Word is reality. For us. anyhow. Maybe God gets to objects. Not us, though. (Dick 2003: 45)

Gumm's encounter indicates to him that his world is composed of signs whose true content is beyond his grasp. The consequence is a negation of any possibility of free action, of departing from reality's source code. As Umberto Rossi has noted, Gumm's experience is a total reversal of Goethe's *Faust*, whose statement '*Im* [sic] *Anfang war die Tat*' ('in the beginning was the deed') is quoted by Gumm shortly beforehand (Rossi 1996: 207). However, Gumm's brush with the Word(s) is not a purely metaphysical quandary, as it later transpires that his illusory surroundings are maintained so that he unwittingly contributes to a terrestrial war effort as the Earth's government seeks to impose its authority over the Moon.

In other words, it is not just that Gumm's inability to intercede in his surroundings stands as a metaphor for his unwilling participation in Earth's war, but rather that it also constitutes the material basis of his unknowing conscription. Behind the nostalgic comforts of suburban Americana lies oppression and destruction. Phenomenal reality, it would seem, is underpinned in Dick's work by inevitable suffering and death, and shrouded in illusion and uncertainty. It seems irrational and unpredictable whilst at the same time systematically restrictive in its rigid causality. Personal fate is indicated in signs and images. These signs are meaningful, but subjects are either unable to see them clearly, or can never arrive at their meaning in time for an alternative outcome to open up. As signs, they are not metaphors for something else, but mean *themselves* as signs of bad fate. Something, it seems, is wrong with our senses, our world, and our

ways of reading the world: 'we fell because of an intellectual error: that of taking the phenomenal world as real' (Dick 2009: 259–60). The fatalism experienced variously by Dick's characters operates as both a mentality, a figment of their inner subjectivity, and also as a sort of natural law: death and tyranny are real, and they are coming for you. In another sense, once fatalism becomes a core component of lived reality – the signs which comprise bad fate come to steer the course of our bodies and minds – *idios* and *koinos* start to merge within its malign agency.

Fate

In 'Fate and Character' (1919), Walter Benjamin proposes a model of perceiving causality which he suggests as typical of industrial modernity, one that is axiomatic to its society and culture. That is, the essay outlines the assumptions which the capitalist knowledge system insists that we perceive when we interpret and locate ourselves within the surrounding world. Benjamin's conception, then, is of a framework that operates as a tool of systemic control or restriction, a preformatting of how we experience life, how we feel able (or unable) to respond to its events. Benjamin outlines the model thus:

> If […] the character of a person, the way in which he reacts, were known in all its details, and if […] all the events in the areas entered by that character were known, both what would happen to him and what we would accomplish could be exactly predicted. That is, his fate would be known. (Benjamin 2004: 201)

In essence, Benjamin's essay presents a theory of knowledge and its intersection with material life. Its assumption is: if only we knew the various causal and material factors surrounding a given process, then we would be able to anticipate its outcome. Consequently, we are led to read events and outcomes in terms of their causation by external signs. An aura of the posthumous surrounds Benjamin's conception of fate and character, as these signs can only be discerned clearly in hindsight. By the time the moment of reading arises, it is already too late to intercede, too late to instigate or explore any possibility of change or difference. According to Timothy Bahti, this attitude of reading outcome from external objects and characteristics ratifies its own determinism, constituting a failure to grasp alternative possibilities, as 'to read such signs means to read them too late […] both the present and its signifying relation to a future are already past' (Bahti 1988: 71). Benjamin further articulates this predicament in the 'Madame Ariane' section of *One-Way Street* (1928), describing it in terms of the subject's relationship with knowledge: 'Omens, presentiments, signals […] To interpret them or to use them: that is the question. The two are irreconcilable. Cowardice

and apathy counsel the former, lucidity and freedom the latter' (Benjamin 2016: 87–88).

Dick's attitude towards foreknowledge is comparable. In addition to Ragle's reference to Goethe in *Time Out of Joint*, Horselover Fat quotes the same phrase in *VALIS* (Dick 2009: 251). In both instances, it refers to a positive model of living: grasping the moment by acting, rather than being bound to apprehending the word, the belatedly recognized signs held inside of language. Conversely, the paranoid subject in Dick's fiction is utterly entangled in the desperate desire to know everything in advance, to parse every figment of every facet of every possibility: 'The paranoiac is not only someone for whom every detail is meaningful […] but someone who holds a conception of meaning that is both totalizing and hermeneutic' (Freedman 1983: 16). For Dick, the paranoid fixation on knowing in advance is enmeshed with fatalism.

In *Radio Free Albemuth* (1985), Dick's stand-in, Phil, relates precognition to self-ratifying determinism: 'In my stories […] it placed the character in a closed loop, a victim of his own determinism […] Precognition did not lead to freedom but rather to a macabre fatalism' (Dick 2008b: 43). Our attachment to reading phenomena, to a retrospective and readable world, becomes a mode of pre-emptive concession to causal reality, and we wind up being bound into reading our own victimhood at history's hands. Dick's description of the schizophrenic individual in 'Schizophrenia & *The Book of Changes*' is pertinent: 'not knowing what is going to happen next and therefore having no way of controlling it […] is the *sine qua non* of the unhappy world of the schizophrenic; he is helpless, passive, and instead of doing things, he is done to. Reality happens to him' (Dick 1995: 177). In this scenario, there is no possibility of agency or free participation in events. In such a world, determinism is woven into subjectivity.

This predicament is a dire situation to be in. We can consider our existence within this framework, one which alleges that things happen *to* us, to be one of 'bad fate'; the time and world of bad fate. According to Benjamin, the signs which indicate fate come to cover the body. That is, they are a negation of the body as a site of freedom, of open process or agency: 'The laws of fate – misfortune and guilt – are elevated by law to measures of the person' (Benjamin 2004: 203). We see something similar in Dick's work. In *Ubik*, traces of entropy and death overcome the bodies of Joe Chip, Wendy Wright and Al Hammond, whilst the characters of *The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch* (1965) have their features overwritten, replaced with Eldritch's stigmata. A more materially rooted instance arises in *The Penultimate Truth* (1964), wherein dystopian clock time is written over the body:

> Time for bed. The clock said so, but – suppose the power had been off again […] the clock might be hours wrong. It might in fact […] really be time to get up. And the metabolism of his body […] told him nothing. (Dick 1970: 13)

Bad fate is a sort of petrified subjecthood, wherein we become the alienated observers of our own bodies. In effect, we become complicit in observing (and thus confirming) our existence as fate-bound subjects. Like Bob Arctor, we spy on ourselves, traitors to our own autonomy: 'Any given man sees only a tiny portion of the total truth, and every often, in fact almost perpetually, he deliberately deceives himself […] A portion of him turns against him and acts like another person, defeating him from inside' (Dick 2008a: 1020). Acknowledging our complicity in our own oppression is vital, as it entails the recognition that letting reality happen to us is only one option amongst many possibilities.

History

The notion of fate under discussion here is intrinsically temporal; it refers to what will happen next, and what has already happened. The ideas raised in 'Fate and Character' explore one avenue of Benjamin's wider theory of history. For both thinkers, our conception of history and the ways in which we remember the present constitute both a ground zero for tyranny and the key site of possible response and escape. In 'On the Concept of History' (1940) and *The Arcades Project* (1927-40), Benjamin conceives of official history and the thinking which underpins it ('historicism') as positing a model of time in which we cannot remember huge swathes of the past because their occurrence has been suppressed. Specifically, these tend to be either the catastrophic underpinnings – the 'wreckage upon wreckage' seen by the Angel of History (Benjamin 2006: 392) – of the social status quo or failed revolutionary opportunities, lost moments in which the ruling classes could have fallen. The result is that the linear, progressive time of official history, a time composed of an accumulation of supposed breakthroughs and advances in society and technology, is homogeneous and empty.

Under official history, the genocidal and racist underpinnings of Western liberal democracy are given a leave of absence. Given such a massively revisionary history, what else can Anaheim, California be but a site of endless self-proclamation? This is the history we experience as and in terms of bad fate. The predicament of concession to appearances and signs, to reality as we are 'supposed' to read it, informs an equally concessionary historical consciousness:

> It is a process of empathy. Its origin is indolence of the heart, that *acedia* which despairs of appropriating the genuine historical image

> as it briefly flashes up […] With whom does historicism actually sympathize? The answer is inevitable: with the victor. And all rulers are the heirs of prior conquerors. (391)

Historicism insists that we see only the triumphal victory parade of history's winners, the ruling elites of each era. *Acedia* (from the Latin for slothful) is the name Benjamin gives to the attitude demanded of us by historicism, a fate-bound subjecthood which surrenders any counterfactual possibility by virtue of its submission to the processional time of official history.

History, then, is the ground upon which fate is either contested or always-already decided for us. It is also the site of paranoia, as the paranoid obsession with reading is fundamentally bound to the compulsion-laden landscape of bad fate. In *The Man in the High Castle* (1962), a text which places history and historicity centre-stage, Dick describes Nazi paranoia as rooted in the desire 'to be the agents, not the victims, of history' (Dick 2007: 38). To desire escape from historical victimhood by means of becoming history's agent requires both an awareness (and thus acceptance) that history is a victim-producing system and also a resolve to be its inheritor, to join the victory parade. Dick's Nazis seek to exert their control over history as a whole, leveraging their mastery of the present as a hegemony over the past and future. In so doing, their interests align with those of what Benjamin calls historicism: every stop on the temporal road is yoked to the worst of all fates. Benjamin's theory of history indicates that tyranny must curate its own legitimizing backstory as a matter of necessity. In other words, it has to produce the very signs that its subjects are subsequently forced to read as signifying their own inevitable oppression.

Dick's worlds are often held tight in the suffocating grasp of a triumphal history which has culminated in war, dystopia, or both. The totalitarian societies of novels such as *The Simulacra* (1964) and *The Penultimate Truth* are premised on carefully falsified accounts of history. In the former, the United States of Europe and America is a one-party state ostensibly ruled by an elected president who is secretly one of a series of robotic figureheads. Political power is held by a permanent first lady, Nicole Thibodeaux (herself portrayed by a series of actresses), on behalf of a secret council. In the latter, an aristocratic class of marketing copywriters maintains power on the basis of a president-simulacrum and a series of fraudulent war documentaries. Such government-by-façade engenders an experience of historical time that is interminable and homogeneous. In both texts, history is both vector and pathogen of oppression.

In Dick's later novels we are alerted to the fact that oppression exists as a totality across historical continua, referred to in *VALIS* as 'The Black Iron Prison' (Dick 2009: 212). In both *VALIS* and its earlier draft *Radio Free Albemuth*, Imperial Rome is used as a motif for this transhistorical tyranny:

> *Rome was here now*; it has invaded the landscape […] Rome had revealed itself as the underlying reality of our present-day world […] There lay no relief from it either in the past or in the present, although in a sense I experienced no past, just a continual present of vast immensity. (Dick 2008b: 158)

The cross-temporal presence of oppressive rule is suffocating. History becomes a nightmare from which there is no waking, and in which things are always ever more the same. In *The Divine Invasion* (1981), the voice of the devil – whose presence signifies the worst of all possible worlds – intones and imposes the attitude of *acedia*: 'Nothing has changed and nothing is different. You could not escape it then and you cannot escape it now' (Dick 2009: 604). This takeover of temporal consciousness, by which the oppressive status quo colonizes past and future categories as extensions of its seemingly inevitable (because 'natural') hegemony, is the bad fate of historicist time, an experience of inescapable entrapment and alienation which demands that we submit to it on a continual basis.

Awareness of these dynamics is step one towards an emancipated understanding of fate and history. In 'On the Concept of History' and *The Arcades Project*, Benjamin proposes an unseating of *acedia*. This becomes available through blasting open the homogeneous course of official history. Two terms he uses to ground this notion are the classical notion of *apocatastasis*, literally a restoration or restitution, in which 'the entire past is brought into the present in a historical apocatastasis' (Benjamin 2002: 459), and 'now-time' (*jetzeit*):

> History is the subject of a construction whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled full by now-time […] Thus, to Robespierre ancient Rome was a past charged with now-time, a time which he blasted out of the continuum of history. (Benjamin 2006: 390)

Benjamin's theory of historical liberation is tied to both revolution and messianism. A messianic appreciation of time is one permeated by the presence of many other periods and the opportunities they present. To make the present moment one available to us *now*, recourse to the values and possibilities other eras is necessary. In Dick's work, alternatives to tyranny and salvific possibilities arise in connection to different types and operations of time. In *The Penultimate Truth*, time travel is presented as the route by which the novel's ersatz reality can be suspended, whilst in *Now Wait for Last Year* versions of Earth's wartime leader (Gino Molinari) from alternative timelines are the planet's best recourse to prevent its annexation at the hands of its sinister ally, the planet Lilistar. An escape from the nightmare of history in *The Man in the High Castle* is presented

as an association of the jewellery created by Ed McCarthy and Frank Frink. Their work is described as existing 'in opposition to historicity' (Dick 2007: 155), a quality which both points to 'an entire new world' (156) and, in the novel's penultimate chapter, causes Nobusuke Tagomi to be briefly transported into what seems to be the Nazi-free timeline of our own world. The revelation in Dick's later novels that '*Rome was here now*' is not just suffocating but also offers a liberating step towards *apocatastasis*/now-time by offering up a differential reading of oppression and suffering, exposing official history as a text which conceals the fact that it is based upon a continuity of control and restriction. The result is that excluded knowledge and experience is brought back into what we can read, what we can live. Fittingly, the messiah figure of *VALIS*, Sophia, offers a counter-formulation to the devil of *The Divine Invasion*: 'Unless your past perishes […] you are doomed […] Your future must differ from your past. The future must always differ from the past' (Dick 2009: 349).

Apostolicism

Where does the individual subject figure in all this? Messianic salvation promises the possibility of an emancipated experience of fate and history, but it appears to do so in a manner that is lacking in both agency (messianism as a benevolent fatalism) and clear commitment to political activism. At the same time, Dick's work is committed to addressing 'real suffering and real death' (Dick 2008a: 723) rather than escaping reality altogether. As Scott Durham has argued, 'Dick's theology […] does not imagine a leap beyond the world' so much as its 'reorganization by a collective subject' (Durham 1988: 183), whilst *Radio Free Albemuth* closes with an affirmation of the responsibility to act in the here and now: 'It has to be this world […] There has to be something here first, Phil. The other world is not enough […] [Because] this is where the suffering is. This is where the injustice and imprisonment is' (Dick 2008b: 280).

This world-reorganizing subject is arguably composed of the characters and readers of Dick's novels, and that their collective subjecthood can be understood in terms of Giorgio Agamben's reading of Pauline apostolicism in *The Time That Remains* (2005). Agamben's book offers a striking and resonant model of the terrain of process and possibility that Dick's work opens into, a space and time in which the sterile continuum of bad fate and official history can be suddenly overcome. For Paul, Agamben claims, the time of the apostle's action is a time *after* the messianic event. In one sense, the time of history has already started to run down, as the messiah's advent signals the approach of the world's end:

> What interests the apostle is not the last day, it is not the instant in which times ends, but the time that contracts itself and begins to end […] or if you prefer, the time between time and its end. (Agamben 2005: 62)

The after-the-fact quality of apostolic time is in many ways a reversal of the belatedness of bad fate, as it constitutes an interval of renewed possibility, in which interpretation and outcome remain as-yet undetermined, potentially available for the individual to intercede in or contribute to. Almost the entirety of the plot (such as it is) of *VALIS* takes place in an 'after': after its protagonist's psychotic breakdown/religious epiphany, after the Good News of impending salvation – '**St. Sophia is going to be born again** […] **The time you have waited for has come**' (Dick 2009: 262) – but before an eschatological conclusion of all time that would by definition preclude any possibility of new events or narratives emerging.

Apostolic time, then, is a time of *reading*, or perhaps of (re)reading the world differently to how we have been reading it up to this point: 'messianic time is *the time that time takes to come to an end*, or, more precisely, the time we take to bring to an end, to achieve our representation of time' (Agamben 2005: 67). Apostolic time also operates as a supersession of linear clock time:

> Whereas our representation of chronological time, as the time *in which* we are, separates us from ourselves and transforms us into impotent spectators of ourselves […] messianic time […] is the time *that* we ourselves are, and for this very reason, is the only real time, the only time we have. (68)

Instead of sitting inside of the processional time of official history, apostolic time unfolds a space of uncertainty, of open process and possibility. It contains a tension between the already (the messiah's arrival) and the not yet (the ultimate fulfilment of time and fate). In other words, there is still work to be done in this world. It offers a moment of opportunity, of shifting from reading fate to action, from word to deed. Agamben's reading is fundamentally concerned with possibility and responsibility: 'messianic time […] is not another day, homogeneous to others; rather, it is that innermost disjointedness within time through which one may – by a hairsbreadth – grasp time and accomplish it' (72).

This is the space and moment that Dick's work takes us to. If the horrible swirl of violence, tyranny and death underlying his worlds leaves the subject mired in paranoia and the nightmare of official history, his writing also opens up an apostolic territory of differential reading, of agential action and the possibility of escaping bad fate. The quasi-visionary notion of blasting eras of history out of the sequence to empower revolutionary action in the present offers one possible framework for a time that is available to us right now, one ripe with the prospect of newly available agency: 'For two thousand Earth years the clock of eternity had been stopped at 70 A.D. Now that clock showed a new time; its hands had at last moved forward […] It was our world. Our portion of time. It

was now' (Dick 2008b: 160–61). Traces of apostolic consciousness can also be found in how Dick's books end or, in some cases, do not end. *VALIS* and *Radio Free Albemuth* conclude in apparently tragic, defeatist circumstances. In *VALIS*, Sophia perishes in a seemingly meaningless accident whilst Phil/Horselover Fat remains mentally unwell, whilst *Radio Free Albemuth* closes with one of its protagonists (Nicholas Brady) dead at the hands of a fascistic state and the other (Phil) imprisoned for life. However, both endings are ambiguous and potentially hopeful. The closing pages of *Radio Free Albemuth* feature an avowal of this world's importance (quoted above) before focusing on the ambivalent but undeniable promise of younger generations (284–86). *VALIS* ends with Phil's decision to keep faith with the spiritual commission he received from Sophia, concluding in a moment and space of apostolic reading and time, a time of coming to terms with time: 'My search kept me at home; I sat before the TV set in my living room. I sat; I watched; I waited; I kept myself awake. As we had been told, originally, long ago, to do; I kept my commission' (Dick 2009: 385). The key point which lies at the heart of what each of Benjamin, Dick and Agamben are getting at is that, in spite of their reference to the messianic, it is not just possible but necessary to grasp a concept of eternity – an utterly conclusive end of all time and suffering – and simultaneously be absolutely committed, *within time*, to the necessity of contingency, uncertainty, chaos and open process. The struggle against bad fate, after all, resides within the time that is lived, rather than eternity. The time in which we have the chance to grasp a time that can be ours, of a history that is yet to be recorded.

Cancelling the Cancelling

One of global capitalism's fundamental characteristics, and dirtiest tricks, is its alloying of inevitability and change. By proclaiming a hegemonic concept of novelty to be a sort of natural law, it becomes possible for 'new' products and campaigns (commercial, political or cultural; the boundaries blur) to be continually deployed without any genuine transformation of the underlying world socioeconomic system. When every instant of official history sells us the same dull round as if it were something new, every future is cancelled – except for the one that we are told that we were always going to get.

Dick gets at this contradictory dynamic via his exploration of paranoia. In 'The Android and the Human' (1972), he posits that '*all* systems – that is, any theoretical, verbal, symbolic, semantic, etc., formulation that attempts to act as an all-encompassing, all-explaining hypothesis of what the universe is about – are manifestations of paranoia' (Dick 1995: 208). In other words, the received *koinos kosmos* of official reality is paranoiac, controlling and deathly. Dick's manifestation of evil is as an unending increase in solidity and stasis

that nonetheless eludes our grasp: a collapse of the horizon of possibility which brings with it a curtailment of agency[2]. Later in the same essay, Dick proposes an embracing of unpredictability as inherent to our surroundings as a counteragent to paranoia's fatalism: 'Sudden surprises […] are a sort of antidote to the paranoid […] because to the paranoid, nothing is a surprise; everything happens exactly as he expected, and sometimes even more so' (208).

Boris Eizykman has identified Dick's writing as a literature which opens into an emancipating, stochastic terrain: 'The paranoia of control runs up against that model of reality which Dick privileges: metamorphosis, the randomness of encounters and emotional outbursts, unexpected intensities' (Eizykman 1983: 32). Chaos, for Dick, is about a rupture from repetition. It is a site of opportunity, an emergence of genuine difference. And its site is not the certitude-portending figure of a messiah, but rather the individual whose subjecthood is assembled between reader and fictional character. In *VALIS*, Dick crucially cites the concept of '*salvator salvandus*' – the 'saved savior,' or saviour who saves themselves (Dick 2009: 293). In Benjamin's philosophy, it is not the angel of history who can save us, and possibly not even the messiah, but rather the historical materialist (writer, reader, subject) who instigates their own liberation. Both Dick and Benjamin enlist theology as a vital component of the activist struggle for a better world. Agamben's model of apostolic time offers some further directions to the ground sought: an available, precarious, uncertain now-time which is truly here and now. Dick's writing is invested in uncovering buried figments of historicity and knowledge, but also in the present world of experience, suffering, joy and change, in looking towards the now, even as the now is something we struggle to recognize. And not just looking, but opening a way from reading into doing, from word to deed.

Endnotes

[1]In the following list, although the term *kosmoses* has been used elsewhere in Dick scholarship, I have chosen to use kosmoi (from the Ancient Greek κόσμοι), as the plural of *kosmos.* The use of *kosmoi* in these columns reflects the fact that Dick's subjects encounter a range of private worlds (sometimes within a single text, as in *The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch)*, rather than a singular *idios kosmos*.

[2]My gratitude goes out to Rachel Hill for the stimulating feedback and conversation which fed into these ideas.

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Westworlds: The Frontier Politics of Suburban California in Philip K. Dick's Space Colonies

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The growth of American suburbia during the mid-twentieth century has long been articulated in language that casts suburban development as a version of the western frontier. From the fictional production of *The Petrified Forest* in Richard Yates' *Revolutionary Road* (1961), to Kenneth T. Jackson's 1985 study of the cultural and material conditions surrounding the development of American suburbia, writers and critics have described suburbanization in terms that recall western expansion. As we shall see, Philip K Dick can be included among this number, writing stories of frontier worlds whose inhabitants lounge by their picture windows and equate freedom with horizontal living space. These writers describe suburbanization as a process in which both the material conditions of building outwards from an urban centre, and the lived experience of those people moving to these newly built homes on the edges of a metropolitan area, echo the larger processes of colonization and westward expansion that have shaped both a national geography and a national myth. As Lizabeth Cohen writes:

> The 'happy-go-spending' world of mass suburbia was a new frontier beckoning them [white families], promising the same opportunity and prosperity that earlier American frontiers had offered their settlers, this time through the miracle of mass consumption. (Cohen 2003: 251)

It is not surprising in this context that the postwar expansion of suburbia would popularize a mass-produced form of vernacular domestic American architecture, the ranch house, whose design evokes, paradoxically, the mythologized independence and pioneering spirit of the western frontier: 'The suburban struggle for upward mobility through the acquisition of material goods had been creatively transcribed through the Ranch Style House: it had become an American Frontier saga' (Allen 1996: 162).

Alongside the rise of the ranch house as 'the most ubiquitous low-cost dwelling of the post war era' (Faragher 2001: 172), another form of cultural expression, the genre of science fiction, drew on the mythology of the frontier to craft stories of extraterrestrial colonization and national expansionism. As Michael Ziser has argued, sf narratives draw together the tropes of western expansionism with an exploration of the politics of frontier land development in settings that evoke the contemporaneous suburban expansion of North America. More specifically, these stories reflect the rapid suburbanization of the Southern Californian landscape; as Ziser writes of Ray Bradbury's *The Martian*

Chronicles (1950):

> The persistent evocation of arid suburbia is one of the first clues that Bradbury is writing about something more historically specific than a lost prewar America […] No writer of the period takes as many pains as Bradbury in detailing the material and psychological consequences of the explosion of residential construction in California after World War II. (Ziser 2013)

The contemporary sf author, Kim Stanley Robinson, has also discussed the transformation of California in terms of planetary colonization; the Californian landscape was arguably 'terraformed' from 'orange groves […] into suburbia' (Robinson 2013). Ziser too reads sf stories of planetary colonization as transposed versions of Californian land development history, arguing that Dick's stories and novels of the 1950s and `60s explore the experience of life in the rapidly developing suburban landscapes of that era, and that the interest of his non-sf work in suburban settings is complemented by his sf's 'relentless attention to colonization' (Ziser 2013). Both interests, Ziser suggests, are facets of Dick's attention to the 'ideological and material infrastructure that invisibly determines the imaginative horizons of his characters' (Ziser 2013).

While Ziser and Robinson both talk broadly about the ways in which colonization narratives dramatize the development of Californian urban space in the postwar years, and link the work of Dick, Bradbury and Robert Heinlein, in particular, to suburban development; they are interested in the larger patterns of development, rather than in more specific examples of regional development. However, ranchhouse tracts, more specifically than suburbia in general, capture the precise set of cultural narratives that are similarly expressed in sf stories about planetary colonization. This sympathy between the regional real estate development and the regional literature means that we can read the sf of writers like Dick in more precise terms than Ziser and Robinson have done so far. This article aims to draw out the ways that the colonized extraterrestrial spaces of Dick's sf echo the same ideologies of expansion and US exceptionalism which underwrote suburban expansion in the mid-twentieth century. It shows how Dick's sf critiques suburban expansion by taking into account the historically and ideologically limited perspective of its creators, and comments on its social and moral failings through its replication in the physical and social environment of many postwar suburbs.

From its inception, the ranch-house design married American cultural interest in the country's past and its future. Thomas Hine says of the ranch that it blends 'Tomorrowland and Frontierland' (Hine 1989: 176). Yet much like the physically adjacent Disney theme worlds being referred to, the developers

of the ranch telescoped and cherrypicked from history, evoking an idealized western landscape of freedom while excluding the reality of racial violence and exclusion that underwrote white America's manifest destiny.

The ranch house itself is a simple one-storey house, usually L-shaped, with a long low profile reminiscent of Prairie School architecture. It has an open-concept living area with flow between the inside and the outside of the house, usually encouraged by a large sliding door between the living room and the backyard. Boundaries between interior and exterior spaces are blurred by the inclusion of courtyards and plentiful windows. Early examples were often clad in adobe, with tiled roofs to evoke the agrarian colonial California Spanish rancho homes. Cliff May, a self-taught designer, popularized the twentieth century ranch house, building the first in San Diego and expanding later in Los Angeles during the 1930s. May conceived of his ranch houses as buildings that promoted modern iterations of a traditional Californian way of life, as he said: 'The ranch house was this informal way of living, the old California way' (Faragher 2001: 166). But, as Barbara Allen points out:

> The pastoral, fictionalized version of the rancho and ranch period, like the previous mission century, has been heavily edited. Mired in class struggle, people of color and natives were the abused labour forces of first the padrones and later the Anglos who continued the missions' hierarchical color structure and abuse of women. The ranch house, while serving its purpose in the conquest of California, was certainly not an artifact welcomed or celebrated by all. (Allen 1996: 157)

May's interest in the ranch house as a template for informal, close-to-nature life, discounted its history as an artefact of colonization, and repackaged ranch-house life as a lifestyle goal. During the postwar period, this repackaging proved hugely popular: in the two decades following the Second World War, the ranch became the most popular housing style in America.

As developers apprehended the favourable equation offered by the ranch, namely a simple, easily reproduceable design, and an eager customer base, they began to plan large-scale tracts of such houses. They marketed them in ways that drew on the design's connotations of a romanticized frontier life, while eliding its evolution from a form which materialized colonial aspirations. As John Faragher explains:

> 'The style that has captured the attention of the American public is the Ranch- House,' wrote the authors of a builder's guide published early in the [1940s] and reissued immediately after the war. The very name evoked myth. 'When we think of the West,' they mused, 'we picture to ourselves ranches and wide open spaces where there is plenty of

elbow room.' (Faragher 2001: 171)

At the same time, as Hine's formulation of Tomorrowland and Frontierland suggests, developers leveraged newly acquired materials and building techniques to promote their developments as houses of the future. In the San Fernando Valley, industrialist Henry Kaiser developed the planned community Panorama City, on the former Panorama dairy ranch. The Panorama City development drew on Kaiser's reputation as a technology innovator in its marketing strategies: Kaiser and residential developer, Fritz Burns, built a $250,000 home to showcase the technological advancements available to potential homebuyers. The June 1946 issue of *Popular Science* contained a three-page spread advertising the Panorama City house, titled 'The House that Has Everything', which emphasized the role of science in modern home conveniences, casting home appliances and design as a facet of scientific progress. In their efforts to attract buyers to their tracts of ranch style homes, Kaiser and Burns blended the language of technological progress with the extant colonial and frontier modes by which ranch houses were conceptualized. As we shall see, a similar blending of frontier and scientific discourses was at work in the colonization narratives produced within sf during the postwar period.

Planned communities and tracts of ranch homes, like Panorama City, made home ownership possible for a large portion of Americans. However, postwar development failed to truly democratize real estate. In LA, racially exclusive covenants were common on new developments until they were outlawed in 1948; but some of the first ranch-home developments in the area (including Panorama City itself) were sold with such covenants in place and, despite the restrictions lifted in the late forties, suburban home ownership established itself as a goal achievable mainly by white Americans. The reasons for this are complicated, but the conception and marketing of the ranch house as a symbol of historical conquest and individual freedom reflects, in some part, the ideology of exceptionalism and exclusion that allowed 'white flight' (the movement of white Americans from racially diverse urban areas to ethnically homogenous suburban areas) to take hold. Arguably, the mythology associated with the ranch house continues to ensure that suburban home ownership remains largely the domain of white Americans.

Concurrently with the rise of Californian-grown housing styles, and the spread of ranch-house suburbia, science fiction from the state mobilized the same Frontierland/Tomorrowland dichotomy as the houses did, but in the service of narratives of extraterrestrial expansion, colonization and the conquering of the 'final frontier'. *Martian Time-Slip* (1964), for example, opens with a scene that places the suburban nuclear family of 1950s popular culture wholesale into

the Martian landscape:

> From the depths of phenobarbital slumber, Silvia Bohlen heard something that called. Sharp, it broke the layers into which she had sunk, damaging her perfect state of nonself.
>
> 'Mom,' her son called again, from outdoors.
>
> Sitting up, she took a swallow of water from the glass by the bed; she put her bare feet on the floor and rose with difficulty. Time by the clock: nine-thirty. She found her robe, walked to the window. (Dick 2012a: 1)

Dick relies on our familiarity with mid-century representations of nuclear family life and uses figures from such representations as a kind of cultural shorthand. The mom inside the home, the son in the yard, and the water by the bed: everything in its proper place. But the banality of suburban life and its representation as stultifying and overly ordered works as an additional layer of humour in the juxtaposition of this human ordinariness with the Martian setting. Dick implies that there is little difference to be found between the lifestyles of those inhabiting 1950s and '60s American suburbia (as popularly portrayed), and the lives of these characters on Mars, despite the alien-ness of the setting.

But Dick's novel is also deeply interested in who is excluded from the wealth and prosperity that these pseudo-suburban Martian enclaves hold. As Susan Cooke Weeber argues, while the colonization of Mars is Earth's future, the future we are presented with in Dick's story is one that is both strangely non-futuristic, and haunted by the past:

> Though Mars here is envisioned as the future hope of an overcrowded Earth, it is hopelessly antiquated – rotting, even – and strewn with these traces of an ancient, indigenous civilization. These traces point to the pastness infecting the present at the same time that they illuminate a long history of colonial exploitation that haunts the novel. Though these indigenous people, the Bleekmen, are minor characters – dismissed or forgotten about both by the other inhabitants of Mars and by most contemporary scholarship – much of the plot, in a subterranean way, spirals back to and radiates from encounters with the Bleekmen and the erasure of their civilization. (Cooke Weeber 2016: 579)

Cooke Weeber's reading of the novel unearths the centrality of the Bleekmen and their forgotten past to the novel's interest in the construction of history and identity. She argues that the Bleekmen's disappearing civilization contextualizes the novel's focus on narrative mutability and, in doing so, helps us to understand the contentious process of history and archive-making: what gets left out and whose stories are maintained. In fact, she directly connects this theme of the

novel to the land development that comprises the novel's central plot: 'This drama of capitalism that sets the plot in motion is doubled or echoed by the longer history of exploiting the Bleekmen and appropriating their land, a history that is obscured, disavowed, or forgotten by characters and critics alike' (Cooke Weeber 2016: 580).

An additional subset of people finds themselves excluded from the nuclear family, and thus suburban life, in the novel: the apparently mentally ill children who are confined to the hospital camps and clinics outside of ordinary residential areas. One of these children, Manfred Steiner, in whose possibly premonitory powers industrialist Arnie Kott takes an interest, finds relief from his fractured perceptions in his encounters with the Bleekmen, who are the first people Manfred perceives in an undistorted way. The novel thus pairs the excluded children with the exploited and colonized Bleekmen in a union of the oppressed. This union might be read as a model for viewing our world, in which the Native Americans of frontier history, and those excluded from suburban spaces in the novel's contemporary America, are a connected group whose shared exclusion from land ownership constitutes a fundamental fault in the ideology of American capitalism.

In *Martian Time-Slip*, Dick makes clear that there is a connection between the specific space of the suburban home and Martian colonization. Jack Bohlen remembers his reasons for leaving Earth as being specifically tied to urban space and its effect on his psyche:

> I emigrated to Mars because of my schizophrenic episode when I was twenty-two and worked for Corona Corporation. I was cracking up. I had to move out of a complex urban environment and into a simpler one, a primitive frontier environment with more freedom[…] That co-op building; can you imagine a thing going down level after level and up like a skyscraper, with enough people living there for them to have their own supermarket? (Dick 2012a: 89)

For Jack, it is particularly the vertical organization of urban and domestic space, and the crowdedness of city life, that is oppressive. He identifies Mars' 'frontier' as its alternative, evoking horizontal rather than vertical expansion. Significantly, he relates this story to the Kindly Dad robot in a setting that is a replica of the inside of a suburban home:

> The chamber in which Kindly Dad sat consisted of one end of a living room with a fireplace, couch, coffee table, curtained picture window, and an easy chair in which Kindly Dad himself sat, a newspaper open on his lap. (86)

The 'picture window with all that glass' was a defining feature of the ranch house; as Witold Rybczynski writes: 'the rancher's most striking feature was its diffidence. Low to the ground, it lacked traditional domestic status symbols, such as porticoes and tall gables. Its one extravagance was a large window facing the street – the picture window' (Rybcznski 2007: 207). But here, Dick connects the false clarity of Kindly Dad's picture window to a tendency to self-selected ignorance on the colonist's part directly connected to their treatment of the Bleekmen:

> That picture window with all the glass – sandstorms would make it opaque. In fact there is not one thing about you that's derived from our actual world here. Do you know what a Bleekman is, Kindly Dad? (Dick 2012a: 88)

The sequence of recollections and encounters between Kindly Dad and Jack pushes readers to perform their own recollecting to connect the language in which Martian emigration is both advertised and articulated by Jack with the rhetoric employed in the western expansion of the United States to California more broadly and, in particular, in the sale of ranch houses. The exclamatory language of the poster that prompts Jack to emigrate seems based on advertisements used during the Gold Rush of 1849, in which potential settlers were encouraged by (as one poster read) 'EXTRAORDINARY INDUCEMENTS!' But, in addition to this general evocation of the historic exploitation of California's land and resources, the terms in which Jack remembers his personal reasons for coming to Mars encourage comparison with the rhetoric used to sell ranch-house suburbia: where language like 'freedom' and 'the simple life' was often used, and Kindly Dad's 'picture window' emphasizes the architectural similarities to ranch-house designs.

Linked to *Martian Time-Slip*'s critique of colonial dispossession is the implication in the colonial project of the social pressures and myths attached to masculinity. As observed, the psychological pressure associated with city life is believed by Jack to be alleviated by his embrace of a mythologized frontier persona and lifestyle, yet the events of the novel make it clear that Jack is mistaken. The mental illness that he suffers from is not alleviated by his moving to Mars; however, Mars does offer Jack a new perspective on his psychology. He grows to see his schizophrenia as a kind of clarity of vision that allows him to see through the artifice of everyday life. In this sense, Dick's critique of suburbia through the false humanity of Kindly Dad is very much of a piece with the kind of criticisms levelled at suburban society in such paradigmatic critiques as William Whyte's *The Organization Man* (1956): suburban life is a drudgery of the same streets, the same work and the same house; zapped of vitality and creativity,

men, in particular, become frustrated participants in a way of life ultimately empty of meaning. The novel's thematic interest in the psychosocial pressures of work and urban life are shared with more straightforwardly suburban texts such as those just mentioned, and these conditions are generally exacerbated or triggered by engagement with the colonial aspects of space exploration. However, in *Martian Time-Slip*, Dick develops a parallel exploration of another psychological condition which is mitigated by the Martian experience: the character of Manfred who finds in his encounters with the Bleekmen both a shared experience of time and a relief from social alienation.

The characters of Jack and Manfred are offered as complementary examples of the psychological distress men (and male children) can experience as a result of social pressures to function in society in a particular way. Jack diagnoses the cramped nature of urban life as the cause of his illness, but actually sees his mental health deteriorate through his work as a robot engineer where he begins to have difficulty discerning reality and fiction. Similarly, we can read Kott's interest in monetizing Manfred's talents, with no regard to the effect on his mental health, as a kind of metaphor for the pressures of work and providership on the masculine mind. This equation comes up time and again in Dick's novels, for example, in the character of Ragle Gumm in *Time Out of Joint* (1959). While Manfred is only a child, Kott – the rampant capitalist – sees in the boy's ability to see glimpses of the future the potential to stack future deals in his own favour. Experiencing fractured time, though, is distressing for Manfred – it exacerbates his difficulties in making meaningful human connections and, by encouraging it for his own gain, Kott makes Manfred sicker. Like the father in Sloan Wilson's suburban satire, *The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit* (1955), these men are forced to do work that has a deleterious effect on their mental health. That we should understand Manfred's story through this lens is suggested to us by its parallelism with Jack's psychological problems that, in turn, link to suburban malaise. Jack's assignment to service the robots at the public school (including Kindly Dad in his fake suburban living room) triggers a bout of psychosis because the Simulacra (the teaching robots) remind Jack of a period when he began to perceive the people around him as automata. Both the Simulacra themselves and Jack's psychotic perception of mechanized people recall the imagery and language used to criticize suburban conformity.

At the novel's end, Jack and Manfred's fates can be read as alternative endings for the suburban man. Manfred, on the one hand, finds freedom from his illness and independence from institutional interference (having discovered how to manipulate the future and free himself from AM WEB, the UN complex that in the future will house the forgotten and decrepit citizens of Mars). Manfred achieves this freedom with the help of the Bleekmen, whose presence helps

him to see time as unfractured and continuous. On the other hand, while on the surface Jack appears to triumph against his antagonists (Kott, in particular); he ends the novel described as 'business like, and competent, and patient' (Dick 2012a: 278), language that suggests acquiescence to the norms of suburban expectations. Jack becomes, at the novel's end, the organization man that Whyte situates within the 'collective' suburban 'communities made in his image' (Whyte 2002: 267).

As Whyte implies by using the example of Don Walling from Cameron Hawley's *Executive Suite* (1952), his organization men live in the very kinds of communities being built by developers like Kaiser in the San Fernando Valley:

> In Walling have been resolved all the conflicts of organization life; he puts everything he has into his work and plays baseball with his boy; he cares little about money and his ranch house is beautiful; he is a loyal subordinate and gets to be president. (76)

The ranch house was designed and marketed in ways that capitalized on this dissatisfaction, appealing to men's desire for a life of freedom and independence, while obscuring its domesticity with technological advancement and western myth. Manfred's freedom from institutional control comes about by association with the Bleekman, who help him to integrate the past and the future together in his perception. This plot point can be compared with the postwar suburb's blurring of the past and future – through its dual narratives of frontier independence and technological progress – in its house design in ways that obscured both the social effects of the built environment and the development's participation in a legacy of exploitation. In a similar vein, *Time Out of Joint* uses the suburban home to stage a crisis in male identity suggesting both that societal expectations about the centrality of male work and male breadwinner roles are connected to suburban ways of life. These roles and social structures are also shown to be nothing more than a kind of role-playing that obscures man's more violent and territorial nature, as well as the connections between suburban development, land disputes and colonial dispossession.

As *Time Out of Joint* opens, Margo Nielson, the protagonist's sister, has had to postpone her child's dentist visit in order to deliver a petition to the Board of Health to try and 'force the city to clear away those three empty lots of old house foundations' (Dick 2012b: 2). The novel impresses upon us the centrality of domestic land development from its very first pages, as it implies the continuous redevelopment and evolution of urban land. Though the action of the first few pages seems mundane, these old foundations of 'rusty wire and concrete slabs' (2) leave an echoing impression of there being a history to this town that we, and possibly the characters, are unaware of. This apparently throwaway

detail prepares us both for the revelations that sit at the story's centre, of the town's hidden background and purpose, and to read the ensuing narrative with attention to the place of land development and domestic space.

Ragle Gumm, the novel's protagonist, is displaced from the traditional male worker and breadwinner role. He lives with his sister and her family, and rather than go out to work at a traditional job every day, he earns his living by completing newspaper puzzles. We are introduced to him as Margo returns home to find him trapped by his 'research materials' in the living room, unable to complete his task:

> His face showed such weariness that she at once forgot about leaving. His eyes, red-rimmed and swollen, fastened on her compellingly; he had taken off his tie, rolled up his shirtsleeves, and as he drank his beer his arm trembled. (6)

The description of Ragle is at once both a serious depiction of a man struggling with his work and a parody of masculine intellectual labour: rolling up his shirtsleeves to grapple with… a newspaper puzzle. There is much in the depiction of Ragle that speaks to Dick's discomfort with his own intellectual labour as a source of income; a discomfort he hinted-at in a letter from May 21, 1968 where he denounces his seriousness about writing in an aside about a new office: 'and MY STUDY. Now everyone is agitating for me to buy a (gak) desk'.

In *Time Out of Joint*, the space of the suburban home acts as a staging ground for a reconstituted masculinity that upends traditional gender roles and expectations: Ragle works inside the home, like a housewife would, and his work is not physical, no matter how forcefully he rolls up his shirtsleeves. That said, as we progress through the narrative, we discover that Ragle is not as untraditional a figure as he first appears: in fact, very much like the male figures in *Martian Time-Slip* who suffer mental breakdowns related to their 'work' so Ragle has cracked under the pressure of his responsibilities. As Ragle slowly uncovers the truth about himself, we realize that his domestic suburban life is an elaborate construct created and maintained by the Earth government in order for him to continue in his real work as an intelligence officer, locating enemy missile attacks, for the Earth defence force.

Like *Martian Time-Slip*, *Time Out of Joint* is explicitly concerned with questions about the morality of colonization. The purported enemy are the Lunar colonists who wish to build a permanent settlement on the Moon, a move that has been outlawed by the Earth President. Yet, as Ragle starts 'becoming sane again' (66), he begins to recover his former belief in the primacy of migration and colonization as a fundamental human impulse. Ragle ends the novel on the side of the colonists planning his move to the moon to join 'the final leap'

and share in 'a universal need, a universal experience' (223). Ragle's suburban domesticity and non-traditional labour role can be seen as a disguise that obscures the more aggressive and traditionally masculine work of the military, which is explicitly connected to land disputes. Suburban life in the novel implicitly contains within it a kind of fortified territorialism in which the everyday suburban actions of reading a newspaper on your couch, and solving its puzzle, are part of a grand colonial conflict. Not only that, but since the suburban environment that cloaks this militarism is chosen from Ragle's own experiences, we must deduce that it in some way produces both the military man, and the Lunatic rebel who embraces the colonists. While Jack in *Martian Time-Slip* sympathizes with the Bleekmen from the novel's beginning, and questions the methods and attitudes practiced by the most prominent colonists, Ragle aligns himself explicitly with the expansionist cause. But both men share romantic notions about what escaping to the colonies entails, as Ragle says, echoing Jack's own words about freedom:

> It answered, for him, a need that he had never been aware of. A deep restless yearning under the surface, always there in him, throughout his life, but not articulated. The need to travel on. To migrate.
>
> His ancestors had migrated. They had appeared, nomads, not farmers but food gatherers, entering the West from Asia. (222)

This extract hints that the problems that have plagued Ragle throughout the novel have not been solved but may be continuing to affect him, albeit differently. Just a page later, in between Ragle's transportation into his childhood memories, Mrs Keitelbein, the Lunatic who helps Ragle uncover the construction of his reality in Old Town, tells him that:

> They didn't do anything to you, to your mind. You slipped back yourself. You've slipped back now, just reading about it. You keep wanting to go back. (223)

By interspersing Ragle's historical reverie about the nobleness of migration, with memories of his childhood that disrupt his present, the novel ends in a way that suggests that Ragle's attitude toward lunar colonization is just as clouded, partial and romanticized as the suburban world fabricated from his memories. Thus, both ideals emerge from a similar problem of perception in which history is telescoped, joining Tomorrowland and Frontierland together. In these idealized spaces, the reality of war and colonization is elided in favour of romanticized notions of the frontier as a place for white masculine identity to develop in its fullness. Though Dick follows the lead of so many conventional suburban

critiques in his depiction of the suburbia as deleterious to male psychological health, his space colonies take these critiques a step further.

While suburban ranch-house developers were busy evoking a version of American history in which the existence of the original inhabitants of the land is not even acknowledged, Dick's stories insist that we consider suburban environments and lifestyles as linked to mentalities of colonization. What both novels explicitly do with these tales of pseudo-suburban settlement is to make us consider that settlement from a chronological perspective which decentres the central narrative and places it within a disrupted flow of historical time. Where the ranch-house developers relied on a telescoped and limited combination of Tomorrowland and Frontierland to sell their homes, Dick reminds us of the ways that our limited perspective shapes the history we record and learn. *Martian Time-Slip*, in particular, suggests a link between the exclusion of certain people from our histories and the kinds of suburban developments being built at the time of the book's production. By placing suburban-like communities in direct relation with excluded and oppressed groups like the Bleekmen and the supposedly ill children, the book pushes readers to consider what categories of people were being excluded from the suburban communities that were thriving as novel was being written. African Americans, in particular, have suffered long-term damage as a group from the exclusionary practices that were common at the time of ranch-house suburbia's greatest popularity. Despite the GI Bill's provisions, few African American servicemen were able to parlay their service into home ownership, and today the legacy of white flight, redlining and a variety of other phenomena have contributed to the current net wealth of African American families being ten times less than that of white families on average. These novels, although written while the practices were common, push back against the prevailing attitudes of the time, and highlight the connections between the colonial ideology, in which settlers assumed a right to land and a narrative of conquest excluded the suffering of those already living there, with that of the suburban frontiersman, riding the wave of white flight to his racially segregated neighbourhood.

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Conference Reports

Corroding the Now: Poetry + Science | SF, Birkbeck College London,12-13 April 2019

Matthew Carbery

The conference began early in an underground lecture room in Birkbeck College's School of Arts. This subterranean setting seemed appropriate for the rarely discussed topics at hand, themselves listed in the intriguingly designed conference guide featuring corrosive graphics by Sinjin Lee. As the organizers stated: 'It is our hope that this event will bring together a wide, multifocal constellation of interests, interventions and responses. Rather than focus on a specific niche, we hope that these two days open into a range of impressions and exchanges as a way of exploring each corrosive node (poetry | science | science fiction) through the lens of each other.' Corrosion was to be conceived throughout as a generative process, something which stripped back the layers of accrued meaning and expectation. This was also reflected in the fact that many of the panels hosted a combination of critical and creative writings, and often blurred the distinction between the two

After opening notes from hosts Stephen Mooney and Francis Gene-Rowe, the first panels began. I attended 'Oil, Wetness and Other Slicks', which, as its title suggests, focused on the various liquids and liquid states we encounter in the Anthropocene. Opening the panel, Alexandra Campbell offered an impressively comprehensive paper drawing together various contemporary poetries which respond to the increasingly critical problem of ocean plasticity. Following this, Josephine Taylor's paper drew on ideas relating plasticity to colonialism. Recalling Rega Negarestani's *Cyclonopedia* (2008), in which petroleum reserves in the Middle East are figured as a living evil, Taylor addressed the speculative horror of Fritz Leiber's 'The Black Gondolier' (1964) and Philip Metre's *Ode To Oil* (2011). In positing petroleum as 'an uncontrollable force beyond human power', Taylor brought into stark relief the sheer range of global processes, and systems affected and determined by the petrochemical industry, and furthermore drew focus to the difficulty of articulating the scale of the problem. The closing presentation of this early morning panel took the form of an experimental sound-collage piece entitled 'Sonic Encounter with Oceanic Nows' by Antoine Devillet and Nelle Gevers. The lecture hall lights were dimmed and bowls of water, backed by light, were projected around the room. Ripples warped the four walls while the two voices of Devillet and Gevers, in interruption and unison, in harmony and disharmony, described a psychogeographical and politicized River Thames.

The second panel of the day consisted of two papers on Afrofuturism; one, given by me, on the legacies of Afrofuturism in the twenty-first century, and the other which took the form of a collaborative reflection on the poetry of Sun Ra with Sasha Myerson and Katie Stone. What stood out in particular in this panel was the way in which science (and its fictions) shape or are shaped by identities. In my own talk, drawing on the work of the Black Quantum Futurist movement, I explored the ways in which Camae Ayewa and Rasheedah Phillips theorize time travel as a process achievable by reorienting our attitude towards temporality itself; similarly, Myerson and Stone maintained that for Sun Ra, there was no 'character' being played, but rather a practice being lived. In the discussion that followed, the panellists reflected on the ways in which Afrofuturism has spread to countries beyond America, and discussed critical arguments that conceive of the transatlantic slave trade as a form of alien abduction.

The first plenary was given by Alex Goody. Drawing on Rosi Braidotti's comment that feminism is not a humanism, Goody's plenary talk focused mainly on the poetry of Mina Loy, and in particular her use of insect life as a model for psychosexual tensions. Goody highlighted Loy's position as one of many modernists who drew upon the Italian futurists' writings and art, but distinguished her poetry as pointedly turned away from their obsessive masculinity. The talk featured strong and developed moments of close reading from specific Loy poems, and offered real clarity in its presentation of Loy as a poet keenly aware of the trappings of anthropocentric thought.

The next panel continued the conference's investigation into the ways in which human subjectivity shapes our lived world. The panel opened with Peter Middleton's paper on the American poet Ron Silliman and autism. Silliman, having recently written about his young son's experience of being diagnosed as autistic, is one of the first major poets to suggest that his poetics is grounded in an atypical neurology. Middleton explored the lack of clarity around diagnoses of autism, and suggested that the tropes of neurodiversity encountered in sf literature and cinema might work as analogues for our own understanding of life that does not conform to our expected norms. Following this, Llew Watkins offered a sample from his PhD research into philosophies of mind in religious traditions. In particular, Watkins focused on Buddhist poetry, and the relationship between language and solitary contemplation. The final presentation of the panel was a showcase of the augmented reality poems of Suzie Gray, specifically 'E-Tabula Rasa' and 'Poetal Lite'. Using software development techniques most often used in phone and augmented reality applications, Gray has created a means of superimposing poetry on the world as viewed through a phone camera.

For me, Middleton's paper was the highlight of the conference. Approaching a topic with little to no extant critical material made Middleton's observations all

the more pertinent, drawing together as they did vast swathes of material from various sources, from DSRM-V definitions to the writings of Temple Grandin and beyond. The reading of Silliman was sensitive, and Middleton acknowledged throughout the potential difficulties and dangers of fetishizing disability in our studies of it. This is, as Middleton noted, particularly difficult in the world of avant-garde poetry (and the long poem in particular, which Silliman specializes in) where authorial intention often slides beyond our grasp incessantly.

The evening began with a poetry reading featuring a range of writers from different creative backgrounds – avant-garde poets indulged their scientific interests alongside more formal poetry drawing on sf movies and shows. Readers included Jonathan Catherall, Iris Colomb, Linus Slug, Robert Kiely, Suzie Gray, Russell Jones, Jo Walton, Sarah Kelly, Liz Bahs, Verity Spott, Naomi Foyle, Richard Parker and Stephen Mooney. The standout performance here was a recording sent in by Brighton poet Verity Spott. In this video, Spott stood on an unraised mechanical platform and read a poem that seemed a kind of warped romance concerning EDL founder Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. Spott fell in and out of character at will, at times spitting the narrative frantically and at others leaning into the voice of the thuggish demagogue with mock sincerity. It was at turns terrifying and hilarious.

The next and final day of the conference began with a roundtable on the politics and poetics of video-gaming. The correspondents – Alife Bown, Marijam Didzgalvyte and Simon Saunders – discussed the various ways video games can be critiqued, ranging from the libidinal to the Marxist, and the conversation dwelt at length on the toxicity of some gaming communities. I was impressed by the expertise of the panellists, particularly as the literature concerning the poetics of gaming is still slim. This was reflected upon by Didzgalvyte, who argued that too often close readings of video games focus overwhelmingly on narrativity as opposed to the affective or phenomenological experience of gaming itself. This stood out as an exemplary moment, encapsulating the ambitions of the conference, and underscoring the value of collapsing and corroding the hierarchies often held between high and low culture.

The next panel I attended featured two papers addressing quantum physics, geology and nuclear energy. Sarah Daw presented the poet Muriel Rukeyser as being distinct amongst her Objectivist contemporaries for grounding much of her work in animal life and natural processes. In particular, Daw drew on Charles Olson's 'Projective Verse' (1950) and his popularization of A.N. Whitehead's so-called 'organic philosophy', in turn reframing Donald Allen's seminal *New American Poetry* (1960) as a moment in which scientific discovery becomes prominent not only in the content of poetry but also in the process of composition. Following this, Fred Carter argued that Wendy Mulford's poetry has

always worked within a figuration of the Anthropocene, and focused in particular on Mulford's engagement with the anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s. What is so alarming about our involvement with nuclear energy, Carter argued, is our inability to comprehend the strange temporalities of nuclear waste.

Allen Fisher's untitled plenary talk addressed a wide range of sf tropes juxtaposed with real world scientific discoveries. In particular, Fisher drew a bathetic comparison between the CERN Large Hadron Collider and the 'Quantum Tunnel' featured in the recent Marvel movie *Ant Man and the Wasp* (2018). Fisher's delivery was subtle, making it difficult to establish whether we ought to consider the Large Hadron Collider or the Quantum Tunnel as the more unbelievable creation. This, combined with extracts from his collage work *SPUTTOR* (2014), made for an exciting and provocative talk without clear conclusion. In the following Q&A, Fisher reflected on the problems of comprehension in scientific literature, and the wider discussion in the room grew to consider the ways in which avant-garde poetry and cutting-edge scientific research might be closer in ambition than expected.

Following Fisher's talk, the next panel opened with a fascinating paper by poet Charlotte Geater, in which she described the fictional life of her Twitterbot poet A.A Hanbury. Hanbury's poems are created from the coding language Tracery, which combines phrases and key terms to make short poetic fragments posted directly to twitter. (During the talk we were invited to follow Hanbury on Twitter; I received the response 'You are my curious Valkyrie'.) Geater suggested that, in performing such experiments, we get a glimpse into the possible workings of non-human agencies, insofar as they are interpreted by and interacted with by human agencies. Following this, Jenny Swingler presented her modern myth 'Gills', a dizzying work of fiction about an amphibian boy exploring the depths of the Thames against the backdrop of the hyper-rich and their luxury housing. The panel closed with a paper by Molina Klingler. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben's and Michel Foucault's writings on biopolitics, Klingler considered the role of the 'hard sciences' in literary works, and developed an argument concerning what she called the 'intricate relationship between the self and the alien and one's environment'. Stephen Collis's book *Decomp* (2013) became a key point of reference throughout the talk, a collaboration with Jordan Scott in which the two poets left five copies of Darwin's *On the Origin Of Species* to decay in distinctly different ecosystems within British Columbia. It felt fitting that the final paper of the conference was so concerned with corrosion, and particularly the kinds of corrosion which find our prejudices and limitations eroded.

The conference came to a close with a roundtable panel featuring guest writers Iain Sinclair and Allen Fisher, and graphic artist Melinda Gebbie. What followed was a wide-ranging discussion of topics as diverse as the space race,

graphic novels, B-movie cinema, 1960s counterculture and the death of the hippie dream in San Francisco. Sinclair and Fisher started out reflecting on how technology had irrevocably altered London since the 1960s, with both referring to the influences that fed into their works. Gebbie offered insight into the development of sf tropes in comics, and dwelt at length on her collaboration with graphic novelist and mystic Alan Moore. After two days of panels, performances and poetry, these three veterans of the intersections between literature and popular culture represented the shift in perception that has taken place as regards sf as a legitimate topic of study, and one which reflects our world in a variety of unexpected and challenging ways.

The provocations and explorations of the conference left me excited at the prospect for further similar events. Whilst it would be untrue to call this the first conference of its kind, it certainly fitted into a niche area and brought into clear focus a number of overlooked writers and artists. The emphasis on sf poetry as opposed to other forms of writing made for a genuinely revelatory event, with delegates locating science fictions where they might previously have been hidden. This owed as much to the delegates as to the organizing committee, whose decision to include wide-ranging, mixed-form panels ensured that there was variation in tone and pace across the two days. The theme of corrosion, in the form of a stripping bare or unconcealing, acted as a grounding for the investigations taking place over the weekend, and furthermore allowed illumination of obscured and hidden themes within eco-poetry, sf, video gaming and scientific research.

Glitches and Ghosts, Lancaster University, 17 April 2019

Joe Ondrak (Sheffield Hallam University)

We have all encountered a glitch in one form or another. As digital technology becomes more and more ubiquitous, so too does the chance for this technology to ‘glitch out’ on us, forcing us to confront questions of digital ontology, agency and aesthetics. As the idea of the glitch proliferates, its aesthetic qualities are appropriated in art as a signifier of frictions between the digital and physical, and of the presence of the spectral. It is in response to this glitchy cultural turn that Kerry Dodd and Brian Baker offered up the idea of an interdisciplinary conference to ‘diagnose and analyse contemporary cultural fascinations with the emergence of digital artefacts and how their spectral presence has come to define our current technological moment’; an idea that, according to Baker, Twitter ‘picked up and ran with until we had no choice’ but to create Glitches and Ghosts, a one-day, free-to-attend conference.

I decided to travel to Lancaster the night before the conference where I, and

any other attendees who chose to stay in the Travelodge that night, encountered our first 'true' glitch when the fire alarm went off for no good reason at three in the morning, rendering us positively spectral in a half-conscious daze in the car park outside. Thankfully, the beautiful weather on the morning of the conference (along with copious cups of coffee) and Lancaster's picturesque campus had us energized and eager for the talks to come. To the credit of all the speakers, as well as the organization, my panel attendance could have been decided on a coin toss given that they all appeared to be teeming with exciting ideas, spanning from art history to animism in the Internet of Things via almost every facet of digital presence and the spectral. Some clipping through walls or glitchy duplication would have come in handy!

After a warm welcome from the organizers and a brief bit of housekeeping, I was off to my first panel where I was giving the opening paper on the 'ontological flattening' of digital textuality. I'd like instead to focus on the excellent work by my panel-mates Henry Morgan and Hayley Louise Charlesworth. Morgan's paper offered a fascinating insight into the world created by Lopatin, a.k.a Oneohtrix Point Never, for the release of his 2015 album *Garden of Delete*. Morgan positioned Lopatin as a maker of 'Internet mediated music' specifically tied to digital cultures and media-specific properties, drawing on Vaporwave and YouTube-based microgenres as other examples that work with passé aesthetics and a bricolage of alienated samples from pop music past. Morgan then mapped the transmedia website created by Lopatin to accompany the album, using Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's concept of assemblages to reveal an elaborate concept storyline of aliens, fake fan-fiction and fictional bands. Of particular interest was the characterization of this site as an alternate-reality game, which then got blurred with Lopatin's release of all notes and samples used on the album prior to release that resulted in fan-created speculative mixes of what the album might sound like. Morgan then isolated some examples of sources incorporated into Lopatin's site, including the entirety of Julie Kristeva's *Powers of Horror*, work by Manuel DeLanda, obscure YouTube home-movies and semi-autobiographical prose resulting in what Morgan described as an 'album in decomposition', wearing all influences on its sleeve and blurring the boundary between artist and audience through the use of website as a transmedia 'key' to understanding the entirety of *Garden of Delete*. Morgan's paper raised interesting questions around identity, digital temporality and the longevity of online sources, and highlighted the still radically new ways in which cyberspace can be used to create art.

Charlesworth's paper discussed the glitchy, ghostly, fan-made alter-egos of YouTube personalities Mark Fischbach (Markiplier) and Sean McLoughlin (Jack Septiceye). Her focus highlighted YouTube's unique position as a platform,

especially in the relationship between audience and content creator, in this case resulting in fan-created 'dark' versions of each creator (Darkiplier and Antisepticeye) that have subsequently been reappropriated and adapted by the original creators. These alter-egos in their reappropriated forms manifest through glitch aesthetics in each creator's videos. Of real interest was the feedback loop between the fan's creation of these characters through fan-art and stories, and the creators' addressing of this and embodiment of the characters. The quote in the paper title, 'You Made Him Real', taken from Mark Fischbach's address to his fans about Darkiplier, conjured up thoughts of hyperstition, tulpas, thoughtforms and the recent Momo scare. It would be fascinating if Charlesworth follows up the 'making real' aspect of these characters in further research. For this paper, she analysed how the glitch aesthetic representation of these 'evil' characters are diagetically incorporated into their creation narrative; Darkiplier's split layers of RGB colour reflecting split layers of various other characters inhabiting one body, and Antisepticeye's 'taking over' of Sean's body and channel at various points in different streams and videos. YouTube celebrities are admittedly a blind spot of mine, and Charlesworth's paper highlighted many exciting avenues to connect with further questions of digital spectral presences, agency and authorship.

After a quick break for more coffee to stave off any hauntings by the lack of sleep, we were into the next panels. I was utterly torn between 'Affective Narratives' and 'Algorithmic Détournement' before settling on the former, purely due to a personal interest in immersive narratives. I am forever indebted to those who can livetweet at conferences with parallel panels! First up was Stephen Curtis who proposed a direct lineage from Cartesian Dualism to the (relatively) recent trend of trapped-in-computer narratives, via Gilbert Ryle's resonant critique of Descartes in the phrase 'the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. Curtis reappropriated the phrase to relate to embodiment and phenomenological experience from the sensory to the digital, reflecting on the specific anxieties around posterity and the dilemma of mortal, material bodies inhabited by immortal, immaterial souls; mapping our ideas of techno-utopian uploaded futures onto classical and religious concepts of the afterlife. In the move from pulpit to power-grid, he noted an inversion in the meaning of the term 'save', from salvation and escape to that of terminal stasis, before setting out his 'taxonomy of the digitised': the meta-ghost, aware of their position within a machine simulation; the unwilling ghost, sucked into the digital world without control; and the motivated ghost, willingly entering the digital realm with a task or goal. These excursions serve to anthropomorphize and colonize digital space in a way that can be conceptualized, with Curtis relating this back to conceptualizations of hell in fiction (such as Dante's *Inferno*), and that

cyberspace is a modern, overdetermined heaven/hell space in need of similar fictionalizing treatment.

Next was Vicki Williams who dealt with virtual reality (VR) as a phenomenological experience, and how horror VR narratives incorporate glitches (intentionally or not) beyond aesthetics. Williams began with an exploration of VR and its relationship with the body and materiality, remarking on VR's quest for total effacement of the medium being blocked by the necessity for hardware and challenging cultural perceptions that VR is, in fact, a 'transparent medium'. In combining phenomenology and affect theory in VR, Williams viewed VR worlds as objects that users move through, and that our experience of VR represents a 'human entanglement in nonhuman processes'. Williams then moved into the realm of the glitch, recounting a fantastic anecdote when playing the Resident Evil VR demo, *Kitchen* (2016), where she physically jumped back, causing a calibration glitch that resulted in her perceived head being further away from her perceived VR body than was possible – an affective emergent event that she initially took as a first-person decapitation experience, and an example of affecting virtual space as a result of virtual space affecting the user. Williams then moved to look at *A Chair in a Room* (2016) as an example of a VR horror game that takes advantage of ontological disparities in virtual space, and diagetically incorporates emergent glitches and VR disjointment through 'perception altering' drugs taken during gameplay. The various forms of disjointment, disembodiment and lack of agency manifest through these glitches then formed the basis of Williams' 'glitch ecology' comprising of emergent (unintentional) glitches, intentional (built-in) glitches, ruly glitches (that can be anticipated) and unruly glitches (that expose the inner workings of the tech). Williams' paper was an exciting insight into navigating and theorizing mediated errors in what is often trumpeted as the utopian future of media, raising questions around human agency, embodiment and experience.

Finally, Charlotte Gislam's paper set out a surprising relationship between narrative types in gaming and the glitch. First, she differentiated between embedded narratives (scripted and the same for all players) and emergent narratives (random encounters that still adhere to system rules and require player input), before challenging existing definitions of the glitch as an obvious error. Gislam then argued that glitches present an opportunity for game narratives, transforming embedded narratives into emergent ones, and allowing emergent narratives to break free of rule constraints to become an experience wholly unique and beyond standard emergence. She then moved on to three areas in which glitches effect gameplay and players that dovetailed nicely with Williams' glitch ecology: exploits, often replicable and aid in gameplay gains such as item duplication or speedrunning; playground, characterized by those glitches that

are often entertaining or horrifying, such as rendering errors or physics engine anomalies; and storytelling, where the glitch leads the player to construct a new narrative to incorporate the glitch, elevating it to a mythic level. This final area seems like a very exciting area for research, and further data gathering could yield new insight into the relationship between glitches and digital storytelling. Gislam concluded her paper by inviting us to speculate on whether you can replicate a glitch in a deliberate manner, suggesting that neural networks may offer new opportunities for player and glitch interaction. An insightful question panel opened up discussion on the critical work done through the examination of glitches, focussing on how they highlight the fallibility of digital systems that shows a shift from a reach for the transcendent to the difficult nature of cyberspace.

After lunch, we reconvened in the conference address room for something that was timetabled only as [Please Stand By]. A two-piece video artwork by matthews AND allen – #Glitch1 and #Glitch2 respectively – followed, creating the effect of a literal glitch in the conference proceedings. Consisting of archive footage of various communication media in action (telephone exchanges, printing press, radio, television), the pieces forced a pause and reflection on the interplay between analogue and digital technologies, the materiality of media, and the lifespan of any given media technology moving from cutting-edge to nostalgia in quick succession. The digital representation of analogue recordings of earlier media brought to mind N. Katherine Hayles' remark that the computer contains all other media, causing me to wonder about remediated glitches and what work they would perform. After these pieces, an informal roundtable discussion was had by all on the conference so far (a great idea that I would love to see implemented more often), focussing on the difference between analogue and digital hauntings (if any) before moving to a discussion on misunderstandings of digitality, the cloud, and the all-too human work and exploitation hidden behind these new frontiers.

We were then on to the third set of parallel panels, 'Theorising the Glitch' and 'Phasing through Boundaries'. Unfortunately, phasing between conference rooms wasn't an option for me, so I made the decision to sit in on the former as it appeared to encapsulate the ethos of the conference. First up was Joseph Lindley with possibly the first paper I have ever seen delivered by a human academic, a smart kettle and a Google Home speaker. Lindley offered an entertaining alternative perspective on non-human agencies and our interaction with that which bridges physical and digital with his design background and household co-hosts. Far more than just a comedy double act, Lindley's appliances served to illustrate and explain Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) and Animism, constituting a framework informing his research into human

interaction with networked technologies and products. Lindley describes a set of experiments where participants were invited to 'interview' the smart kettle and Google Home after first being primed in regarding them from a post-anthropocentric perspective. Lindley's findings revealed that participants could not avoid asking weighty metaphysical questions that no machine would be able to answer, raising questions about how we situate ourselves in socio-technical assemblages, and how we view other components of those assemblages in relation to ourselves.

Kerry Dodd furthered the panel theme of challenging anthropocentric interactions with the digital as a launchpad for his discussion of our conceptualization of digital space, using a mixture of science fiction and Gothic analysis in the process. Dodd began by arguing that when attempting to visualize the digital, we cannot help but do so in an anthropocentric manner, before gesturing to alternative methods that may grant new perspectives (such as OOO). Dodd then showed how borders between the digital and the physical are eroding, building on James Bridle's idea of the 'New Aesthetic' and that the digital is neither space nor time, but another dimension entirely that can interpenetrate the physical. Dodd proposed throw pillows with glitch patterns on as an example in one direction, and the concept of 'render ghosts' (the anonymous faces that populate architectural renders) as an example in the other that conjures up uncanny doubling and concerns around ownership of one's likeness in the digital. Glitches, in this instance, sever anthropocentric perceptions of digital space and may serve as anti-corporate praxis (although, as the pillows demonstrated, the aesthetic is often re-integrated back into capital). These themes coalesced in Dodd's discussion of *Mr Robot* (2015–) and the haunting of the protagonist Eliot by the title character. As the two wrestle for control of one body, Dodd showed how glitch aesthetics symbolize this relationship moving beyond a psychoanalytical doppelganger towards more digital-oriented concerns, such as divisions of the self, the haunting nature of digital presence and the constant spectre of personal data tracking.

David Hulks rounded off the panel with a fascinating paper that added a new dimension to current glitchy conceptualizations. Hulks mixed art history and systems theory to argue for the glitch as a catalyst for radical development and change, beginning by arguing that cultural systems and natural systems both develop through evolution – feedback loops and memetics rather than rational actors. For Hulks, a cultural system can be read as through information theory, as cultural systems copy information, and like digital systems are prone to glitch, which in this case signifies a shift in a dominant art style. The glitch is then embraced, replicated and normalized until a new glitch emerges catalysing further change. Hulks demonstrated the normalization process through

recounting the story of *2001: A Space Odyssey*'s monolith; the original design informed by Stanley Kubrick's art world experience, before being an influence on the art world itself. Hulks then moved on to argue that the 'white gallery' space is less a place for art to reside and more an enabling structure akin to a living cell: a busy environment of complex signals enabled by the boundary containing them. For Hulks, the system of Minimalist art within the gallery space became glitchy, dissolving into Post-Minimalism as the glitch was embraced, shifting dominant styles as the system adapted. The following Q&A focused mostly on questions of agency and that we desire the aesthetics of the glitch, but not the agency of the system that it signifies; a spectre that loomed across the conference in the many papers and discussions between panels.

To close off the day, Will Slocombe delivered an insightful keynote (and teaser for his upcoming book). Navigating between post-structuralist and materialist interests and incorporating many of the themes and topics that had emerged across the panels, Slocombe characterized the glitch as a 'system interrupt' represented in a myriad of ways across fiction. Slocombe moved through specific glitch aesthetics (the 'glitchy' ghosts of *Supernatural* versus the ghostly glitches of *The Matrix: Reloaded*) to show how the glitch may be a breakthrough of the organic into the technological and vice-versa. Slocombe then turned his attention to representations of AI in fiction, leading to a very spirited debate in the room around *Ghost in the Shell* (1995) and the AI/human status of The Major (at what point is AI humanized versus at what point is human behaviour purely machinic?). Slocombe reached a crucial point in his talk by revealing that the system interrupt is part of the system to begin with; a reading for AI and a reading of glitches is done via narratives and we cannot lose sight of the material when reading. For Slocombe, the glitch manifests on the interface, it is part of the narrative and the structural imagination. After a final Q&A session, that was the end, save for the enthusiastic discussions over dinner and drinks that evening.

As I reflected on the conference on the train back to Sheffield, it was quite clear that this would not be a one-off. The event was a resounding success and the interdisciplinary nature of the conference revealed many more aspects of the work glitches do, how they relate to spectral presences, and what that may mean for a variety of research fields than I thought possible just the day before. From aesthetics to metaphysics across everything from literary analysis to product design, it is clear that we have only scratched the surface of glitches and the spectral agency that comes with them.

Stanley Kubrick: The Exhibition, The Design Museum, London (April 26–September 15, 2019)

Reviewed by Paul March-Russell (University of Kent)

Stanley Kubrick once averred that a film director is 'an idea and taste machine'; that it was the director's function to input suggestions and to adjudicate upon the outputs. It was through this feedback loop, with the director as its conductor, that the perfect circuit of the film was completed. Literal machines appear throughout Kubrick's *oeuvre*, from the relatively unsophisticated (Jack Nicholson's manual typewriter in *The Shining* [1980]) to the technologically advanced (HAL in *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968)). More figuratively, Kubrick's films are characterized by what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari term the 'machinic': the vast assemblages and bureaucratic structures, in which bodies and machines come together, producing a mixed array of fears and desires. Speaking of the characters in *Full Metal Jacket* (1987), Kubrick claimed that they were neither good nor evil but a combination of the two. The moral uncertainty that such a hybrid provokes points to both the existential unease and public controversy, which Kubrick sought to incite in his viewers, as well as his desire to transcend such human concerns through his annunciation of the machinic.

This major exhibition of the design elements in Kubrick's work begins with a kind of trailer that prepares the spectator for entry into Kubrick's post-human world. As we see later in the exhibition, Saul Bass's title sequence for

Spartacus (1960) did not merely introduce the film but set the scene for its exploration of imperial decay. Similarly, the single perspective of a montage of clips projected onto a series of flat and angled screens both introduces and establishes Kubrick's vision of geometrically designed space. To give ourselves up to this vision, embodied by the final image of the monolith from *2001* that swells and engulfs our point of view, is to abandon one's own sense of personal space. Like the shuttle hostess walking up and around the interior of the craft, Kubrick seeks to undo our preconception of space – of what is up and what is down – and the other vertical hierarchies that go with that. As such, it is hard to say when and where the exhibition actually begins. There is little sense of a crossing-point; this trailer (of sorts) prepares us only by undoing us, of already absorbing us into Kubrick's singular idea of space.

It is no coincidence, then, that the first gallery rejects – apart from the briefest mention of Kubrick's childhood and education – a chronological introduction to its subject. Instead it feels, at first, as if we have entered a film sequence from another Hollywood outsider, Orson Welles, and the conclusion to *Citizen Kane* (1941), in which Kane's estate has been reduced to one vast warehouse of incalculable objects. Similarly, we encounter two chessboards – one conventional, the other an early computerized version; Kubrick was an avid fan of chess. We have examples of the Sasco cards that Kubrick used to plan and coordinate the special effects of films such as *2001*. And then, like the remnants of Kane's estate, we have bags and cases marked with Kubrick's name as well as his director's chair. From an undetected loudspeaker, we hear Kubrick himself being interviewed, perhaps from the late 1960s. Bit by bit, we begin to feel our way towards an understanding of his creative process. The curators have decided to help us by concentrating upon two unmade projects, Kubrick's life of Napoleon and *A.I.*, subsequently filmed by Steven Spielberg. There is a small library drawn from Kubrick's private collection of books on Napoleon, a tray of index cards meticulously detailing Napoleon's life-story, and correspondence to actors such as Audrey Hepburn and Oskar Werner, attempting to persuade them into signing up for the film. What quickly emerges is Kubrick's desire to encompass his subject, his obsessional eye for detail, and his complete conviction in assembling those he needs to achieve his goal. It is, of course, tempting to see Napoleonic traits in Kubrick's own character but the curators balance this temptation by emphasizing the role played by Kubrick's collaborators. We can see this clearly in the concept designs produced by Chris Baker for *A.I.* Baker offers beautiful and sometimes surreal sketches of buildings and highways, as well as suggestive remarks on the androids themselves, indicating that they might be more Platonic and androgynous forms of the human body. A picture of David's fully automated bedroom, with a Pinocchio

doll sat in one corner, indicates that this story element was already established long before Spielberg's involvement.

The rest of this gallery illustrates how Kubrick's ideas, if they got funded, would come to fruition with examples from his screenplays, shots of suggested locations (always done by others – Kubrick loathed external shoots), the types of camera used, a mock-up of an editing suite (Kubrick's preferred environment), accounts of his earliest films, and a selection of posters. It is also here that we have detailed descriptions of Douglas Trumbull's most celebrated innovations for *2001*: the Slit-Scan machine through which, over a period of six months, Trumbull filmed the hallucinogenic voyage through the Star-Gate and the centrifuge, built by Vickers Armstrong at a cost of nearly £600,000, with which Trumbull simulated the effects of anti-gravity. The idea for the centrifuge was drawn from the work of Werner von Braun, as popularized by Willy Ley in the 1950s, on what an orbiting space station might look and be like.

The second gallery looks at three war films – *Paths of Glory* (1957), *Spartacus* and *Full Metal Jacket*. Absorbing in themselves, what comes through in these films from a science-fictional point of view is Kubrick's obsession with the 'geometric formation' of actors. As with the other galleries, there are excerpts from all the films – we see Kubrick's brilliant recreation of trench warfare in *Paths of Glory* and one of the battle scenes inserted by Kubrick into the screenplay of *Spartacus*. For a director so preoccupied with the latest technological innovations, there is something of the silent movie impresario in these films, of Cecil B. DeMille and Erich von Stroheim. If, for the sake of historical accuracy, Kubrick needed vast numbers of extras, then that is what he demanded – even if it meant that hundreds of extras would then need to be numbered so that Kubrick could coordinate their movements. By contrast, *Full Metal Jacket* was a smaller affair but the same machinic interest is apparent: the dehumanization of the recruits, so that they can become effective fighting units, is ambiguously portrayed. Kubrick himself, though, was alert to the worth of new recruits; impressed by his work on Neil Jordan's *The Company of Wolves* (1984), Anton Furst was employed to redesign Beckton Gas Works as a mock-up of Vietnam.

The third gallery, looking at *Lolita* (1962) and *A Clockwork Orange* (1971), is built around the theme of public controversy. Perhaps most touching amongst the *Lolita* exhibits is a warm and friendly letter to Kubrick from Sue Lyon (the curators draw a veil over whether Shelley Duvall sent anything similar to Kubrick after *The Shining*). By contrast, whereas Kubrick attempted (unsuccessfully) to divert the sexually transgressive content of Vladimir Nabokov's novel, *A Clockwork Orange* ramped up the misogynistic violence of Anthony Burgess's original text. As Kubrick acknowledged, there is 'a sexiness

to beautiful machines' which inspired his approach to Pop Artist Allen Jones, already notorious for his pornographic representations of the female body, to work on the film. Jones and Kubrick fell out over money but Jones's initial designs still influenced the production work of John Barry and his assistant, Liz Moore. The giant phallus and the graphic female nudes from the Korova Bar are all on display, as is the Valentine typewriter, a subtler indication of Kubrick's sexualization of contemporary technology. A strong emphasis is given to Kubrick's use of Brutalist architecture in the film – the already deteriorating new town of Thamesmead and the concrete terrain of Brunel University – juxtaposed with Skybreak House in Hertfordshire, designed by Norman Foster and Richard Rodgers. A similar admixture is also apparent in Milena Canonero's costumes for the droogs, a combining of Edwardian chic with the bovver boots worn by skinheads. The bowler hat, an emblem not only for Alex (played by Malcolm McDowell) but also for the film itself, was presented by Kubrick to illustrator Philip Castle, who designed a series of graphic airbrush prints. Kubrick's use of contemporary locations, fashions and designs confuses the temporality of the film – a copy of *Wisden's Cricketers Almanac* for 1970, prominently displayed in one of the excerpts, suggests that the film is less a near-future dystopia and more a distorted version of the present day; a mirror, which as the curators say of *Lolita*, reflects us back to ourselves.

The fourth gallery brings together two examples of psychological horror, *Eyes Wide Shut* (1999) and *The Shining* (1980), whilst the fifth focuses on *Dr Strangelove* (1963) and *Barry Lyndon* (1975). The link here is the work of Ken Adam who modestly claimed that his set for *Dr Strangelove* was the greatest ever built. A series of photographs by Weejee (Arthur Fellig), whose voice allegedly gave Peter Sellers the inspiration for the eponymous anti-hero, record the production – including the controversial pie-fight cut from the closing scenes. Another example of a letter from a disappointed film-goer, this time an outraged US patriot, suggests Kubrick's baffling penchant for collecting disgusted fan mail.

The final gallery concentrates solely upon *2001*. It begins, appropriately enough, with 'the dawn of man' and Stuart Freeborn's brilliantly realized ape masks and suits. The work of mime artist Daniel Richter, who played the key role of the Moonwatcher, is especially highlighted. (So convincing were both the performances and the suits that, so the story goes, the Academy Awards took them to be real apes – which is why neither Freeborn nor Richter were honoured.) Unable to afford a location shoot in Africa, Kubrick sent his runner – the later renowned film director Andrew Birkin – to Namibia to take photographs of the landscape. Through a process of front projection, these were then seamlessly incorporated into the film as a backdrop to the actors. The famous

jump-cut, from animal bone to orbiting weapons satellite, establishes this opening sequence as the prehistorical context for the more obviously science-fictional elements of the succeeding narrative.

To that end, Kubrick's partnership with Arthur C. Clarke is, of course, highlighted, beginning with a copy of *10 Story Fantasy*, in which 'The Sentinel' first appeared in 1951. (The cover bears an illustration for 'The Tyrant and Slave Girl of Venus' written by John Beynon; presumably discredited by Beynon in the same year as his alias, John Wyndham, published *The Day of the Triffids*.) Other contributions from genre sf include the concept designs by illustrators Roy Carnon and Harry Lange, who had previously known von Braun, and the models built by Joy Cuff, best-known for her work with Gerry Anderson. Via figures such as Clarke and Lange, Kubrick had access to the thinking of NASA but he otherwise kept the agency distant from his film. He did, however, collaborate with Eliot Noyes, industrial design curator at the Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art and a consultant at IBM, on how HAL might appear on screen.

Otherwise, Kubrick was particularly alive to design as lifestyle, for example, the work of British fashion designer, Hardy Amies and his assistant, Frederick Fox, on the costumes worn by the shuttle crew and American and Russian scientists. In 1964, Kubrick visited the New York World Fair and many of the innovative designs, which included the prototypical iPads used in the film, were drawn from that expo. As Tony Masters, lead production designer on the film, emphasized, they were trying to present '2001 as a period […] a way to live', which meant not only the worldbuilding of space exploration but also the habitats in which the citizens of 2001 would reside. Consequently, in an early example of product placement, General Motors, Hilton Hotels, Howard Johnson and IBM all feature in the film. Whereas, for cultural critic Andrew Ross, the 1939 New York World Fair effectively appropriated the revolutionary appeal of pulp sf, Kubrick's appropriation of its 1960s counterpart was not to revolutionize society (despite his many artistic innovations) but to offer the most convincing portrait of the future based upon its design culture. An uneasy stand-off therefore exists between the commercial imperative of Hilton Hotels wanting to be in the film (and to publicize it thereafter) and the film's metaphysical concerns, established in the opening sequence and brought full circle in the figure of the Star Child, again designed by Liz Moore. Heading towards the exit, past the electronic display of patrons who have helped to finance this immersive yet insightful exhibition, the viewer is left wondering about the tension between art and commerce that Kubrick's attempt at a totally controlled environment only temporarily suspended.

Book Reviews



Graham J. Murphy and Lars Schmeink, eds. *Cyberpunk and Visual Culture* (Routledge, 2017, 326pp, £37.99)

Reviewed by Kathryn E. Heffner (University of Iowa)

From fluorescent faces of women superimposed on skyscrapers to neon grid representations of cyberspace, visualizations of cyberpunk iconography flourish in contemporary media. Graham Murphy and Lars Schmeink provide a collection of essays that closely examines the aesthetics of a wide variety of media – ranging from comic books, tabletop role playing games, major movie productions and independent film – all within the subgenre of cyberpunk. In the introduction, the editors state their intention 'to map the contours of our contemporary environments and the radical transitions of our posthuman existence by focusing its critical analysis on the interplay of visual and virtual media, an interrogative tactic into the simulated materiality of our everyday lives'. In keeping with this theme, the collection provides substantial value to the field of sf, cyberculture and media studies alike through its explicit framework of visual analysis.

The essays are divided into three thematic sections: (1) the history of the subgenre from its literary origins, (2) virtuality and visualization, especially in video games, and (3) cyberpunk in a transnational context. More succinctly, these sections outline cyberpunk's radical trajectories from its literary beginnings, to digital performances within video games, and finally to contemporary concerns in cyberpunk cinema productions. The variety of media examined is complemented by the use of critical apparatuses from such fields as posthumanism, animal studies and information sciences. The book differs from prior scholarship in its emphasis upon the visual culture of cyberpunk. While maintaining scholarly rigour, this edition also provides novices with an accessible entry-point in which to deepen their study and interest in cyberpunk texts/performances.

The first section examines the role of cornerstone texts such as *Neuromancer*, *Blade Runner*, *Tron* and *Hackers*, in addition to lesser-known media. Stina Attebery and Josh Pearson, for example, explore fashion, posthumanism and embodiment within the tabletop roleplaying game *CP2020*, arguing that the function of fashion within the game problematizes human and cyborg identities. In his essay on the aesthetics of light, Pawel Frelik untangles

the politics of illumination and neon light that floods visual representations of cyberculture. Frelik provides a concise history of the role of electrical illumination within sf before connecting the aesthetics of cyberpunk with energy waste, late capitalism and globalization.

The second section examines the significance of digital representations of cyberpunk aesthetics within video games. Mark Johnson argues for three foundational factors of the visuals of cyberspace in terms of space and spatial representations, colour, and shapes and symbols. Seeing the symbiotic relationship between video games and textual productions, Johnson notes that 'portrayals of cyberspace in film and cyberpunk fictions have been explicitly inspired by arcade video games'. Johnson's work resonates with Frelik's observations on the aesthetics of light within the subgenre by emphasizing affect and colour theory. Cohesively, the section provides fruitful insights on the ways that video game simulation and the textual heritage of cyberpunk perform and coalesce.

The final section is politically charged, as the editors ask their readers to consider how 'science fictional' our contemporary culture is. Essays by Mark Bould, Sherryl Vint and Anna McFarlane examine the ways in which the politics and aesthetics of cyberpunk are realized globally. Bould works to shift the myopic lens of Anglo-American cyberpunk by critically and cogently analysing the aesthetics of transnational interventions and performances of African cyberpunk. He takes to task the whiteness of cyberpunk through his thorough assessment of African creative interventions within the subgenre. Vint draws our attention to virtual and real warfare simulation technology and the ethics found in *Ender's Game* and *Good Kill*. She explores the ethos of cyberpunk resistance by problematizing cyberpunk's technocultural culpability.

Cyberpunk and Visual Culture brings to the fore an analysis of the aesthetics and media that have structured the subgenre since its inception in the late twentieth century. This collection demonstrates the breadth and depth of the subgenre through intriguing and accessible essays on the diversity of cyberpunk media, offering unique and important new arguments about the visuality of cyberpunk.

Nick Hubble, Esther MacCallum-Stewart and Joseph Norman, eds. *The Science Fiction of Iain M. Banks* (Gylphi, 2018, 282pp, £18.99)
Paul Kincaid, *Iain M. Banks* (University of Illinois Press, 2017, 208pp, £17.99)

Reviewed by Bob Hugh Hodges (University of Washington)

Iain M. Banks's scholarly reputation after his premature death in 2013 continues to grow as evidenced by these two new books. Paul Kincaid's book is the first monograph to tackle the entire oeuvre, although it gives pride of place to the science fiction, as befits an entry in the Modern Masters series. Kincaid's approach moves between a biographical treatment, a reception study of critical responses to the works with rare indulgences in what appears to be an extended book review (especially concerning Kincaid's misgivings with the standalone sf *The Algebraist* [2004]), and keen literary-critical observations.

The survey offers several ways through Banks's prolific output. First, his place within a Scottish fantastical tradition arguably establishes a context for reading Banks's frequent themes of doppelgangers, familial betrayal and genre play alongside writers such as James Hogg, Robert Louis Stevenson, Alasdair Gray, Irvine Welsh and psychiatrist R.D. Laing. Second, the critiques of John Clute and M. John Harrison, published in *New Worlds*, of ossified space opera acted as a formative influence both upon Banks and his high school comrade Ken MacLeod. Banks and MacLeod exerted reciprocal influences as readers of each other's work, whilst between them, they not only inspired Harrison's return to the subgenre but also influenced writers such as China Miéville and Alastair Reynolds (one might add Karen Lord and Kameron Hurley). Third, in Banks's middle career a thread of linguistic play arises: sections of Scots dialect in several haute literary novels sublate into the post-apocalyptic argot of *Feersum Endjinn* (1994), while that novel and *Excession* (1996) anticipate conventions of email as well as text and social media messaging. Last, Kincaid periodically and evocatively returns to Banks's career-long fixation on symbols of macroscopic scale: bridges, castles,

starships and other edifices in the grand sf tradition of the Big Dumb Object that provide Banks with frequent novelistic subjects and formal structures.

The collection by Nick Hubble, Esther MacCallum-Stewart and Joseph Norman emerged from what became posthumous tributes to Banks's work: a 2013 symposium at Brunel University and a series of events at the 2014 Worldcon in London. The first section centres Banks as an individual, reprints a valuable interview with him, and opens with a moving tribute by MacLeod from the symposium. The reminiscence climaxes with a reflection on Banks's and MacLeod's ecstatic appreciation of sf, grounded in an epiphany 'that our lives are lived against a dark background of deep space and deep time, and that they matter all the more for that'. The second section features contributions from the book's editors, who query the play of genre in Banks's sf. Hubble examines the influence of fairy tales and epic fantasy, particularly in *Matter* (2008), also a touchstone for MacLeod. Norman resurrects a vital question from R.C. Elliott about the role of art under an achieved utopia to examine music as subject and structure in *Look to Windward* (2000) and *The Hydrogen Sonata* (2012).

Martyn Colebrook bridges the genre section and the collection's third section on gameplay with a comparative piece on Banks and John Fowles. MacCallum-Stewart and Ian Sturrock document with copious lists and charts both the mechanics and theoretical apparatus undergirding an attempt to (re) create the game Azad from *The Player of Games* (1988). MacCallum-Stewart's and Jo Lindsay Walton's pieces attend to the challenges that Banks's ekphrastic narrative play pose for game theory.

Questions of genre and gameplay (and the long struggle pre- and post-Wittgenstein to define those categories) segue into the collection's consideration of limit points in Banks's sf. Jude Roberts asks an intriguing question of the ethico-aesthetic status of nominally victimless cannibalism in the novella 'The State of the Art' (1989). Jim Clarke offers, for me, the most useful chapter in the collection: both a rapid, deft survey of various historical senses of the sublime and an exposition of Banks's peculiar adoption of that term for super-civilizational afterlives. Clarke's piece serves as a rejoinder to readers sceptical about Kincaid's link in his monograph of the Culture's reluctance to 'Sublime' with its alleged immaturity and socio-political decadence. Robert Duggan's concluding essay conscripts Raymond Williams, Fredric Jameson and Farah Mendlesohn in a commendable attempt to think simultaneously about the political import of Banks's fiction and the staggering capaciousness of scale and space in novels such as *Excession* or in the Borgesian intricacies of Azad, as aptly considered by the game scholars in this collection. Kincaid, MacLeod and earlier critics of Banks attend to his political valences, but Duggan's synthesized spatial sense enlivens this ongoing discussion. Banks's concern with higher

levels of spatiality prompts comparison from Duggan and Kincaid to Edwin Abbott's *Flatland* (1884).

A common critical saw holds that an artist's death spurs a burst of critical acclaim, but posthumous artistic reputations trough in a few years and require reconsideration about half a century later. Six years on, the pace of Banks scholarship has yet to slacken with strong additions like this collection and Kincaid's monograph. Nevertheless, despite a rich array of connections made in both books, comparative work with Banks seems to be limited so far, so that future scholarship may feature more consideration of Banks alongside not only his immediate literary and sf contemporaries and successors but also nascent cross-media resurgence in critical utopias and socially progressive space opera.

Lou Tambone and Joe Bongiorno, eds. *The Cyberpunk Nexus: Exploring the Blade Runner Universe* (Sequart, 2018, 416pp, £15.08)

Reviewed by Ben Horn (University of Birmingham)

Writing in *The Guardian* in 2018, Paul Walker-Emig argued that although cyberpunk's longevity cannot be denied, this longevity is symptomatic of a broader cultural deadlock: 'The future has looked the same for almost four decades'. Which is to say, that cyberpunk coincided with the period of neoliberal triumphalism, set into motion by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and which – like the economic logic that it formally articulated – now looks increasingly ragged. Nevertheless, the social conditions that cyberpunk ambivalently gestured towards – the rise of communicative capitalism, internet censorship and surveillance, ecological catastrophe – are arguably more pronounced now than they were in the 1980s. As Veronica Hollinger has argued, cyberpunk has become a form of 'science fiction realism' insofar as what once looked like radical critique has been overtaken by social realities and, under the logic of late capitalism, the foreclosure of political alternatives. For this reason, despite its apparent relegation to the past, the genre remains of interest.

While the original term was coined in a short story by Bruce Bethke in 1980, Ridley Scott's future noir masterpiece *Blade Runner* (1982), along with William Gibson's *Neuromancer* (1984), became cyberpunk's *ur*-texts. As Lou Tambone argues in the introduction to this new essay collection, the word 'nexus' (used in Philip K. Dick's original novel, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?* (1968) and Scott's film adaptation) is defined as a relationship between people or things. It

may also mean a causal link, a connected group or series, or the central focal point of something. Tambone argues that, with some conjunction swapping, this leads to a central theme of cyberpunk: the 'relationship between people *and* things'. Expanding on this, the concurrent themes of breaking boundaries and making connections characterizes much of cyberpunk, as well as informing all aspects of this substantial exploration of the *Blade Runner* universe.

As such, the collection does not follow a literary or film theoretical framework, but instead provides an extensive investigation of virtually all aspects of Scott's science fictional *tour de force*, bar the 'making of'. (For that, see Paul Sammon's *The Future Noir* [2017].) Sammon himself offers an introduction to the film, in which he recounts a brief exchange between himself and Scott in which the latter explained that he had been struggling with the death of his brother. From here, Sammon examines the relationship between Scott's personal tragedy and the relentless negativity of punk rock, borrowing Ed Sanders' image of the 'drums of doom' synonymous with punk's negation of the status quo. Sammon's argument that the *Blade Runner* universe is touched by an omnipresent 'entropy and corruption' is evidenced in both the film and the book by the near-extinction of animal life, the normalization of repressive violence and widespread radioactive pollution. While in Dick's novel, much of the population has emigrated off-world, Sammon points out that Scott's overcrowded Los Angeles feels as if it is ready to fall apart.

After Sammon's foreword, the reader is presented with an abundance of features, detailing nearly every aspect of the *Blade Runner* universe. In a section on the film's creative influences, the co-editors revisit Dick's novel, examining how he blurs the distinctions between humans and androids. Through a series of close readings combined with the vitalist ethics of Albert Schweitzer, Joe Bongiorno examines Dick's treatment of empathy for animals and artificial beings alike. The film's debts to the expressionist motifs of 1940s noir cinema receive attention, as do the less examined influence of *Heavy Metal* / *Metal Hurlant*. The second section details more technical aspects of the film's production, including its troubled first screening, collaboration with special effects artist Douglas Trumbull and the creation of the film's unique 70mm prints. Bentley Ousley examines the multiple versions of the film's soundtrack, pointing out in a Dickian twist, that there are multiple 'official' releases, over sixty bootlegs and its journey to record store shelves, disguised as orchestral pieces. Paul J. Salamoff argues that the film's theatrical cut is the 'truest' version of the movie, while Tambone returns to Deckard's oedipal journey and the question of whether he is a replicant. These essays make interesting companion pieces to *The Future Noir*, though *The Cyberpunk Nexus* remains worth reading independently.

Section three revisits some of the familiar themes of *Blade Runner*, such

as the concurrent notions of humanity and dehumanization, as well as Dick's critique of Cartesian ontology. Timothy Shanahan points out that while the replicants are synthetic humans, they are closer to the original definition of 'robot', derived from the Czech word *robota*, meaning 'servitude', 'drudgery' or 'forced labour'. This ties into the status of the replicants as an exploited slave caste, commodified and sold, despite their being virtually identical to humans. Ian Dawe examines the themes of death, suffering and wasted potential, while Nelson Pyles explores the humanity and empathy of the replicants.

A lengthy and interesting section is dedicated to the film's sequel material and derived media, such as the K. W. Jeter novels, comic adaptations by Marvel and later BOOM! Studios, and spoofing in British sf sitcom *Red Dwarf*. The timing of this publication also allows contributors to comment on the 2017 sequel, *Blade Runner 2049*. Tambone draws attention to Villeneuve's visual update of Scott's cinematic vision, arguing that its straying from conventional cyberpunk signifiers and use of spaces beyond the city partially account for its reinvigorated perspective. This is continued in Leah D. Schade's view of the films, and Dick's novel, through the lens of 'cli-fi' and race erasure. Combining contemporary debates in eco-criticism with critical race theory, Schade provides an illuminating and prescient perspective on *Blade Runner 2049*, not least as Dick's depiction of a smog-saturated future, or the films' combination of accelerated ecological and technological disaster loom ever larger.

The Cyberpunk Nexus is neither a mere companion to Sammon's *The Future Noir* nor a collection of purely academic essays. Rather, it is a comprehensive map of the *Blade Runner* universe, from its literary inspiration to contemporary debates about Villeneuve's sequel and their respective legacies. While the themes it explores are familiar, the enthusiasm of its contributors is plainly evident. It is a book for cyberpunks, old and new; returning fans, new fans, and even that strange group of fans known as 'academic critics'.



Anindita Banerjee, ed. *Russian Science Fiction Literature and Cinema: A Critical Reader* (Academic Studies Press, 2018, 380pp, £43.50)

Reviewed by Polina Levontin (Imperial College London)

Russian Science Fiction Literature and Cinema is a collection of articles and essays that offers multiple perspectives across many modes, from historical overviews to close readings. There is no single theoretical framework, nor is there an attempt at

comprehensive treatment. The resulting haphazardness of the book befits the subject, however. Shaped by the ruptures, pitfalls and political stagnations of the last hundred years, the history of Russian sf is essentially a record of Russian history. As with other forms of art, Russian sf has been hostage to censorship which, together with wars, was responsible for creating gaps, delays and diversions in the evolution of the genre. In her introduction, Anindita Banerjee offers an additional and very plausible explanation of why any volume doing justice to the subject would resemble a quilt:

> Science fiction in Russia has been co-created and co-produced by an astonishingly large community that included scientists and engineers, philosophers and policy makers, social and political activists, journalists, artists, illustrators, and, above all, consumers, with their frequently flawed material lives and often unfulfilled aspirations.

The collection illustrates this vividly by patching together perspectives from literary and media studies, intellectual and cultural history, psychoanalysis, as well as science and technology studies.

Digressive and full of loops, the book traces a disheartening arc through time: from exultant revolutionary and cosmic energy to the codified impotence of recent anti-utopias; from immortality (or at least electricity) for all to no transformative agency for anyone. 'Immortality for All' was an actual aim of the philosophical and cultural movement known as Russian Cosmism, where 'All' included not just the living but the dead, who would naturally have to be resurrected first.

The essays are arranged into four parts: 'From Utopian Traditions to Revolutionary Dreams', 'Russia's Roaring Twenties', 'From Stalin to Sputnik and Beyond', and 'Futures and the End of Utopia in Russian SF'. The opening essay by Darko Suvin examines the history of utopian thought in Russian sf up to the 1960s, when after several lost decades Yefremov's *Andromeda* (1958) revived a vision of a 'unified, affluent, humanist, classless and stateless world'. Although Suvin identifies the 1820s as the beginning of Russian sf, one of its distinguishing characteristics that is mentioned by several authors is its intertextuality with Russian fairy tales – the head-waters for utopian thought. Suvin mentions explicitly the 16th-century tale 'Legend of the Sultan Mahomet', which combined the fantastic genre with a blueprint for the centralization of power under a single leader. This tale was dusted off more than once since by various dictators who rose up to the challenge.

The way certain objects/texts/subjects tend to reappear along the journey through the book, transformed in unexpected and occasionally violent ways, evokes the Zone from *Roadside Picnic* (1972). Take, for example, the historic

figure of Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, widely cited as the progenitor of the Russian space programme. In various essays, he resurfaces as a rationalist, an aeronautical engineer, a transcendentalist, a political visionary, a science fiction writer, *and* – briefly in an essay by Asif A. Siddiqi – as a racist and eugenicist. This aspect of his biography seems to have been largely buried, as Tsiolkovsky is mostly treated with reverence, despite proposing in 1918 that as a matter of cosmic improvement all people of colour should be wiped out. Eugenics is examined more thoroughly by Yvonne Howell via two of Mikhail Bulgakov's novellas, but mysteriously she does not mention Tsiolkovsky.

Through the course of the book, it becomes apparent how replete the history of Russian sf is with 'negative spaces': silences, omissions, suppressions and erasures. We learn of filmmakers whose legacies are neglected, of writers whose works had remained unpublished in Russia for decades, and of others, especially poets, whose invaluable contributions to the genre remain little known either in Russia or abroad. Perhaps only four names would be familiar to foreign science fiction fans: Victor Pelevin, Yevgeny Zamyatin, the Strugatsky brothers and Andrei Tarkovsky. The more literary inclined would also recognize names such as Vladimir Mayakovsky, Nikolai Gogol, Bulgakov, Andrei Platonov, Leo Tolstoy, Maxim Gorky and perhaps the Symbolist poets Andrei Bely and Valery Bryusov – yet most would be surprised to learn about their engagements with the sf genre or Russian Cosmism. Platonov especially deserves greater recognition within sf and a wider readership, and it is a missed opportunity that he does not receive more attention in this volume of essays. Nevertheless, the collection succeeds in bringing the work of a series of writers to a wider audience, and in emphasizing the deep cultural affinities running throughout Russian literature between the imagination, mysticism, revolutionary politics, and science and technology.

Patrick B. Sharp, *Darwinian Feminism and Early Science Fiction: Angels, Amazons and Women* (University of Wales Press, 2018, 196pp, £60)

Reviewed by Katie Stone (Birkbeck College, London)

Despite such landmark studies as Justine Larbalestier's *The Battle of the Sexes in Science Fiction* (2002), early women's sf remains woefully neglected in the vast majority of sf criticism. In contrast with the historic tendency to paint sf's early years as an exclusively male space, Patrick Sharp argues that 'women have always

been important contributors and collaborators in the development of SF'. Sharp's new book complements such recent anthologies as Mike Ashley's *The Feminine Future* (2015) and Sharp's own, co-edited with Lisa Yaszek, *Sisters of Tomorrow* (2016). From the angelic islands envisioned by Inez Haynes Gillmore to the pulp sf of such writers as Lilith Lorraine, Sharp demonstrates that early women's sf forms not a niche sub-genre of interest to specialists but rather an integral element of the genre's history. *Darwinian Feminism and Early Science Fiction* is by no means a flawless work, but Sharp's execution of the critically and politically significant task of drawing attention to these much neglected writers means that its merits far outweigh its shortcomings. This is an important monograph for any reader of sf, whether they consider themselves to be a scholar of women's sf or, perhaps even more importantly, if they do not.

Sharp's study does not take the form of a historical survey. Rather, his aim is to demonstrate the relevance of what he calls 'Darwinian feminism' to the field. In his introduction, Sharp defines Darwinian feminism as the convergence of first wave feminism, evolutionary theory and women's sf. As he puts it: 'The growing power of feminist movements and their embrace of evolutionary discourse in the late nineteenth century provided key conditions of emergence for women's SF'. This monograph, then, is an origin story for women's sf which, significantly, frames the development of the genre in relation to contemporary scientific discourse. This marks a departure from the commonly adopted critical approach to women's sf in which it is assumed that female sf authors are primarily concerned with social, or 'soft', sciences. As someone whose background is in the study of the cultural dimensions of science and technology, Sharp is well placed to address 'the failure of SF scholars to engage with critical scholarship on the sciences' which, as he states, 'continues to be a major limitation of the field'. The fact that he chooses to do this within a study of women's writing sets an important precedent for scholars working with women's sf. Sharp clearly demonstrates that it is possible for writing to be both 'a celebration of science and a critique of scientific masculinity', and indeed it is writing which performs this dual function that serves as the primary subject of his research.

The book is structured around the 'five frequent storytelling tactics' which Sharp identifies in the writing of Darwinian feminists. These include the reorganization of sexual selection, the expansion of the domestic sphere, the reconfiguration of the colonial gaze 'so that women are seen as the carriers of civilization who must overcome the savagery […] of men', the enumeration of the dangers of masculine science and, finally, the representation of Amazons and angels as the apex of evolution. Sharp ably traces the development of these 'tactics' throughout the five chapters of his monograph. Beginning with a history of the institutionalization of science and its establishment as a masculine

discourse, he then moves on to a consideration of feminist reactions to this discourse in utopian writing of the 1890s and then in magazine sf. This history of Darwinian feminism is rich in both literary and scientific detail. Sharp offers thorough examinations of the works of dozens of writers as well as a wealth of historical insights which contextualize sf as the inheritor of a colonial, gendered discourse of scientific masculinity stretching back as far as the late fifteenth century. His discussion of Margaret Cavendish's *The Blazing World* (1666) as a precursor to Darwinian feminism offers a particularly striking example of this critical approach, in terms of his dual focus on her scientific and literary production. Given the vast amount of evidence Sharp provides, it seems impossible to deny that a significant strand of the history of feminist sf is that of women who 'embraced evolutionary discourse as […] objective ground upon which to make the case for suffrage and social equality'. The central Darwinian tenet of the malleability and adaptability of living organisms permitted feminists to propose alternate evolutionary histories which, as Sharp details, combatted scientific masculinity from a range of political standpoints.

The question of just how politically radical, or indeed how feminist, these women were remains unfortunately unresolved in Sharp's work. While it is undoubtedly fascinating to read about the work of Victorian evolutionary theorists such as Antoinette Brown Blackwell and Eliza Burt Gamble, who challenged the presumed objectivity and underlying misogyny of much scientific discourse, or the ways in which early sf writer Clare Winger Harris explored 'the pleasure that women can have' when domestic concerns are addressed in a scientific register, Sharp fails to explore the complexities of their respective political positions. In his introduction he persuasively argues that 'the most limiting aspect of SF scholarship over the past half century has been the contention that it is necessary to define SF […] in order for a scholarly project on the genre to have merit', and yet this statement is followed by an extensive discussion of the distinctions between genre, discourse and utterance in which only male theorists are cited. Meanwhile, no such time is devoted to the history of feminism as either a political movement or a theoretical field. This leaves some of the underlying tenets of Darwinian feminism worryingly under-theorized. For one thing, the adherence to an essentialist rhetoric exhibited by many of these writers goes unquestioned in Sharp's analysis and, by failing to critique or justify his exclusive focus on the writing of cis-women, Sharp risks reaffirming their binary understanding of gender. Moreover, while Darwinian feminism's co-opting of colonial power is broadly condemned in Sharp's analysis, it does not receive the same kind of thorough critique found in his writing on scientific masculinity. By failing to make use of the wealth of feminist criticism available on the subject of white feminism's imperialist and racist history, Sharp risks falling back on

presumed public opinion and common sense; as if it were a truth universally acknowledged that texts which portray 'a feminine form of colonisation' are to be treated with hostility.

As Sharp has previously published on constructions of race in Darwinian theory (*Savage Perils* [2007]), this lack of theoretical grounding in either womanist or colonial studies is disappointing. Furthermore, with the exception of Pauline Hopkins, whose novel *Of One Blood; Or, The Hidden Self* (1902–3) is only briefly referenced, all of the women whose writing Sharp refers to are white. However, these serious drawbacks do not negate the fact that Sharp's book is a timely and well-researched piece of criticism which seeks to address the erasure of women's contributions to the development of early sf. Going forward one can hope that future scholars of feminist sf will be able to combine the scientific and historical rigour of Sharp's work with the theoretical precision and political clarity which this study, unfortunately, lacks. Rather than providing the final word in Darwinian feminist studies, this book should be taken as a call for feminist sf scholars to reach back into the history of women's sf and interrogate the variously racist, essentialized and radical models of gender and evolution found there.



Gary Westfahl, *Arthur C. Clarke* (University of Illinois Press, 2018, 240pp, £18.99)

Reviewed by Jerome Winter (University of California, Riverside)

Gary Westfahl's timely and exciting study is the latest addition to a mini-renaissance of interest in Arthur C. Clarke that has occurred over recent years. For instance, SyFi Channel produced a lavish adaptation of *Childhood's End* (2015); Michael Benson's well-researched and compulsively readable *A Space Odyssey* (2018), which shockingly gave equal time to Clarke and Stanley Kubrick, marked the fiftieth anniversary of *2001*; and Stephen Baxter and Alastair Reynolds collaborated on *The Medusa Chronicles* (2016), a sequel to Clarke's 'A Meeting with Medusa' (1971). Eschewing a redundant critical return to Clarke's much discussed major novels or any new forays into the steadily mounting biographies of this author – to be rendered obsolete anyway when Clarke's private diaries are legally made public in 2038 – Westfahl's new book is the most sustained and comprehensive anatomy yet attempted of analysing Clarke's fictional enterprise as a whole, with special emphasis on the ritually

neglected short fiction and equally overlooked minor and later novels of this influential author.

The first chapter dutifully begins, however, with a brief biographical sketch that offers little by way of new insights. For those unfamiliar with the author's life, all the major highlights are stressed: the death of Clarke's father when he was a child, the resulting strapped finances of his family that foreshadow the money troubles that would haunt his adult life, his mother's struggle to send him to an elite grammar school, his burgeoning interest in pulp fandom, especially his participation in the British Interplanetary Society, his stint as a London civil servant and service in the RAF during World War Two, his degree from King's College London in physics and mathematics, his marriage to Marilyn Mayfield and their subsequent estrangement, his queer relationship with Mike Wilson and permanent relocation to Sri Lanka in part to avoid homophobic laws in England, his growing obsession with diving, and his post-polio syndrome. Nevertheless, the second chapter sets the stage for the fresh takes of the rest of the volume by its focus on the satirical humour of Clarke's juvenilia and early short fiction. Westfahl's compelling contention is that critics have overlooked the extent to which Clarke's mature fiction never lost an understated tone of wry, sophisticated bemusement.

The third chapter shifts from a loosely chronological to a purely topical arrangement. Westfahl surprisingly contends that the ebullience of Clarke's optimism about future technological developments has been grossly exaggerated. While Westfahl does not contextualize Clarke's dogged belief in the seemingly magical if mixed blessings of technological progress against later dystopian, apocalyptic and jaundiced sf writers such as J.G. Ballard or William Gibson, he does compactly digest an impressive array of short fiction and too-often-forgotten novels, such as *The Fountains of Paradise* (1979) to contend that, if only for the sake of plot mechanics, machines are often depicted as dysfunctional and dangerous accidents of self-glorifying inventors. Similarly, in the fourth chapter, Westfahl productively bucks the default truisms of Clarke criticism to aver that the much-vaunted conquest of space typified by the Cold War competition between the USA and Russia is often shown, in Clarke's fiction, to be equally bureaucratically banal and fraught with catastrophic danger, if not totally automated and impersonal. Likewise, Clarke's scientists are often not lone maverick heroes but collaborative team members with deep institutional support. To defend this well-supported close reading, Westfahl deftly draws on a wide variety of short fiction as well as detailed discussions of novels such as *Rendezvous with Rama* (1973), *Imperial Earth* (1975) and *2061* (1987).

The fifth chapter examines Clarke's predictions of humanity's future. This chapter expertly showcases Westfahl's rare value as a major critic and

scholar, codifying Clarke's wildest speculations into a kind of automated phone system of numbered, sequential options within options for analysing Clarke's miscellaneous speculations. For instance, Westfahl mines *Childhood's End* (1953) and *The City and the Stars* (1956), as well as an exhaustive set of short fiction, to explain that if a Clarke reader were to encounter a sufficiently advanced civilization that has peaked, becoming an enervating utopia, then the reader may subsequently witness that society either suicide into oblivion, escape into virtual reality or cultivate ever more sophisticated arts of governance, if not initiate new waves of rebellion against civilizational decadence and stagnation. Moreover, if the reader sees that an intrepid youngster chooses to rebel, the society will then proceed to innovate daring research into previously verboten programmes, rediscover a neglected but illustrious past or commit to space travel afresh. Whether, as Westfahl believes, such Stapledonian long-view future histories amount to a critique of utopia or an outright repudiation of Donald Wollheim's 'consensus' vision of a pan-spermian expansion of humanity into the cosmos remain unclear to my mind. It is doubtless, however, that this linear, branching analysis is scholarly precision at its finest.

Chapter six continues such meticulous taxonomies by reading the *2001* sequels as plausible scientific extrapolations of diverse alien physiologies. Westfahl also discusses the way Clarke's frequent motif of the unsolicited interventions of prying, ethereal alien super-beings emphasizes humanity's insignificance, replaceability and existential isolation. Oddly, though, Westfahl refuses to countenance that the near-mystical ecstasy that such encounters elicit also reinforces a hymn to progress that later writers would find difficult to endorse. Westfahl then proceeds to a chapter on Clarke's fascination with the sea, its denizens and its effect on humanity, before devoting a chapter to Clarke's complex treatment of religion as both a psychopathology and source of ultimate values. Finally, chapter nine reads *The Sands of Mars* (1951) and *The Songs of Distant Earth* (1986), among other texts, to argue that the charge that Clarke writes one-dimensional, depthless characters is sorely mistaken. Westfahl compellingly argues that what naysayers as astute as Kubrick himself might see as a bland or perfunctory clumsiness of characterization is simply Clarke's understated way of rendering loneliness and a dignified dedication to a scientifically knowable cosmos larger than the neurotic individual.

Jaroslav Kalfař, *Spaceman of Bohemia* (Sceptre, 2018, 288pp, £8.99)

Reviewed by Paweł Frelik (University of Warsaw)

'This is not going to go the way you think.' There may not be a single *Star Wars* connection in *Spaceman of Bohemia*, but Luke Skywalker's words seem to me a very apt warning for someone who thinks they have worked out what the novel is about after the first fifty pages or so. The initial impression of familiarity is not unjustified since genre markers are all over Kalfař's debut, which masquerades as a straightforward space opera.

A number of familiar tropes are easily identifiable straightaway, ranging from clever reworkings to direct allusions. The novel's protagonist Jakub Procházka, the first astronaut of the Czech space programme to be sent to explore a mysterious cloud in the vicinity of Venus, may seem an unlikely hero, but as far back as March 1978, the Czech pilot Vladimír Remek was the first international member of the Soviet-sponsored Interkosmos programme. When an alien encountered by Procházka begins describing his voyages with the words 'I have travelled through galaxies […] I have raced with meteor showers and I have painted the shapes of nebulas', many readers will hear echoes of Roy Batty's monologue from Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* (1982). The description of the entry into the cloud reads like a verbal analogue to the ring sequence from *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968). There is a threat of alien invasion from a race of minuscule, ravenous beings known as Gorompeds (despite them being susceptible to washing detergent), whilst Russia has a shadow space programme, where real breakthroughs are made in secrecy. This is a very motley crew of sf tropes, but they quickly instil a sense of familiarity.

To be sure, Kalfař, a Czech-American writer who did not move to the USA until he was fifteen and who had been centrally shaped by a different culture, plays with these narrative bricks in a manner indicative of a non-Anglophone fantastic tradition. Despite the novel's seriousness, there are unmistakable pockets of humour very much in the vein of his countryman Jaroslav Hašek's portrayal of the Good Soldier Švejk: the ironic declaration of 'my nation's triumph', the assertion that 'the space program's shrink stinks of pickles', or constant jibes at corporate sponsors of the mission, clearly poking fun at the crude capitalism of the post-Soviet era. When Procházka approaches Venus, he encounters the mummified body of Laika, the Soviet space dog floating in space, a sight as grotesque as it is unlikely since the canine explorer never

left Sputnik 2 and crashed back on Earth. The balance between action and character development marks another signature of a different tradition of the fantastic. Things do happen in the novel, but Kalfař de-emphasizes events at the expense of the protagonist's musings, a characteristic move of so many continental European writers from Poland's Stanisław Lem to France's Bernard Werber. All in all, *Spaceman of Bohemia* comes across as a perfect exemplar of slipstream space opera. Or non-genre space opera. Or whatever else one chooses to call it. At first.

But this is not what *Spaceman of Bohemia* is about. Not even close. For all the fantastic trappings and near-futuristic setting (the mission launch is dated for spring 2018), the novel casts its eye in the opposite direction: into the past of Bohemia, Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. Under its speculative guise and ironical asides, *Spaceman of Bohemia* is a profound novel about Czech history in general and the twentieth century in particular. Certainly, there are older references here. As the reader learns on the very first page, Procházka's space shuttle was named *JanHus1* in homage to a late fourteenth/early fifteenth-century theologian burned at the stake for heresy. Since the alien whom the astronaut befriends has no individual name, Procházka calls him Hanuš after a fifteenth-century Prague clockmaker allegedly blinded by the authorities. Later, when Procházka almost dies, of all the things that one might ponder when faced with death, he thinks of the events of March 1939 when Emil Hácha, for some one of the most tragic figures in Czech history, was summoned to the Reich Chancellery to essentially surrender Czechoslovakia to Hitler.

But it is really the history of Czechoslovakia after 1945 that is at stake here. Early in the novel, Procházka reminisces about his childhood and, almost offhandedly, mentions that his father was a torturer for the Communist secret police. It takes another few chapters for this fact to assume significance, but – without too many spoilers – his father's occupation has determined the protagonist's life in many ways, some of which he never even knew about until the time of his space mission. While there are brief scenes that are anchored in Communist Czechoslovakia, *Spaceman of Bohemia* focuses on the post-transformation, on how Czech society has dealt with the aftermath of the regime, and on the long shadows that the period has cast on entire families and communities. Despite its geographical specificity, the novel can also be read more universally. For all the local idiosyncrasies and differences, I suspect many events will resonate with readers from various Central and Eastern European countries, as well as anyone interested in how the region has transitioned into what seemed, back in 1989, a shiny brave new world of capitalism and parliamentary democracy.

The degree to which this backward gaze dominates over the fantastic

narrative is best exemplified by Procházka's miraculous rescue and return which would, in a more action-oriented novel, really stretch the definition of likelihood. In a way, one could even say that the entire ploy of a space mission and an alien encounter exists to create for the protagonist necessary conditions for remembrance, reflection and symbolic – rather than literal – rebirth. Despite its adventurous trappings in space and self-deprecating humour, *Spaceman of Bohemia* is a slow and wistful novel in which the present (and near future) are yoked to the past, both personal and communal. On the very last pages of the novel another revolution in Prague is brewing and the wheel of history is about to turn again. But, as Procházka, now reconciled and changed, muses, 'we are what we are, and we need the stories.' The one about an alien named Hanuš is as good as any other.



Rose Macaulay, *What Not: A Prophetic Comedy* (Handheld Press, 2019, 195 pp, £12.99)

Reviewed by Paul March-Russell (University of Kent)

Halfway through Rose Macaulay's utopian satire, the female protagonist Kitty Grammont exclaims: 'Revue is England's hope […] it's the only art in which all the forms of expression come in – talking, singing, dancing, gesture – standing on your head if nothing else will express you at the moment'. Macaulay's discordant novel strives, likewise, for these effects and it succeeds in presenting a topsy-turvy vision of post-World War One society that, nonetheless, looks strangely similar to the historical world.

Published in 1919, but only after the scheduled first edition had been censored, *What Not* describes an attempt at utopia by extending the authoritarian governance of wartime into the ensuing peace. For several critics at the time, most notably D.H. Lawrence in his novel *Kangaroo* (1923), this is exactly what had happened. Macaulay takes this perception and runs with it, offering a twisted version of the post-World War One settlement. Despite the utopian dreams of its male protagonist, Nicholas Chester, and the dystopian effects his administration produces, Macaulay's imagined society is neither a utopia nor a dystopia. Too chaotic to be the former, and too unruly to be the latter, it is instead a society in flux, attempting to come to terms with the legacy of the war and seeking to build 'a home fit for heroes'. It is these unresolved tensions that cast the novel's utopian and/or dystopian elements into sharp relief.

Macaulay is unclear on several of her society's key features. We learn that

there is an oligarchy, a five-man United Council, which oversees the running of the state. Nevertheless, the current political parties continue to exist and elections are conducted. However, the apparent democracy is in a state of near-anarchy: Kitty explains, 'We have now remained in office for over six months […] and we hope to remain for at least three more'. With such a short life-span for individual governments, it is inconceivable that the Ministry of Brains, the 'vast organisation' for which Kitty works, is the creation of the current administration. It is more likely to have been the creation of the United Council and its phalanx of civil servants, so that each elected administration is really a faceless non-entity. Chester's failure, as the Minister of Brains, is to become an all-too-visible face for its unpopular policies. Despite draconian measures, such as book banning and police raids on avant-garde booksellers, a relatively free press continues. There is *The Hidden Hand*, a government-owned publication, while historically conservative newspapers such as *The Times* tend to follow the party line, but there are also the real-world tabloids (*The Daily Mail*) and left-leaning newspapers (*The Herald*), as well as the imagined muck-raking paper, *The Patriot*, and *Stop It*, a peacetime version of *The Ypres Times*. A serious consideration, then, is the relationship between government and the mass media (an exploration that led to the novel's censorship) as well as the extent to which the latter can manufacture both popular opinion and popular protest.

At the same time, Macaulay delights in the play between fact and fiction, a pleasure evident in the way that she telescopes in and out of both her invented narrative and the real-world of politicians, writers and editors whose names she cheerfully dispenses. What emerges from Macaulay's world-building is a barely functioning anarchy: a mass stupidity that could, as Macaulay suggests in her authorial note, benefit from the eugenic policies of the Ministry. As Sarah Lonsdale argues in her introduction to this new edition, part of what makes the novel both so intriguing and aggravating to read is Macaulay's 'refusal to come down on one side or another'.

This edition continues Handheld Press' commitment to reprinting classic sf and fantasy (see Ernest Bramah's *What Might Have Been*, reviewed in *Foundation* 131), but this work is especially important as it presents Macaulay's novel as she intended it. Using a first edition from John Clute's personal library, owned originally by Michael Sadleir, a director at Constable, it restores the key scene where a newspaper editor attempts to blackmail Chester. With the popularity of the press already at an all-time low, following its complicity with the Ministry of Propaganda in spreading wartime lies, Constable took fright and cut this passage. Now restored, it not only gives the story greater narrative logic, it also substantiates Macaulay's daring satire at the expense of both government and mass media.

Much of the novel's interest lies in the extent to which it explores the techniques of propaganda, including the use of posters, pamphlets, public meetings, theatre, cinema, newspapers and state-directed religion, to whip up support for the Ministry's proposed Mental Training Bill. This campaign follows on from the Mental Progress Act which has already organized the citizens into various gradations, ranging from A to C, based upon their intellectual capacity. The Act prohibits marriage and breeding between the categories so as to produce eugenically healthy specimens. Macaulay (like E.M. Forster in the 'The Machine Stops' [1909]) clearly has H.G. Wells' vision of a world-state in her sights as well as the Eugenics Education Society, the U.S. Mental Deficiency Act of 1913, and the pervasive discourse within government circles, since the Boer War, of 'national efficiency'. Lonsdale brings substantial circumstantial evidence together to suggest a possible link between *What Not* and Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), but ultimately this evidence feels unconvincing compared to what we already know about the influences that acted upon Huxley. In any event, *What Not* is significant enough in itself without being compared to its more illustrious successor. What is surprising, however, is that Lonsdale makes no mention of *Man's World* (1926) written by the pioneering female journalist and wife of the biologist J.B.S. Haldane, Charlotte Haldane. There, I would suggest, is the novel that marks the missing link between *What Not* and *Brave New World*.

As in so many other dystopias, illicit desire proves to be the unregulated element that throws the social order into doubt. Kitty and Chester fall in love and decide to marry although Chester is prohibited from marriage because of his two mentally deficient siblings. (Macaulay does not pay any attention to the exact nature of their condition; they are merely written off like the beggar who intrudes upon Kitty and Chester's honeymoon). Chester has pursued his Ministry's policies because of embarrassment at his siblings, and anger with the religiosity and wastefulness of his parents. Kitty, for reasons that are less clear, shares with Chester his distaste for the eugenically impure.

Here is the key stumbling block in Macaulay's novel. Leaving aside the question of their gross hypocrisy, are we meant to side against Kitty and Chester because of their repugnant social attitudes or are we meant to side with them as martyrs for a cause that might have cured the mob-like mentality that led to World War One? The unpleasantness of their characters, in contrast with the more endearing couples in the novel, makes for a more complex work that speaks to the nuances of the immediate post-war period. Some of the most disturbing aspects of the narrative take place in its margins, such as the forced repatriation of Jews to Jerusalem or the baby taxes that encourage mass infanticide.

These darker elements puncture the fun that Macaulay has at the expense of new technologies, in particular, ones associated with transportation, such as the automated baby-walkers, the underground rail and the Aero Bus Company (the initials of which suggest a familiarity with Rudyard Kipling's 'As Easy as A.B.C.' [1912]). Macaulay also paints a vivid picture of a bureaucracy struggling to keep its paymasters in power. Ultimately, it is this anarchic vision – again, in keeping with Kitty's extolling of revue – that best distils Macaulay's position. The final chapter reflects upon 'the debris of ruined careers, ruined principles, ruined Ministries, ruined ideals'. In 1953, following another conflict that her characters in *What Not* seem doomed to endure, Macaulay published an idiosyncratic study, *The Pleasure of Ruins*, in which she renewed the eighteenth-century notion of *Ruinenlust*. She delights in both ruins and the comedy that these fragments exhibit – the vanity of human endeavour. It is this vicarious pleasure that she shares with the early novels of Huxley, the later satires of Evelyn Waugh and, most of all, 'the piecemealing of the personality' that Wyndham Lewis saw as undergirding his modernist broadsides. The 'carnival of destruction', which Brian Stableford sees as emblematic of British scientific romance, is present not only in *What Not* but also in the male-dominated satires that Macaulay's novel so effectively counterpoints.



Rebecca Roanhorse, *Trail of Lightning* (Gallery/ Saga Press, 2018, 304pp, £10.99)

Reviewed by Selena Middleton (McMaster University)

In accepting her 2017 Nebula Award for Best Short Story, Ohkay Owingeh Pueblo and African-American writer Rebecca Roanhorse reminded conference attendees – including sf/f writers and the gatekeeping editors who select stories for publication – that Indigenous people are still living on the land known as America, and that they are still writing and telling stories as they have been doing for thousands of years. *Trail of Lightning* is part of Roanhorse's project to bring Diné (Navajo) stories to the forefront of popular literature and awareness, and to centre Diné lives in such narratives. With a cast comprising of entirely Diné characters set in a fractured (and partially drowned) world in which the nation of Dinétah is rising, *Trail of Lightning* succeeds not only as a service to literary diversity but is also a fast-paced and engaging read.

Roanhorse's novel, the first in the Sixth World trilogy, introduces Maggie Hoskie, a monster-hunter who struggles not only with the implications of her

clan powers – the dual gift of speed and lethal violence that enables her to hunt the lower-order supernatural beings that have plagued Dinétah since the apocalyptic Big Water event – but also with the traumatic childhood loss of her grandmother, and her more recent abandonment by mentor Neizghànì. When Maggie encounters a new kind of monster after being hired to find a missing girl, she must use the skills honed under Neizghànì's tutelage to discover the monster's origin and ensure the safety of her people. Maggie's past and present challenges render her an often emotionally distant or unreliable protagonist in much the same vein as other, often male, protagonists whose proclivities pull them equally toward dark and light. But the weight of Maggie's pain and resultant self-doubt is often lifted by the easy confidence of Kai Arviso, who performs the sidekick role on Maggie's monster-hunting quest, while gradually revealing his own substantial powers and his ability to pull Maggie back from her almost supernatural despair to a realm of human feeling.

Characterization is one of Roanhorse's strengths, and this strength extends to landscape as well. Like Maggie, Dinétah is presented as a complex environment, and a wounded one. Geographically, Dinétah is the Navajo reservation which straddles the states of Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico and the stark mesas – alternately rolling red earth and jutting black mountains – infuses the narrative with an unstable ambiance. Maggie and Kai spend much of the book travelling over this characteristic landscape and its simultaneous beauty and danger infuses the narrative with additional layers of conflict. It is significant that one of Maggie's most traumatic memories repeatedly pulls her back to the Black Mesa, where she camped with the demigod Neizghànì before her abandonment. On the Black Mesa, evidence of Dinétah's colonial history emerges in the presence of the ruins of an old mine and the memory of crooked lawyers, forced relocations of Diné people, and dirty water and cancer for those who stayed. Even the powerful Neizghànì refers to the Black Mesa as 'sickness'. Maggie can't shake the way the place seems to trigger her clan powers, as if the landscape is a monster she could kill.

As ancient Dinétah gods and monsters have returned to the land after the Big Water, the frequent visitations of Ma'ii, or Coyote, embody the unstable element suggested by the foreboding of the Black Mesa and Maggie's doubt of her own goodness. The trickster god first appears dressed immaculately in a 'dapper gentlemen's suit right out of the Old West', a detail which connects the character both to a particularly brutal period of the colonial project pushing into the western regions of North America and to the locally felt lawless chaos of said era. Notwithstanding these sinister connotations, Ma'ii's presence in *Trail of Lightning* is frequently a delight. When Maggie's wardrobe is utilitarian, and the landscape is stark, Coyote's suits are colourful or flamboyant in their

detail. His gestures are practised and charming, despite the fact that his human guise sometimes stutters into the canine. In this way, the reader experiences the trickster's seductive power in his ability to inspire an appetite for what one knows to be dangerous.

As is common in sf/f written by Indigenous authors, Roanhorse interrogates usually unchallenged western categories of time, space and embodiment. In a novel replete with fantastical elements, the uncanny Shalimar nightclub stands out as a space which bends logic in its very existence. The discomfort inspired by this space begins when Maggie is forced to forego her usual leather jacket for a halter top, bandolier, and a faceful of cosmetics. In costume and on display for the other club-goers, Maggie discovers a part of Dinétah that, in her social isolation, she did not know existed. In this space, with Kai's medicine on her eyes, Maggie realizes that what she has always assumed to be the true form of the various Diné clans is actually an illusion, and that Diné bodies – and the appearances of Diné gods – encompass a variety she had not previously imagined; thus the strangeness of this trickster space extends its power into the real world through Maggie's new awareness. But the Shalimar's extension into other dimensions is also literal and spatial. Even though Maggie knows she is deep underground inside the Shalimar, the ceiling seems to rise up into the atmosphere, displaying the desert stars far overhead. It is in the liminal space of the Shalimar, too, that Maggie begins to understand the various ways her own life has been destabilized and shaped by non-human forces.

With *Trail of Lightning,* Rebecca Roanhorse has set out to highlight Diné lives and decentre responses to colonization as a primary narrative function. The result is a world and characters who are not unaffected by the colonial past; indeed, evidence of that past is in the ruins atop the Black Mesa and in the effects of climate change which has submerged or destroyed most of the world. But Dinétah is a nation and a people that no longer need to speak back to colonization because the old gods have returned, the old stories are alive, and the most pressing issues Maggie, Kai and others must deal with are of Dinétah origin.

Anthony Burgess, *Puma* (Manchester University Press, 2018, 328pp, £20)

Reviewed by Adam Roberts (Royal Holloway College, London)

This new Burgess science fiction novel is actually old-new, or twice-old-new. It's new in the sense that it has never before been published in this form, old since it was actually written four decades ago, and old-old because that original, unpublished draft was chopped-about, reworked and amalgamated with other material to make Burgess's 1982 novel *The End of the World News*.

Back in 1975 Richard Zanuck and David Brown, producers of *Jaws*, decided to reboot the *When Worlds Collide* idea for their next blockbuster, and hired Burgess to generate a story. With characteristic industry Burgess completed a book-length prose treatment of the idea by January 1976, calling the world-ending object hurtling towards us 'Puma' and naming the novel after it. The movie, of course, was never made, and despite a few desultory attempts by Burgess to see it into print, *Puma* languished unpublished. Then, in 1980, came the notable commercial and critical success of Burgess's *Earthly Powers*. It's likely his UK and US publishers asked for something comparable, a 'big' novel as a follow-up. Burgess responded by combining a trimmed-down version of *Puma* (with the rogue planet renamed 'Lynx') with two other book-length projects he had sitting around in a desk drawer: a novel about the life of Sigmund Freud, originally written in the mid-1970s at the instigation of Canadian television (who contemplated a TV series on the subject), and the libretto to an unproduced opera about Leon Trotsky visiting New York in 1917. These components were, Burgess conceded with rather devastating off-handedness in his author's note, 'shuffled together' to make *End of the World News*, cut into chunks and distributed across the whole – the intention, Burgess claimed, was to mimic the choppiness of channel-hopping whilst watching TV.

Burgess aficionados, in other words, have seen this work before, and may be tempted to regard *Puma*'s standalone publication, a quarter century after its author's death, as merely refried beans. That would be a mistake, though. Puma works much better as a standalone than the 'Lynx' reworking did when so choppily included in *End of the World News*. Here, freed of its adulterations, the story acquires genuine narrative momentum, and its worldbuilding, though designedly schlocky, possesses an impressive heft. It is the kind of story that needs to barrel along, interruption-free, and in this version it is allowed to do

precisely that.

The disaster, first impending and then actual, is parsed through more than a dozen main characters, *Towering Inferno* style – 1974's biggest movie and a manifest influence on Burgess's approach. There are some splendid set-pieces, especially towards the end, and several of them were not included in *End of the World News*. Governments lie to their populations, assuring them that Puma will pass, but they know the impact will destroy the earth, and work in secret to build a space-ark to carry a workable population of humans away from the disaster. The puritanically eugenicist process by which potential crewmembers are chosen (by a computer called VOZ) facilitates a deal of plunging Burgessian satire at the wickedness of calibrating human beings by criteria of absolute efficiency. Vanessa Frame, a pneumatic genius scientist who happens to be the daughter of the designer of the spaceship project is chosen, but her unfaithful, potbellied husband Val Frame finds himself excluded – in the *End of the World News* version he is deliberately left off the roster; here he is included at his wife's insistence but gets stranded in a storm-wracked and flooded New York as the rest of the crew fly to Colorado to join the craft.

Val falls in with the larger-than-life Courtland Willett, a hugely fat and rambunctious actor, once a Shakespearian player, now reduced to dressing up as Santa Claus in shopping malls. There's a certain amount of verve to the way Burgess writes Willets – fierce, gluttonous, kindly, bold, lecherous, as easily moved to tears as anger, a drinker and smoker and shagger – though he obviously loves his creation a little too much. Comparisons with Falstaff are invited by the novel itself, but Burgess knows he's pastiche Shakespeare rather than the real thing (he's a Will-ette, rather than the full Will) and perhaps as a result overcompensates with great scads of tiresome Elizabethan swearing: 'snotnosed bastard […] and now that I have leisure and breath, I might add that you are a slabberdegullion druggel, a doddipol jolthead, a blockish grutnol and a turdgut'. A little of this sort of thing goes a long way and, I'm sorry to say, Burgess gives us great scads of it. Val and Willets trek across the disintegrating USA trying to reach the space-ark before it takes-off, and heading for an interestingly different novel's-end than the one Burgess decided on for *End of the World News*.

Val is that most venal of figures, a writer of science fiction who supplements his income by teaching university courses on the genre; and Burgess takes this pretext to unload some *de haut en bas* sneering at the genre he is himself writing. Copies of Val's 'well-made but trivial fantasies', we are told, 'were to be found in airports, tobacconists and pornoshops, and they existed also in cassette adaptations and microfiche' – a nice example of how rapidly visions of the near future (Burgess in 1975 imagining America in 1999) tend to date. We're

given the reader samples of Val's fiction, including a number of fruity-sounding titles: '*Eyelid of Slumber*, *Maenefa the Mountain*, *Cuspclasp and Flukefang*, *Desirable Sight*, *The Moon Dwindled*' – a rather pleasing Jack Vance vibe to these, I'd say. But Val himself loathes his own chosen genre, and unloads on his students:

> 'Science fiction is, let's be honest, ultimately a triviality,' said Val. 'It's brain-tickling, no more. The American cult of mediocrity, which rejects Shakespeare, Milton, Harrison and Abramovitz, had led us to the nonsense of running university courses in science fiction. Christ, we should be studying Blake and Gerard Manley Hopkins.' This was indiscrete, he was also surprised at the vehemence with which he condemned the very thing he was being paid to promote.

Burgess's ostentatious flashing of his cloven hoof, here, is more endearing than shocking, the closest this honestly four square disaster novel comes to irony. More, it's placed in a complicating context by editor Paul Wake's inclusion, as appendices, of various accounts of 1970s sf titles from Burgess's prodigious backlist of book reviews. Some of these are as dismissive as Burgess's Val: of Frank Herbert's *Dune* (1965), Burgess remarked, 'there is very little intellectual content in SF; neo-technological gimmicks don't really tickle the higher centres', while reviewing Gollancz's 1978 list of genre titles he indulged in some satire at the expense of the gobbledygook he considered sf to be:

> Sf plots are easily devised. We are a million years in the future, and the world is run by the Krompire, who have police robots called patates under the grim chief with the grafted cybernetic cerebrum whose name is Peruna. There is a forbidden phoneme. If you utter it you divide into two entities which continue to subdivide until you become a million microessences used to feed the life system of Aardappel, the disembodied head of the Krompir. But there is a phonemic cancellant called a burgonya, obtainable on the planet Kartoffel. You can get there by Besterian teleportation, but the device for initiating the process is in the hands of Tapuch Adamah, two-headed head of the underground Jagwaimo, Man must resist the System. The Lovers, who amate according to banned traditional edicts of Terpomo, proclaim Love.

'Type it out,' Burgess instructs us, 'and correct nothing: you will find yourself in the Gollancz SF constellation.' But the reference to Alfred Bester in amongst all that potato-themed knockabout speaks to a man more familiar with the genre than he is letting on. And other appendices included here, not least a lengthy, astute and enthusiastic introduction to J.G. Ballard's collected short stories, gives the lie to his curmudgeon mode: where sf was concerned, Burgess both

knew whereof he spoke and appreciated the things that the genre could do that mimetic fiction could not. I mean: look again at that sketched-out parody – let's call it *A Clockwork Potato* – and confess: doesn't that sound like a rather wonderful book? I'd certainly read it.

Andrew Biswell, director of Manchester's International Anthony Burgess Foundation, and Paul Wake, of Manchester Metropolitan University, are general editors of the ongoing collected edition of Burgess's complete works, the 'Irwell edition'. Handsome, comprehensively annotated editions of *A Vision of Battlements* (1965), *The Pianoplayers* (1986) and *Beard's Roman Women* (1976) have already appeared; other titles are in the proverbial pipeline, or perhaps we should say (since Burgess never smoked a pipe) in the metaphorical cigarillo box. And notwithstanding his occasional grumpy animadversions against the genre, sf fans have good reason to be interested in Burgess. He wrote near-future dystopia in *A Clockwork Orange*, the influential overpopulation yarn *The Wanting Seed* (both 1962) – in fact, Burgess complained that Harry Harrison stole both the idea and the reveal of *Make Room! Make Room!* (1966) from this novel – and *1985* (1978), a reworking of George Orwell's celebrated novel. Moreover, Burgess novels not usually considered sf turn out, on closer inspection, to have key genre elements: the husband in *One Hand Clapping* (1961) is a telepath who has visions of impending global apocalypse, *Inside Mr Enderby* (1963) is narrated by time travellers from the future (who in one scene manifest and creep around sleeping Enderby's bedroom) and Burgess's last published novel, *Byrne* (1995), returns to near-future dystopian territory. *Puma* makes a fascinating companion piece to his lifelong, conflicted engagement with genre, quite apart from being an extremely good read in its own right.



Ian McDonald, *Time Was* (Tor, 2018, 144 pp, £9.99)

Reviewed by David Murakami Wood (Queen's University, Ontario)

Recent years have seen a resurgence of time travel both as a theme in general and the time slip romance in particular, beginning with such works as Connie Willis's *Doomsday Book* (1992) and accelerated by the massive commercial success of Audrey Niffenegger's *The Time Traveler's Wife* (2003). At the same time, the novella is currently having a well-deserved revival both in and beyond sf, which might be connected both with social acceleration and a perceived lack of time to read, as well as the pervasiveness of e-readers. Ian

McDonald's *Time Was* combines both of these trends.

Any initial suspicions, however, of a purely commercial motive for *Time Was* subside very quickly. First of all, *Time Was* shares substantive sf themes, particularly in terms of quantum physics, with some of McDonald's other work, most notably *Brasyl* (2007). There's an element of Christopher Priest here too: while McDonald is not attempting any kind of pastiche, I was reminded of both *The Separation* (2002) and *The Adjacent* (2013), which have several similarities in terms of theme and setting. Secondly, while one cannot avoid seeing *Time Was* as at least partially rooted in the currently fashionable British nostalgia for the apparently simpler and more heroic times of World War Two, a nostalgia which the choice of cover art clearly plays into, the story itself is not a safely heterosexual time slip romance but a queer love story that also deals profoundly with what the soldier-poet, Wilfred Owen, called 'the pity of war',

A concern with gender is one thing shared by McDonald with the late Ursula K. Le Guin but the two have much else in common. For all its brevity, at the heart of *Time Was*, and indeed in McDonald's writing more generally, is something that defined Le Guin's sensibility and style: a subtle, mature and yet, at times, emotionally devastating treatment of love, loss and longing that only serves to mutually accentuate rather than detract from the progressive political concerns that motivate their fiction. The (so far) last published element of the Chaga sequence, *Tendeleo's Story* (2000), is also a novella and also features a powerful emotional depth in the characterization, and a pervasive sense of the loss and renewal of displacement. The displacement in *Tendeleo's Story* is that of the geopolitical refugee; *Time Was*, it is the result of lovers thrown apart by physics.

Finally, and most importantly of all, *Time Was* is beautifully written. McDonald has always been something of a stylist, yet at the same a writer for whom stylish writing appears effortless and unaffected. It is a mark of this rare facility that he also dares to introduce quirkier elements, even genuine comedy, into a romance of this nature, especially in a form like the novella, which leaves very little room for error. Yet McDonald does this with his portrayal both of second-hand booksellers and an unlikely band of East Anglian pagans, ufologists and heavy metal musicians, and without ever detracting from the achingly beautiful trans-temporal relationship at the centre of the book. About this central relationship, I will not say too much but it is written with a lightness of touch, full of implication and longing, and which the reader, like the lovers themselves, only experience in short, beautiful, fleeting moments scattered across the timespan of the novella. And, like the relationship, the novella ends all too soon leaving the reader with no option but to follow the entangled temporal circularity of the story and start all over again. *Time Was* is quite simply a lovely book. If it doesn't feature on the shortlists for best novella I will be sorely disappointed.

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Research Bursary Opportunity
Charles Chilton and *Journey into Space* (1953-1956)

Charles Chilton's BBC Radio science fiction programme *Journey into Space* was the last UK radio programme to attract a bigger evening audience than television. Broadcast in three series between 1953 and 1956, 'Operation Luna', 'The Red Planet' and 'The World in Peril', listening to *Journey into Space* was described in a BBC report to be a 'family occasion'. Chilton later wrote three best-selling novels and several comic strip stories based upon the radio series.

Chilton's collection of material relating to *Journey into Space* has recently been acquired by the University of Liverpool to augment its existing holdings and supplement the Science Fiction Foundation's collection, which is also maintained by the University. The unique collection includes original scripts, artwork, comic strips, press cuttings and BBC Contracts (see https://sca-archives.liverpool.ac.uk/Record/129793 for details of the holdings).

The Olaf Stapledon Centre for Speculative Futures is pleased to announce a research bursary opportunity in relation to this new acquisition. The £500 bursary is intended to cover appropriate accommodation and travel costs to enable the researcher to spend time in the archive. The proposed research should have some form of presentation and audience in mind, whether at a Con, an academic conference, an established fanzine, or an academic article in a relevant publication. We are especially interested in proposed research that:

- relates Chilton's work to the broader field of British sf production during the mid-twentieth century
- considers the representation of the 'future' in Chilton's work, and how it relates to other, comparable visions of the future
- uses the collection to examine the importance of media in relation to sf and/or visions of the future.
- explores the relationship between sf and its audiences through the collection.

Applicants for the bursary are requested to provide the following:

- An outline of proposed research (no more than two sides of A4, explaining the intended use of the collection, and where the research is intended to be published or presented).
- A CV (no more than two sides of A4).
- A justification of expenses (no more than one side of A4).

The application should be submitted to futures@liverpool.ac.uk by Thursday 31 October 2019. Informal enquiries can also be sent to this address, or to Phoenix Alexander (Phoenix.Alexander@liverpool.ac.uk) or Will Slocombe (W.Slocombe@liverpool.ac.uk).